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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the development of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF), from its foundation in 1993 to the Presidential election of 2008. The study begins with a 
discussion of the context of change for the CPRF in the post-Soviet world from the perspective of 
political transitions of other communist parties and their development in the post-Soviet world. The 
final years of the party’s predecessor, and that predecessor’s collapse contribute a sense of 
perspective to the party’s development and this is followed by a consideration of the need for 
ideological change in order to transform the party, the electorate’s support for the CPRF in recent 
parliamentary elections and the political views of members of a branch of the party with particular 
emphasis on the opinions of younger members: those who may be guiding the party’s development 
in the future. 
How does the transformation of the CPRF compare with that of other communist parties in 
the region? Organisational change, including the inheritance of political control and resources by 
former communist parties in some countries where they were in power, has greatly aided some 
parties in their return to government while the lack of such advantages has hindered others. The ban 
on the party in Russia adversely affected the unification of communists in Russia from 1991 to 1993 
while the CPRF’s counterparts in other countries faced no such difficulties. The electoral successes 
of other communist and former-communist parties serve to highlight the increased problems the 
CPRF faces after the splits the party has undergone in recent years. Ideological change across the 
post-communist world has been very varied in terms of moves towards social democracy, towards 
nationalism or the retention of a more orthodox communism depending on the local circumstances 
in individual countries.  
How has the legacy of the CPSU influenced the formation and development of the successor 
party? The origins of the CPRF can be seen in the divisions that formed in the CPSU in its final 
years. The scale of ideological change in the final years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
can be seen in the radical differences between the 1986 Party Programme and 1991 draft 
Programme. Documents from the era reveal a failure to understand the depth of the reaction against 
communism in Eastern Europe and what it could mean for the Soviet Union as well as concern 
about the effects of glasnost’ on support for the regime and the thinking behind attempts to use 
electoral change to increase the party’s legitimacy. These changes did not have the anticipated effect 
for the CPSU and resulted in the loss of party control over those elected and over electors with the 
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formation of platforms in the CPSU and parties outside the CPSU leading the way to the demise of 
the party. 
When the ideology a party represents appears to have been comprehensively rejected, how 
does that party reposition itself in the political landscape in order to survive? With the election of a 
new leader prepared to lead the party in a new direction, the CPRF has recast itself as a nationalist 
party that sees communism as a Russian tradition. Zyuganov’s repositioning of the party has been 
characterised by the acceptance of democracy, which has arguably kept the CPRF in the public eye 
as the party has been represented in every Duma since 1993, and the search for means of uniting 
various political groups under a broad ‘patriotic’ banner in order to return the party to power at the 
head of a coalition. Zyuganov’s reworking of communist theory includes a heavy reliance on 
geopolitics to argue for the re-establishment of the Soviet Union and support for the Russian 
Orthodox Church and Russian culture as cornerstones of the patriotic cause. 
Which members of the Russian electorate now define themselves as communist? The party’s 
relationship with the electorate is examined through the results of public opinion surveys conducted 
just after the 1999 and 2003 Duma elections to see what views communist voters hold in common 
and whether it is possible to determine what political opinions can be said to predict a vote for the 
CPRF. A CPRF supporter could be predicted to be older and with more strongly held political views 
than the average Russian citizen. As many previous studies have found, age is clearly one of the 
most significant factors in predicting support for the CPRF but this factor is outweighed in these 
surveys by party identification and ideological conviction. If a voter identified with a political party 
and an ideology, there was a greater probability that that voter supported the CPRF than any other 
political party.  
 Are members of the party able and willing to defend the change in direction of the party 
leadership? Interviews with members of the St Petersburg branch of the CPRF indicated that 
members were willing to accept the nationalist stance of the party as a temporary necessity to extend 
electoral support for the party. In view of the fact that party membership has fallen drastically in 
recent years, members were asked what was drawing them to join the CPRF or remain in the party 
when others had left. With an ageing and falling membership, the Komsomol is playing an 
important role by recruiting young people to the party. Members were asked for their views on the 
possibility of the party changing course and their attitudes to Zyuganov’s leadership. However, with 
support for the party from the electorate in decline, party members were divided about what they felt 
needed to change. 
 10 
 This thesis concludes that the party remains popular with a minority of voters who were 
impoverished by the transition and that the current strategies of democratic participation and a 
nationalist stance have been accepted by the membership as the achievement of communism is seen 
as a very distant prospect. The party, however, still believes that communism is inevitable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The fortunes of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have reflected those of 
Russia’s political and economic transition from 1991 onwards. There have been two phases of 
development in the post-communist era for the CPRF: advance under the Yeltsin regime while 
political parties proliferated and competed on a more even footing and the media was less restricted; 
and then decline under the Putin regime as the economy improved, the media came under increasing 
political pressure and the country moved towards a ‘managed democracy’. With its origins in the 
conservative faction that formed in the CPSU in its final years, the party had to find a new direction 
in a society that had just rejected communism but has the CPRF succeeded in leading the opposition 
or is it more interested in preserving its privileged position in parliament? Has it adopted the role of 
‘nominal opposition’ rather than fighting without compromise against restrictions imposed on 
opposition parties and society as a whole in order to avoid being excluded from the political 
process? 
 Traditional reasons for studying political parties have been the consideration of their role in 
bridging the gap between society and government in modern democracies,1 their importance for the 
functioning of parliaments in uniting politicians behind common policies and ideological goals, their 
organisation of the agenda of parliaments and their determination of parliamentary procedure.2 In 
Eastern Europe, the study of political parties and their development had the further significance, in 
the early years of the political transitions, of being used to determine the extent to which new party 
systems were truly pluralist.3 However, in Russia’s ‘managed democracy’ there are elections and a 
choice of parties but the choice of parties is determined by the elite’s manipulation of party 
alternatives through the creation of new parties designed to split existing ones and be loyal to the 
existing regime, resulting in the choice in elections being between party labels rather than policy 
alternatives.4 While the CPRF has presented the electorate with a clear set of policies, the party has 
struggled to remain distinct from other parties in recent years as others have also adopted a 
‘patriotic’ profile. 
                                                 
1
 Dellenbrant, J.  “Parties and Party Systems in Eastern Europe” in White, S., Batt, J. and Lewis, P. (eds) Developments 
in East European Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke, 1993, p.148 
2
 Olson, D. & Mezey, M., "Parliaments and Public Policy" in Olson, D. and Mezey, M. (eds) Legislatures in                                           
the Policy Process: The Dilemas of Economic Policy, CUP, Cambridge, 1991, pp.1-24. 
3
 Pridham, G.  “Political Parties and Their Strategies in the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: the Comparative 
Perspective” in Wightman, G. (ed.) Party Formation in East-Central Europe: Post-communist Politics in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995, p.1. 
4
 Golosov, G.  “The Structure of Party Alternatives and Voter Choice in Russia: Evidence from the 2003-2004 Regional 
Legislative Elections”, Party Politics, vol.12, no.6, 2006, p.721. 
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 Along with Yabloko and the LDPR, the CPRF is one of only three parties to contest every 
Duma election since 1993. Political parties in Russia are different from those in Western Europe 
because most parties have formed, merged, renamed, disappeared and reappeared under new names 
with great frequency in the early post-Soviet period, and to some extent they are still doing so. In 
this respect, the CPRF stands out for being very consistent. The CPRF, unlike many smaller parties, 
has a clear and fairly consistent programme and does not exist purely for the interests of its leaders, 
as some of the smaller parties have appeared to do, many parties being formed just before elections 
and disappearing soon afterwards. While the majority of Russian voters have no stable party or 
ideological identification5 CPRF voters, by contrast, have the strongest affiliation with their party of 
any group of voters. 
 Political parties are not static organisations, but change of ideology or of internal 
organisation, however, do not 'just happen'.6 While revolutions have changed the ideological 
orientation of the former ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe, ideological change in Western 
European parties has usually resulted, in recent times, from electoral defeat, leadership change and 
change of dominant faction within a party.7 For the CPRF, ideological change resulted in initial 
electoral success followed by decline as the political situation changed and the party was unable or 
unwilling to adapt while recent electoral defeats have led to splits rather than any re-evaluation of 
the party’s ideology or replacement of the current leadership.  
The fates of the former ruling communist parties have been very varied with some returning 
to power as social democratic parties and others remaining relatively unreformed. The successful 
adaptation of several of these parties has depended on whether the leadership before and during the 
political transition was composed of people prepared to sacrifice the ideology for which their party 
had existed and present the party as reformed.8 Such an outcome has been possible because, 
although these parties were generally considered to be strongly united organisations, they did 
contain several factions, some of which were already calling for change in the political system9 in 
the late 1980s. Along with the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, the CPRF is one of the 
                                                 
5
 Anohina, N. and Meleshkina, E.  “The Political Attitudes of Russian Voters” in Gel’man, V., Golosov, G. and 
Meleshkina, E. (eds.) The 1999–2000 National Elections in Russia: Analyses, Documents and Data, 2005b, Sigma, 
Berlin, 2005, p.123. 
6
 Harmel, R., Heo, U., Tan, A. & Janda, K.  “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: an Empirical 
Analysis” in West European Politics, vol.18, no.1, 1995, p.2 
7
 Harmel et al, 1995, p.1 
8
 Ishiyama, J.  “Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern 
Europe”, Comparative Politics, vol.27, no.2, 1995, p.148. 
9
 Waller, M.  “Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-
Democratization?” in Party Politics, vol.1, no.4, 1995(a), p.467. 
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least reformed communist parties in Eastern Europe. Both were banned after the fall of the Soviet 
Union but the CPRF has failed to achieve the levels of parliamentary representation of the CPRM 
due to the very different political and economic circumstances in Russia from those in Moldova. 
During the fifteen years’ existence of the CPRF, many articles and books have been 
published about the party. This thesis adds to the existing literature such as Urban and Solovei’s 
Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads and March’s The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia by 
considering how the political context for the party has changed in recent years. As the reach of 
democracy in Russia has diminished, so the CPRF has found its room for manoeuvre curtailed. As 
the CPRF has been forced to reach an accommodation with the new regime so as to avoid being 
forced out of existence, so its membership has declined and it has been obliged to accept funding 
from distinctly un-communist sources. In the light of the splits in the party that have occurred in 
recent years, this thesis complements the existing works by considering the future for a much 
diminished communist party in Russia. 
Chapter 1 discusses the context of change for the CPRF in the post-Soviet world, considering 
the other former communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in terms of 
organisational change, their inheritance from the previous regimes, which in some cases included 
the retention of political control and resources by former communist parties. The activity of 
communists in Russia from 1991 to 1993, during the ban, while waiting for a legal opportunity to 
found a successor party to the CPSU provides an indication of the determination of believers to keep 
hope of a communist future alive in the early post-Soviet era. However, the splits and divisions in 
the CPRF after the party repeatedly failed to win the Presidency show that democratic centralism 
can not deal permanently with frustration with the current leadership and electoral strategy. This 
discussion is followed by an analysis of the CPRF’s and others’ attempts to use coalitions as 
methods of returning to power and how ideological change across the post-communist world in 
terms of moves towards social democracy, towards nationalism or the retention of a more traditional 
communist outlook has benefited certain parties depending on the local political and economic 
circumstances. The evolution or disappearance of communist parties in Western Europe is also 
considered along with some discussion of the newer parties in Eastern Europe that formed or re-
formed at the end of the communist era as an indication of a general ideological shift towards the 
centre in recent times. 
The sharp fall in membership at the end of the communist era has been a major feature of 
organisational change for these parties as those on the right left parties that remained communist 
while those on the left deserted parties that moved towards social democracy. Whilst these parties 
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are now more united in terms of their members’ support for the ideology, further divisions still exist 
in many countries over the national composition of electoral alliances the parties have formed. There 
is notable variation across the Russian Federation in terms of allegiance to the CPRF leadership in 
Moscow and the electoral alliances forged with regional CPRF branches contesting elections in 
alliance with different parties across the country. Communist parties have endured as organisations 
but their goal now is to retain or regain power, rather than the violent overthrow of the existing 
political order. Across the region, communists are still in power but communism, in general, is not 
as former communist parties have become competent political actors in a multi-party environment. 
Chapter 2 looks at the final years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) using 
documents from the end of the communist era, the 1986 Programme and 1991 draft Programme to 
examine the events which shaped the formation of the CPRF. The effects of glasnost’ on the media 
and the Politburo’s reaction to the demise of communism in Eastern Europe are considered as well 
as electoral change in the Soviet Union as an attempt to increase the party’s legitimacy and the 
unintended consequences this had in terms of the loss of party control over those elected and over 
electors. These were major factors in the growth of open divisions in the party that led to the 
formation of platforms in the CPSU and the formation of parties outside the party. The battle 
between reformers and conservatives is illustrated well in the formation of a Communist Party of the 
RSFSR within the CPSU that was, effectively, the predecessor of the CPRF. Conservative concerns 
that were articulated via this party continue to be seen in today’s successor  
In considering the final years of the CPSU, this chapter makes use of Fond ’89 which 
includes a wide range of documents which are copies of papers held in the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation, the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern 
History and the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation. Documents in the 
collection reveal the nature of the changes in policy and the difficulties the party faced as it 
underwent reform from a revolutionary, vanguard party, designed to lead the proletariat eventually 
to communism, towards becoming a parliamentary party and from a socialist political and economic 
system towards a market economy. These documents also indicate the difficulties encountered by 
the party with respect to the unexpected results of electoral reform, the divided support within the 
leadership for democratisation and the inability on the part of some of the leadership to accept the 
loss of support for the party.  
Chapter 3 considers Zyuganov’s philosophy and its relationship to traditional Marxism and 
socialism. His writing is interesting in light of the fact that some of his pronouncements are directly 
opposite to what would normally be expected of a communist. Zyuganov’s plans for returning the 
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CPRF to power centre on the adoption of nationalism as a means of uniting various groups under a 
broad ‘communist’ banner. His argument for the restoration of the USSR is justified with 
geopolitical arguments about Russia’s ‘right’ to extend its borders outwards towards Europe in one 
direction and Asia in the other. This new direction is based on the merging of communist and 
nationalist theories and the unification of traditionally left-wing and traditionally right-wing ideas in 
Zyuganov’s writing replaces calls for the unification of the working classes across national 
boundaries with calls for saving the nation from catastrophe. It is this move towards more nationalist 
policies that Zyuganov sees as making the party electable. 
This shift in philosophy also accommodates religious belief in the form of Russian Orthodox 
Christianity, as support for Russia’s national church is vital if claims of patriotism are to be 
believed. To convince his readers, Zyuganov now argues that communism and Christianity are 
compatible and that both are part of the ‘Russian tradition’. He now dates the emergence of the 
communist idea as far back as the birth of the Christian era, with which he claims it is linked, rather 
than to the publication of the Communist Manifesto in 1848. The defence of Russian culture forms 
part of Zyuganov’s attack on the media and the internet for what he sees as their bias against 
traditional Russian culture and promotion of Western values in a conspiracy with the government 
against true patriots. In recent years, Zyuganov has expanded his theories to include linking 
international terrorism to a new ‘Coalition against Capitalism’ as he now sees Islamic countries as 
natural allies in a battle with the West against globalisation. In common with other left-wing parties, 
the CPRF has also belatedly adopted environmentalism in an attempt to attract younger members. 
Chapter 4 discusses the party’s relationship with the electorate through an analysis of 
surveys conducted just after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 Duma elections. Using the New Russia 
Barometer VIII, New Russia Barometer XII and New Russia Barometer XVI, the chapter examines 
which indicators of communist support have changed between these elections by considering 
support for communist ideology, ages of voters in comparison with support for the CPRF, economic 
status, support for the restoration of the USSR and the influence of the media. A logistic regression 
analysis of those factors that were shown to most influence support for the CPRF indicates to what 
extent they can predict whether a vote will be cast for the CPRF. All surveys included questions on 
employment, followed by sections asking respondents’ opinions on economic matters, politics, 
voting and parties, views of life, international relations and social structure. This chapter looks at the 
support of the electorate for the CPRF and its policies and assesses the level of support for the party 
before Putin was elected President to that after his election: an event which has clearly had an 
impact on the communist vote.  
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 Parties have very limited influence in Russia as a result of the political system adopted in the 
1993 constitution. While parties may claim to act on behalf of social groups, they have very little 
power to effect changes on those groups’ behalf as the strong powers granted to the president are not 
subject to party control and parties have very limited ability to influence government policy.10 How 
then does an opposition party like the CPRF retain support? Various studies have shown that age, 
economic status, occupational status and residence in smaller towns or rural areas are significant 
factors in voters deciding to vote for the CPRF. Bearing these studies and their sometimes 
contradictory findings in mind, the analysis in this chapter compares the communist vote in the 1999 
Duma election with that in 2003 and 2007 and finds that communist voters are not, in fact, the most 
severely disadvantaged people in Russian society. 
Chapter 5 analyses interviews with members of the St Petersburg branch of the CPRF. The 
development of the branch in St Petersburg from the ban to July 2003. Views on social democracy 
and the party’s adoption of patriotism as well as attitudes to Zyuganov’s leadership and the current 
election strategy. What motivates today’s members of the CPRF? Are they long-term supporters of 
communism and former members of the CPSU or are they new converts to the cause? Are the 
majority older citizens or are younger voters joining the party, as the leadership claims? Has the 
social composition of the party changed? Does the party have an active membership or are members 
generally passive? How much influence do rank-and-file members have on decision-making within 
the party and has their influence grown in comparison with what it was in the CPSU?  
 This chapter also considers the relationship of the party to its youth organisation and the 
differences in the ‘reformation’ of the two organisations. As it was possible to interview a number of 
young Komsomol members this chapter also includes a discussion of the future direction of the 
party as the younger members will be leading the party through any changes in policy and ideology 
in years to come. This chapter asks whether there is any sense of members wanting to move towards 
social democracy or back to revolutionary tactics and whether there is a full acceptance of 
democratic means of attaining power. 
By way of limitations, this thesis does not include a discussion of the CPRF’s work in the 
State Duma and on specific legislative questions due to reasons of space and also due to the party’s 
now limited ability to influence such legislation. Neither is internal organisation dealt with here in 
detail, in part as several other, published, texts have covered this area and in part as responses to 
questions put to activists in the party on internal change for Chapter 5 indicated that little change 
                                                 
10
 Pammett, J. & DeBardeleben, J.  “Citizen Orientations to Political Parties in Russia”, Research Note, Party Politics, 
vol. 6, no.3, 2000, p.374. 
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had taken place. Potential rivals to Zyuganov for the leadership and the various splits that have 
occurred are dealt with only briefly as are the different factions within the party as Zyuganov has 
succeeded in remaining leader despite numerous challenges over the years and factions that have left 
the CPRF have notably failed to challenge the party significantly at subsequent elections. The main 
threats to the CPRF now come from groups that never belonged to the party. 
Finally, the conclusion looks at prospects for the future of the party and finds that the party 
remains popular with a minority of voters who have been impoverished by the transition. While the 
adoption of patriotism has been popular with the electorate, this change in the party’s strategy has 
not been enough for the party to retain, never mind extend its support. The party has clearly failed 
since its early electoral successes to move with the times and adapt its policies and tactics to deal 
with the changing political situation, in particular the adoption of patriotic rhetoric by United Russia 
and other parties. While communism has not been abandoned altogether, it is now seen as a very 
distant future aim. Members appear to have accepted democratic elections but see the current 
ideology as a necessary compromise.  
 18 
CHAPTER 1 
THE CPRF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POST-SOVIET WORLD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) survived its counterparts in Central and 
Eastern Europe by almost two years beyond the 1989 revolutions but its successor, the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), whilst returning to the political scene in 1993 with 
considerable support from the electorate, has seen its appeal decline in recent years. The fates of the 
former ruling parties have been very varied with some returning to power as social democratic 
parties and others remaining relatively unreformed. After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe 
in 1989 ex-communist parties have been “faced with the necessity of altering themselves from 
essentially instruments of social, economic and political control into electorally competitive 
parties”.11 Most have broadly achieved this and been re-elected in democratic elections as either 
communists, socialists, social democrats or democrats, overcoming the initial communist/anti-
communist political cleavage that so strongly divided the early post-communist societies of Eastern 
Europe. 
The diversity in outcomes for former communist parties across the post-communist space 
has been considerable with some, such as the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 
remaining a communist party while the Hungarian Socialist Party adopted social democracy. The 
CPRF, by comparison, has retained much of its communist rhetoric while adopting a patriotic 
stance. The parties’ successful adaptation has depended largely on whether the leadership before and 
during the political transition was composed of reformers prepared to sacrifice the ideology for 
which their party had existed and present the party as reformed.12 This has been possible for many 
because, although these parties were generally considered to be strongly united organisations, they 
did contain several factions, some of which advocated reform of the political system.13 Further 
issues which dictated the success or failure of the communist parties in the early post-communist era 
were to what extent they retained control over the resources, in particular property and media, that 
they had commanded during communist rule and as well as a preparedness to negotiate during the 
                                                 
11
 Ishiyama, J.  “Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of  Democratization in Eastern 
Europe”, Comparative Politics, vol. 27, no 2, 1995, p.148. 
12
 ibid. 
13
 Waller, M.  “Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of  Social-
Democratization?” in Party Politics, vol. 1, no 4, 1995(a), p.467. 
 19 
transition period and a willingness to sacrifice democratic centralism has served many formerly 
communist parties well. 
This chapter considers the CPRF in the context of political change across the former 
communist world, looking at organisational continuity and ideological change among the 
communist successor parties of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as their 
electoral successes, the coalitions they have formed and the splits and divisions that have hampered 
progress for some. The communist and social democratic parties of Western Europe are also 
considered briefly as part of the context of ideological change on the left in recent decades as is the 
competition the communist successor parties face from new parties in Eastern Europe, the 
similarities between changes in Eastern Europe and those in Western Europe in terms of increased 
media influence on elections, declining party membership, lack of trust in parties and the rise of the 
far right are also considered. However, it is the specific context for the CPRF in Russia’s ‘managed 
democracy’ (where there are elections and a choice of parties but the choice is determined by the 
elite’s manipulation of party alternatives)14 that has determined an outcome unlike that for any other 
successor party. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTINUITY 
Various arguments about what determines the outcome of political transition for the former 
communist parties have been suggested, including the actions of former communist party 
leaderships at the time of the revolutions, the nature of the individual transitions and the nature of 
the previous communist regimes themselves. All these factors appear to be relevant when discussing 
the development of former ruling parties in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In Poland 
and Hungary, where the former regime had already implemented reforms to pacify a potentially 
powerful anti-communist uprising, the parties were able to discard their old ideologies quickly and 
adopt a social democratic programme,15 while in Russia, hardliners were the dominant force during 
the formation of the post-Soviet party, a year and a half after the end of communist rule. Although 
the CPSU had been in the process of reforming the economy, the factions in favour of reform left 
the party, to found other political movements rather than trying to turn the CPSU into a party of the 
centre left.  
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Lipsett and Rokkan ask which conflicts came first (within a national community) and which 
came later as a means of defining political parties and party systems.16  What replaced these 
cleavages after independence from the Soviet Union? Which conflicts came first and which came 
later? Which ones proved temporary and which ones secondary?17 In Russia, the communist/ anti-
communist cleavage remains while this cleavage in the other republics of the former Soviet Union 
has remained in some and been replaced in others with a pro-Russia/anti-Russia cleavage with the 
division following similar lines to the pro-European (or pro-Western) versus pro-American views. 
Cleavages along ethnic lines have also become durable in some former Soviet Republics. 
Writing of the ethnoregionalist parties of the European Union, De Winter and Gomez-Reino 
Cachafeiro note that “European integration strikes at the heart of the cleavage (the ethno-territorial 
or centre-periphery cleavage on which this party family is grounded, i.e. the 
empowerment/disempowerment of higher levels of decision-making in the centre and the regional 
periphery).”18 In a study encompassing 21 states, Tossutti notes that the empirical evidence shows 
how cultural and territorial identities have not just been able to withstand the pressure towards 
international standardisation but to thrive in such circumstances. Since 1945, 197 new ethnic, 
religious and regional political parties have been established in 21 Western countries. While the 
CPSU attempted to impose a degree of standardisation on the USSR in the interests of ideology and 
economic progress, here also, ethnic and territorial identity became a driving force towards 
independence19 and it was this centre-periphery cleavage that accelerated the demise of the CPSU. 
The suspension of the activity of the Communist Party of the RSFSR imposed by Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin on 23rd August 1991 was followed by a ban on the party’s activity on 6th 
November that year as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activity of the CPSU across 
the Soviet Union. Communists appealed to the Constitutional Court to overturn the ban on the party 
and the court suggested that former party leaders Mikhail Gorbachev, V. A. Ivashko and Valentin 
Kuptsov should represent the CPSU but Gorbachev and Ivashko declined, leaving Kuptsov, who had 
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become leader of the CP RSFSR just two weeks before the coup, to defend the party.20 The CPSU 
by this time had split into its national components, which each took different political directions. 
The day after the ban on the CP RSFSR came into effect was the anniversary of the October 
Revolution and tens of thousands of people voluntarily marched through the streets of major 
Russian cities to mark the event rather than out of requirement, as in previous years.21 Within days 
of the ban coming into effect, activists were organising various new communist parties. The Russian 
Communist Workers’ Party was formed in November 1991 in Yekaterinburg by 500 delegates to the 
founding congress, of whom only 16 were workers, although the party declared that it should have a 
working-class membership.22 The Russian Party of Communists was established at a congress in 
Zheleznodorozhe outside Moscow in December 1991 by the centrists of the co-ordinating council of 
the Marxist Platform in the CPSU and was attended by delegates from St Petersburg, Chelyabinsk 
and Ryazan. The Socialist Workers’ Party was founded in autumn 1991, and the All-Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which held its founding congress in St Petersburg with delegates 
from across the former Soviet Union, was established in September 1991.23  
In late 1992, the Constitutional Court found that the ban on the CPSU and the CP RSFSR 
had been legal but not the ban on the primary party organisations. Effectively, the party was able to 
rebuild itself from its grass-roots, some branches of which had still been functioning long after the 
ban (such as the branch in St Petersburg, discussed in Chapter 5) and so were well placed to 
recommence work. The CPRF declared itself the linear successor to the CP RSFSR at its founding 
congress which it designated the Second Extraordinary Congress of the party24 in February 1993 and 
elected Gennady Zyuganov as leader so indicating a decisive shift in direction to attract nationalists 
to the communist cause. During the ban Zyuganov was elected chairman of a revived co-ordinating 
council of People’s Patriotic Forces of Russia, took part in the right-wing Russian National 
Assembly as one of its co-chairmen, and in 1992 he helped to found and became a co-chairman of, 
the National Salvation Front.25 He has been described as a “shrewd political organiser and adept 
propagandist”26 and “a compromiser intent on gaining power within the system first and then 
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changing it by means of the system’s own institutions”.27 His leadership of the party in the early 
post-Soviet period resulted in a degree of success in uniting the ‘patriotic left’ but such unity is 
becoming more elusive. 
The party aimed to unite many of the various groups that had been formed during the ban 
and the wish for unity for its own sake amongst communists has been described as a greater catalyst 
for unity rather than the threat of democratic competition28 due to the long history of democratic 
centralism in the party. However, unity has not been total as several small communist parties to the 
left of the CPRF remained separate from the main successor party and in recent years, those on the 
right of the CPRF have begun to leave to form separate parties. Also, regional organisations of the 
party were sometimes slow to join the CPRF, such as the branches in Tatarstan and Yakutia which 
only joined the main organisation in 1997.29 However, the party leadership in Tatarstan also split in 
1997 with only the minority remaining loyal to Moscow.30 The party did, however, succeed in 
uniting those who had been waiting for the legal possibility to form a successor to the CPSU, such 
as many of the early members of the CPRF who had been members of the Russian Communist 
Workers’ Party (RCWP) during the ban (discussed further in Chapter 5).  
Changes to the legal status of political parties in Russia over the years since the end of CPSU 
rule have been substantial. The registration of new parties began in 1991 when many only had a few 
hundred members. Parties were to have to goals of participation in elections and government, a 
programme which should be published and the right to nominate candidates and campaign on their 
behalf.31 Parties at this point needed 100,000 signatures to participate in Duma elections.32 In 1993, 
proportional representation was introduced as an incentive to stimulate party participation in the 
elections and party development.33 While elections in the early 1990s were determined by the 
electorate, under Putin, they became more predictable, less competitive and so less meaningful. 
Changes that Putin has made to the political system have made Russian politics less pluralist and 
contributed to the decreasing significance of elections for Russian politics.34 In December 2004, 
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President Putin signed amendments to the law on political parties, the main innovation of which was 
to raise the minimum number of members for each party to 50,000 across Russia. More than half of 
the regional branches must have no fewer than 500 members each, while the remainder of the 
regional branches should have a minimum of 250 members each. Parties had until 1st January 2006 
to comply with the new rules. If they failed to reach these levels of membership, they were to have 
another year to make the transition from a political party to a public association.35 This now clearly 
threatens the survival of the CPRF. 
Across the post-Soviet world, the relatively high membership of the reformed communist 
parties, in comparison with their new competitors, their assets in terms of finance and property, and 
their nationwide organisation show that they are still effectively traditional mass parties.36 This 
contrasts with the new type of party that their competitors formed in the early post-communist era 
due to lack of resources, comparatively few members and changes in the way elections were fought. 
However, former communist parties are now losing their advantage in terms of mass membership 
and the CPRF attracted few entirely new members to begin with, the vast majority having been 
former CPSU members.37 
Whilst the former communist parties were discredited as a result of their previous monopoly 
on power, they did, however, have skills that they could transfer to the new political order. Some 
had negotiated their way through the transition and some had initiated reforms so could plausibly 
claim to be committed to democracy and declare their competence to govern.38 There was far less 
change in Romania and Bulgaria than in Hungary and Poland, for example, as the parties were never 
forced out of power so were not obliged to develop new and responsive programmes. Instead they 
were able to offer material incentives to their supporters in order to secure votes.39 
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) remained in control with a coup from within. As the 
party had co-opted dissenting groups in the past and also previously initiated limited reforms, the 
successor party had a number of experienced politicians from various backgrounds who were able to 
assume leadership of the new party.40 The BSP did not dissolve and kept its membership and 
changed its name by referendum of the membership and the new party retained its predecessor’s 
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property, state resources and control of the media. Similarly, in Romania the communist party 
remained in power via a ‘palace coup’ by communist and military officials. The National Salvation 
Front (NSF), as the successor organisation was known, also retained control of the state 
administration and media and the property of the Romanian Communist Party.41 In Albania, the 
communist party also remained in power and there was no change of leadership and the party did 
not reform and so kept its membership,42 only changing its name in June 1991 from the Albanian 
Party of Labour to the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA).43  
The BSP tried to keep part of the legacy of its communist predecessor which can be seen in 
the continuity of its leadership, social base and organisation. It faced a very weak opposition at the 
end of 1989 and the party was able to take a leading role in the reform process by organising the 
Round Table talks in early 1990 which led to the first phase of democratisation. The party contained 
sufficient reformers to initiate the necessary organisational and ideological changes that would 
enable the gradual social-democratisation of the party. There were internal struggles as different 
factions disputed the path of transformation the party was following but the leadership managed to 
avoid any splits and the party won an absolute majority in the first post-communist elections in 
1990.44 Many of its supporters from before the transition are still prepared to vote for the party. It 
has over 300,000 members and 10,000 branches throughout the country, despite a post-communist 
ban on work-place organisation.45 
Like the CPRF, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was reformed in 1993 and soon 
became the largest party in the country and is one of the most unreconstructed successor parties.46 
The CPU calls for social and public ownership of property, nationalisation and collective farming.47 
During the ban on the party’s activity, those more inclined to compromise joined the Socialist Party 
of Ukraine set up in October 1991 along with those waiting for the CPU to be reformed.48 Others 
formed small far left parties.49 The CPU sees itself as a continuation of the old party and calls for the 
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voluntary restoration of the USSR.50 It remains loyal to the memory of the CPSU and defends the 
Soviet Union in nationalist terms, avoiding specifically Ukrainian nationalism and, from a 
nationalist perspective, supports the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.51  
In Poland, when the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) coalition was formed in July 1991, it 
included various trade unions and left wing parties.52 Much of the property of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PUWP) was confiscated but the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDPR) 
managed to retain some buildings in which the party set up offices and much of the funds of the 
previous party.53  The party also had state funds that were allocated to political parties and was able 
to rely upon membership dues and funds donated by West European social democratic parties. The 
SDPR may not have had much more money than its new, non-communist competitors but it did 
build a better infrastructure early in the post-communist era and the party was also able to rely upon 
members to deliver leaflets and campaign for candidates.54 
The Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) did not have its assets confiscated as it donated 90 
percent of them to the state in 199055 while in Czechoslovakia, the party and its successor in 
Slovakia were required to hand over all their funds. In Bulgaria, the BSP also fared better and was 
able to put its financial resources into new companies and so avoid losing its assets in the 
transition.56 The retention by former communist parties of financial and organisational assets from 
before the revolutions is significant because it is these resources that gave them considerable 
advantages over their new competitors in elections in the early post-Soviet era. 
The HSP has a strong continuity of personnel with its predecessor, especially among the 
leadership57 however, the rank and file members had to actively join the new party.58 Although it is 
a strongly united party, it has been the diversity of opinion tolerated within the HSP that has enabled 
it to attract a broad range of voters. While there was internal debate within the party, the leadership 
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kept control of party policy59 and maintained strong party discipline in the parliament, in 
comparison with the new parties.60 While the Workers’ Party was the ideological successor to the 
old communist party, the HSP was its legal successor which meant that the HSP has the former 
party’s assets.61 Members of the HSP had generally been members of the communist predecessor 
and were mostly middle class, urban, educated and older than voters for other parties in the early 
post-communist era and voters for the HSP tended to be former communist party members or had 
relatives who had been members.62  
The HSP is also considered to be closer in the composition of its membership to a social 
democratic party based on the new middle classes, as in Western Europe, than a typical workers’ 
party.63 The party also managed to appeal to manual workers, pensioners, public-sector employees 
and pensioners in the 1994 election by promising more social protection along with gradual reform 
but without losing the votes of the middle class.64 The HSP spent its time in opposition defending 
the interests of the working classes in an attempt to broaden its support and reduce the support for 
the smaller left-wing parties. 65 The party also maintained a strong presence in the countryside and 
small towns, unlike the newer parties66 which has enabled the party to remain a truly national party 
rather than one based largely in the capital. 
The Central Asian branches of the CPSU have followed very similar paths since 1991. The 
parties largely kept the old ideology and symbols of communist rule along with the former parties’ 
leaders and members.67 In all the Central Asian republics, except Kyrgyzstan, the Soviet-era 
leadership remained in power with the former communist party first secretaries becoming the new 
presidents and establishing authoritarian regimes.68 The communist parties did not disappear in spite 
of the ban imposed after the coup and remained mass parties that continued to run their respective 
countries69 while the new communist parties that have been formed by people still committed to 
communist ideology are very small. At the last congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan in 
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December 1991, the party renamed itself the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan. The new party 
adopted new policies but it has not changed its style of rule and is the only legal party in the 
country.70 There was a similar change in Uzbekistan where the Communist Party of Uzbekistan 
became the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan71 and retained the structure, membership and 
party functionaries (of the CPSU) and methods of work.72  
In Kazakhstan, the former communist party renamed itself the Socialist Party and became 
one of the largest in the country but in October 1991, the Kazakhstan Communist Party was also 
reconstituted by members who had not agreed to the renaming and change in direction. The former 
communist party supported market reforms while the refounded communist party opposed them. In 
Kyrgyzstan the communist party was also reconstituted in 1992 as the Party of Communists of 
Kyrgyzstan (PCK) and enjoyed fairly broad support.73 It attacked the government’s economic 
reforms and called for a return to state control of key sectors of the economy and for regulation of 
prices. The party still has a nationwide network of members and is supported by industrial workers, 
pensioners, war veterans and some of the urban intelligentsia but not by young voters.74 In 
Tajikistan the communist party was reconstituted in 1992 but reformers failed in their attempts to 
change the party. Nevertheless, it remains popular and is the largest and best organised party, 
however, the ruling party is the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan which has a similar 
programme to that of the new communist party.75  
As a result of the ban, the CPRF had to re-register members. The problem of declining 
membership led the Third Congress of the party to lower the minimum age for membership from 18 
to 16 and the number of years a sponsor of a new candidate must have known the candidate from 
three years to one.76 Whilst initially the largest party in Russia, the CPRF has since been overtaken 
by United Russia in terms of size of membership. The leader of United Russia, Boris Gryzlov, 
declared in Moscow in March 2006 that the party had over 1 million members.77 CPRF membership 
in 2006 stood at 184,000 members, having lost 21,000 members in 2005 and gained only 9,800. 
With over 48 percent of members over 60 and the average age of CPRF members at 58, the party 
could soon have a problem as 50,000 members are now required by law in order for a party to 
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exist.78 This is a problem also faced by the Communist Party of Ukraine which was overtaken in 
terms of membership and size by the United Social Democrats in the late 1990s.79 In common with 
many other communist parties in the region, members are generally retired and many are 
unemployed.80 
The Czech communist party did not ask its members to re-register. The membership of the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM), like that of many former communist parties, is 
composed largely of retired people and as a result of difficulties in attracting younger members, the 
membership is declining. 81 In Slovakia, the Slovak part of the former communist party was not 
formally dissolved but members were required to register as members of the new party in the hope 
that more orthodox members would not join the now social-democratic Party of the Democratic Left 
(PDL).82 By comparison, communist successor parties in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia 
generally have larger memberships than their competitors and these memberships are spread more 
widely across the republics than those of the newer parties. They also inherited the property of the 
old communist parties so are better equipped than their competitors.83 
Those in East Germany who had joined the communist party for career purposes and 
hardline communists left the party at the end of the communist era, along with many industrial 
workers. A vast majority of the members, most of whom were members of the old party, support the 
new left-socialist leadership.84 They are generally old and concentrated among the intelligentsia in 
former East Germany with around 90 percent having been members of the communist predecessor 
and around four fifths of the membership over 60 yet the party is still the largest in East Germany.85 
However, the profile of those who vote for the PDS is quite different from that of the members as 
the party draws electoral support almost equally from different age groups. Also, East Germans who 
vote for the PDS are generally better educated than those who vote for other parties and a larger 
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proportion of white-collar workers support the party than blue-collar workers and the party also 
benefits from the support of the unemployed.86 
Many new political parties have come into existence in Eastern Europe and Russia since the 
end of communist rule and nearly as many have disappeared again. This was a widely expected 
development as a result of the transition from authoritarianism towards liberal democracy.87 Another 
common theme throughout Eastern Europe despite the proliferation of parties, was the deep distrust 
of political parties as a result of the decades of one-party control of society.88 The word ‘party’ was 
associated with oppression to such an extent that many new political groupings in the early post-
communist era chose to call themselves by other names: ‘movement’ and ‘union’ occurring 
frequently.  
 The new parties in Eastern Europe are generally ‘cadre’ parties consisting of a small number 
of leaders in parliament and the presidential offices rather than the mass parties characteristic of 
Western Europe.89 While these new parties lack the identifiable social base of traditional West 
European parties, it is shared cultural identities that unite these ‘elite parties of professionals’ and 
those who vote for them in elections, rather than a clear ideology or set of socio-economic 
interests.90 Parties representing ethnic minorities, such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
representing the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, are the most obvious exception to the vague, mass-
appeal cadre parties as they tend to have clearly defined constituencies, whereas the ‘cadre’ parties 
do not.91 
New parties in Eastern Europe had been expected to develop in the same way as those in 
western democracies but they are developing in very different circumstances from those in which 
western parties developed. The ‘cadre’ model is very suitable for the new parties of Eastern Europe 
as it solves the problem of representing social and economic groups while these groups and their 
social values are still evolving. 92 If parties are directing their appeals to the electorate as a whole 
rather than to any specific group, they will not be limiting the level of support they may receive. 
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This tactic has been described as a source of continuity with the East European “tradition of the 
ruling party” with activists from the old regime continuing political participation in the new regime 
in new parties.93 
The large membership of mass parties is not needed by these new parties as the party elite 
communicates with and mobilises its supporters via the mass media instead of through the more 
traditional channels of the party’s organisation and membership.94 Instead, the active membership 
often consists of little more than the professional political elite of the party at a national and local 
level.95 In Hungary up to 1994, for example, the parties with the largest mass membership were 
often also those with the lowest electoral support, having their base in particular sectors of society 
rather than appealing to the electorate as a whole (the HSP was a notable exception). The most 
popular party in Hungary during 1992 and 1993, the Alliance of Young Democrats, had the smallest 
active membership of all the major parties.96 A system based on such parties can be described as an 
elite democracy as opposed to the classical mass democracy as these parties are not democratically 
run or controlled by their members, but by a small group of professional party managers able to 
manipulate the decision-making processes.97  
Organisational development was slow to take place in Bulgaria with the establishment of 
stable national and local organisations and branches only achieved by the BSP by 1996.98 Anti-
communism was the unifying aim of all the early opposition groups in Bulgaria but this unity only 
lasted until the first free elections of 1990.99 However, the anti-communist opposition was led 
largely by former communists. This situation arose because there was no long tradition of opposition 
to the regime in Bulgaria as there had been in most other East European countries, the Bulgarian 
Communist Party having enjoyed a greater degree of legitimacy than many of its counterparts 
abroad. Opposition, to a large extent, came from reform communists within the party. These people 
went on to lead some of the most anti-communist parties and even replaced the leaders of some new 
parties who had been victimised by the communist regime.100 
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In Eastern Europe, among newly-formed political parties, a failure to unite where different 
parties have had similar ideologies has been a common theme but with parties remaining “important 
for recruiting members to parliament and ministers in government but in many respects they seem to 
be a declining force”.101 Another common occurrence throughout Eastern Europe since the end of 
communist rule is that either supposedly national parties do not have branches throughout the 
country, sometimes with none outside the capital at all, or the coalitions that they join are not 
uniform in all regions of the country.  
There has also been a change in the electorate as the working class shrinks and therefore a 
loss of old constituencies in the East. While party membership has fallen in both Eastern and 
Western Europe in recent decades, parties continue to rely on their membership levels at least to 
give the impression that they are mass parties and so present an image of being a legitimate channel 
for representation due to the size of their support from the electorate.102 In Eastern Europe, amongst 
the newer parties, the battle was more for votes than for members with those parties which failed to 
attract votes in the founding elections subsequently disappearing. In Hungary, the party survival rate 
in the late 1990s was 90%; in Poland it was 72% but in Russia the party survival rate was only 
53%.103  
The opposition to the ‘idea of party’ seen in the formation of many political groups in 
Eastern Europe that refused to use the word ‘party’ in their name and tried to find alternative forms 
of organisation, through collective leadership, for example, can also be seen in various social 
movements in Western Europe. The Greens in Austria, as in some other countries, see themselves as 
the ‘antithesis’ of traditional parties. They try to avoid use of the term ‘party’, they do not require 
formal membership or payment of a fixed membership fee but that ‘participants’ believe in the 
Greens’ goals and will actively campaign for them and there is a strong emphasis on internal party 
democracy.104 
As in Eastern Europe, there has been a decline in party membership in most countries in 
Western Europe but many parties still rely on membership numbers to maintain the impression of 
being mass parties and also for legitimacy as political actors.105 Anti-party feeling in the West is 
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often led by a sense that while “the parties may become more privileged, they also become more 
remote.”106 The emergence of ‘anti-party’ politics is one of the most significant changes in party 
politics to take place in the West in recent years. Its defining features are a growing scepticism about 
the integrity and honesty of politicians and those associated with the party in central office; the 
attempt to mobilise opposition to all established alternatives, as they are seen to have failed; and the 
emergence of new extreme right wing forces in most Western democracies as a result of a slow 
down in economic growth and the perceived inability of policy-makers to make any significant 
changes in an internationally determined economic order together with increased racism.107 
 The French National Front, the National Alliance in Italy, the Republicans in Germany and 
other parties have benefited greatly in elections from this rising tide of racial intolerance.108 There 
have been new parties set up which have combined a racist agenda with regionalism, anti-politics 
and opposition to taxation policies. Similarly to the Greens, these parties have often “constructed 
themselves in opposition to the existing parties and the wider model of party politics that the 
dominant parties represent”.109 One of the characteristics of party politics in France in recent years 
has been the decline in the ability of long-established parties to mobilise voters. Challenges to these 
parties include emergence of small parties and protest groups, the huge loss of members to these 
groups and the growth of dissidence in the ranks of the larger parties.110 ‘Quality of life’ or ‘post-
material’ issues, those of ecology, feminism and pacifism seem to have cut across traditional 
political and economic cleavages and greatly contributed to an erosion of the established bases of 
party support.111 The Social Democratic Party in Germany lost many members to the Greens in the 
1980s. It was argued by party activists that these people, supporting environmentalist, pacifist and 
feminist concerns had felt under-represented in a party tightly controlled by leaders who had little 
interest in these issues.112 
Organisational changes in political parties in Western Europe have included the 
professionalisation of the work of the party in central office. This is now being carried out by 
consultants instead of party bureaucrats and activists, as in the past.113 Electorates have also become 
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more socially and culturally homogenous and less controllable by parties and it is this that has led 
largely to recent organisational changes. As television became central to political competition, it 
changed parties’ electoral campaigns and their organisation with the mass media driving parties 
towards personalised campaigns, which have become candidate-centred as well as issue-
orientated.114 By contrast, in Russia the CPRF relies heavily on its members to spread the 
communist message via door to door campaigning even though other parties in Russia rely mainly 
on the media. Reliance on this rather old fashioned form of campaigning is likely to be a problem 
for the party as its membership is in decline. The media have also been dominated by United Russia, 
the new ‘party of power’ so the CPRF has had little choice in its campaign methods. 
Between the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, communist parties in 
Western Europe were represented in many governments. They enjoyed their greatest levels of 
support at this time as a result of their participation in the wartime resistance movements. However, 
this (limited) support for socialism faded with the onset of the Cold War115 and as a consequence, 
some communist parties decided to assert their independence from Moscow, the first being the 
Danish Communist Party in 1958.116  While the 1989 and 1991 revolutions in Eastern Europe and 
Russia were also major catalysts for change in the West European communist parties, an attempt to 
regain support had been made in the late 1970s with ‘Eurocommunism’. ‘Eurocommunism’ 
represented a break with the past as those parties that took this route opted for democratic practices 
over revolutionary means to achieve socialism. The November 1975 Rome declaration of the Italian 
and French communist parties accepted the “democratic functioning of the State, the plurality of 
political parties, the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, ... the free formation of 
majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating democratically”.117 This acceptance 
of elections and democracy did not take place in the CPRF until 1993, with the election of 
Zyuganov. 
 In Italy, opposition to the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 had lead to increasing 
criticism of the Soviet Union by the Italian Communist Party (ICP) and by the mid 1970s, the idea 
of political pluralism became acceptable.118 The ICP lost over 2.3 million votes in national elections 
between 1970 and 1989. Of particular concern to the ICP was the loss of support among young 
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voters and in the areas that had traditionally supported the party in central Italy and in the northern 
cities where the industrial working class was concentrated. The decline in support was largely 
attributable to the party’s failure to adapt its programme and take into account the economic changes 
which had resulted in a smaller working class.119 The ICP was voted out of existence by the 
delegates to its twentieth Congress in 1991 and a Democratic Party of the Left was approved in its 
place.120 Individual liberty, democracy, the environment and women’s rights featured prominently in 
the new party’s statutes whereas references to Marx, Lenin, the class struggle and the overthrow of 
capitalism were absent.121 Such references are also very few in CPRF documents. 
 Communist Refoundation was formed in Italy a few weeks after the dissolution of the ICP. 
One opinion holds that this is a new communist party and the other holds that it is a more orthodox 
remnant of the old ICP. The leaders of Communist Refoundation were pro-Soviet members of the 
old ICP so the image of the party is somewhat tarnished122 but not so tarnished that it could not hold 
power as a junior partner in a coalition government and bring that government down, in 1998, 
through the withdrawal of its support. Massimo D’Alema, the leader of Democratic Party of the 
Left, the largest party in parliament, became the new Prime Minister, as head of a new coalition 
including the newly formed Party of Italian Communists,123 a break-away group from Communist 
Refoundation.124 
 ‘The British Road to Socialism’, which rejected revolution for change by legal and 
democratic means, was the attempt by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1951 to 
replace Lenin’s ‘State and Revolution’ with a set of policies more in tune with post-war opinion in 
Britain.125 However, neither Marxism-Leninism nor democratic-centralism were rejected in this 
document which proposed parliamentary and extra-parliamentary change instead of revolution.126 Of 
those who left the CPGB, the Marxist-Leninists formed the New Communist Party in 1977 and 
militant industrialists formed the Communist Party of Britain in 1987.127 By 1987 the 
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Eurocommunists had reached a position where they dominated the leadership and in 1991 brought 
about the dissolution of the party and formed the Democratic Left movement in its place.128 
 
IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE / CONTINUITY 
 The communist parties of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have followed very 
varied paths of development and some have been very successful at regaining power in only a very 
short time since they were overthrown. There have been three main tendencies in the process of 
becoming re-electable, each of which has depended on the political and economic circumstances of 
the individual countries: social democratisation has been followed by the former communist parties 
of Hungary and Poland as there was considerable support for a move towards the centre; the 
adoption of nationalism in countries where there are ethnic tensions such as Serbia or patriotism in 
Russia as a national defence of communism; and a restatement of socialist or communist aims where 
there has been an economic decline as in Albania and Moldova. The ideological origins of the CPRF 
and external constraints prevent the party from abandoning communism and Zyuganov now writes 
of ‘socialised capitalism’.129 
Why has the CPRF not moved towards social democracy? The term means different things 
to different people. Giddens defines social democracy as moderate, parliamentary socialism built 
upon consolidating the welfare state.130 Kitschelt defines social democracy as a generic concept 
covering a broad cohort of parties that run under socialist, labour and social-democratic labels131 but 
defines socialism as more uncompromising than social democracy in its call for the priority of 
collective decision making and formal organisation over markets and individual liberty. While 
socialists believe in a large-scale reorganisation of society, social democrats mistrust grand theories 
and advocate incremental trial-and-error social change. Socialism is concerned with the 
redistribution of property rights as the key problem of justice while social democrats believe that 
equality should be pursued within the limits of efficiency; inequality being acceptable to social 
democrats as long as it helps the worst-off in society to improve their lot, provided a minimum 
standard of living guarantees the primary goods underlying human dignity and self-respect to all 
citizens.132 
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Some parties that would never define themselves as social democratic (such as the 
Communist Party of India) pursue social democratic policies while some self-defined social 
democratic parties (such as the Labour Party of New Zealand) have implemented neoliberal, free 
market programmes.133 The traditional model of social democracy had a large role for the state in 
economic life including an extensive public sector and state regulation of a mixed economy, the 
pursuit of equality and justice through high and redistributive taxes, the promotion of full 
employment and strong links with trade unions. However, after the economic problems of the 1970s, 
social democratic parties dropped their (theoretical) commitment to replace capitalism with 
socialism, accepting their role was remedial rather than transformational.134 This lies at the heart of 
why the CPRF cannot change as they are unable to relinquish their commitment to a communist 
future. 
Social democracy stands for a balance between the market and the state and between the 
individual and the community and a compromise between an acceptance of capitalism as the only 
reliable mechanism for generating wealth and a desire to redistribute wealth according to moral 
rather than market principles.135 Some socialists have used the term ‘social democracy’ as a term of 
abuse, implying unprincipled compromise or betrayal.136 Social democracy is historically very weak 
in Russia as social democracy is too socialist for the democratic pro-reformers and too democratic 
for the socialists.137 Russian communists found social democracy to be too close to democracy and 
preferred nationalism to democracy.138 As March notes, since the range Zyuganov’s support was 
much narrower than Yeltsin’s (and later Putin’s), if he had run as a social democrat he was more 
likely than his opponent to alienate his core electorate.139 Communists, by nature, see their party as 
having as ‘divine’ right to rule as they ‘lead the working class’ and as a result, there is a tendency to 
take worker support for granted. They are unable to adapt to social democracy as they have 
criticised it so completely in the past and see it as a betrayal of communism. 
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The CPRF is still a programmatic party while other Russian parties are much more 
dominated by the personalities of their leaders. Although this has given the party a stable electorate 
it also causes problems for the CPRF in broadening its support,140 which now seems to be in serious 
decline anyway. The continued use of democratic centralism and replication of the organisation of 
the CPSU with the Chairman, Zyuganov, Deputy Chairmen, the Presidium, the Central Committee 
and the primary party organisations and a membership that is largely inherited from the party’s 
predecessor, give the party a greater degree of organisational continuity than some of  its more-
reformed counterparts in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.141 
 The CPRF has become the party of the relatively deprived (see Chapter 4 for details) as did 
the PDS in former East Germany and also in common with the CPRF, many of the PDS’s members 
are retired with over 50 percent of PDS members over 60.142 The former communists are losing their 
traditional constituency and, although the PDS claims to represent the working class, changing 
concerns among the electorate have necessitated a greater emphasis on environmentalism and the 
problems facing former East Germans; a direction also taken by the CPRF in the search for the 
youth vote, in terms of environmentalism, and the nationalist vote, in terms of support for the rights 
of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics. 
The CPRF has not remained in power despite a considerable change in ideology. It is, 
however, difficult for the party to abandon communism and doubtful that it would yield the desired 
electoral results if the party did. While Chotiner claims that “there are no appreciable extra-
organisational barriers for a move by the CPRF to the moderate left”,143 the organisation itself was 
formed as a reaction against the moves towards social democracy led by Gorbachev at the end of the 
Soviet era and the support for social democracy in Russia is minimal as seen in election after 
election where social democratic parties fail to achieve representation in the Duma. By contrast, the 
communist parties in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, did not give up power and remained 
the ruling parties for several years after the end of the communist era through the adoption of 
nationalism and the continued control of the national media. 
The CPRF promotes the achievements of the CPSU during the Second World War as a 
means of defending communism and to promote their patriotic stance. In Chapter 5, it will be seen 
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that respondents deeply regretted the anti-patriotic rhetoric of the Yeltsin years, as they saw it, and 
felt that patriotism had been demonised. Zyuganov has expressed concerns that the CPRF is not seen 
as sufficiently nationalist by the electorate now in the face of competition from United Russia and 
the LDPR.144 In St Petersburg, respondents for Chapter 5 spoke of the CPRF being ‘patriotic’ long 
before other parties adopted this outlook. 
Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the successor to the Communist Party of Moldova, 
the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) was returned to power in 2001 partly 
as a result of severe economic problems in Moldova and the previously governing parties’ failure to 
deal with those problems.145 The party programme is still Marxist-Leninist but also refers to 
‘reformed socialism’ and the party has taken a patriotic stand.146 The PCRM no longer emphasises 
class issues or internationalism.147 Like the CPRF, the party is able to rely upon its nationwide 
network of local organisations for campaigning, an advantage not available to other parties.148  
Nationalists were able to mobilise mass popular support against the communist parties of the 
Caucasus in the late 1980s as the nationalists had done in the Baltics against Russian domination.149 
The post-Soviet situation for the communist parties in the Caucasus was largely determined by the 
Soviet past - the mass killing of civilians in Azerbaijan and Georgia by Soviet troops radicalised the 
opposition and greatly limited the communist parties’ ability to compromise in order to stay in 
power.150 Communists in the late Soviet period formed the national elites that were held together by 
a shared interest in retaining control over economic and social advantages rather than a commitment 
to communism.151 All three republics have a range of political parties representing diverse 
ideological platforms but they tend to be small organisations that do not play a prominent role as a 
result, mainly, of each republic having a presidential system.152  
In Armenia, there was a process of dialogue in 1989 and a transfer of power from the 
communists to the nationalists. However, the Armenian National Movement (ANM) included many 
Communist Party members and after the ANM had been elected to government in 1990, various 
former communists held ministerial posts in the nationalist government.153 In Armenia, while the 
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nationalists took power at the national level, communists still head major enterprises and run much 
of the regional and local administrations adopting nationalism where expedient.154  
In Azerbaijan the communist authorities tried to suppress the nationalist Azerbaijan Popular 
Front (APF) but the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the APF to seize power in 1992 in a 
coup.155 There were no parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan between the election of the Supreme 
Soviet in 1990 and November 1995 so the Soviet era parliament remained in place all that time but a 
smaller National Council of half former communists and half representatives from other groups took 
over dealing with national matters.156 The Azerbaijan Communist Party was registered in spring 
1994157 but was prevented from running in parliamentary elections after 5,000 of the signatures on 
its petition lists were declared invalid.158 
In Georgia, the communists made concessions to the nationalists but did not succeed in 
entering into dialogue with the opposition. Instead, the Georgian Communist Party adopted many of 
the nationalists’ policies.159 A national movement was elected to power in October 1990 in the 
parliamentary elections which were followed by the election of a nationalist president in May 1991. 
This was followed by a military coup in 1992 after which Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia 
to serve as head of the state council formed by the leaders of the coup. A new parliament was 
elected in October 1992 and Shevardnadze was elected as head of the government.160 After the 1992 
elections, various political groups claimed to be successors to the Communist Party of Georgia. 
These included the Communist Workers’, the Union of Communists and the Stalin Society which all 
merged to form the United Communist Party. Remaining independent from this new group were the 
Communist Party and the Stalin Party as well as other left wing groups.161 One of the parties set up 
and registered in 1992 was the Democratic Union, composed largely of former communists and lead 
by Avtandil Margiani, a former leader of the Communist Party of Georgia.162 
In East-Central Europe, the first political cleavage to develop was that of communism versus 
anti-communism and this dominated the first, and sometimes subsequent, elections in most 
countries. While in Poland and Slovakia other political cleavages survived the communist years, 
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reformed ‘historical’ parties have generally not been successful as they were absent from the 
political scene for so long. Divisions closer to the standard left-right political cleavages over 
economic reform emerged later as it became obvious that there were going to be losers in the 
economic transformation as well as winners which gave the communists in Russia and the reunited 
Germany, for example, a new cause and a new, if smaller, constituency as those who lost out as a 
result of the transition became a focus for calls for the return of socialism. 
Resistance to change characterised the Russian communists but in Poland and Hungary, the 
ex-communist parties along with the social-liberal parties were actually the instigators of change.163 
They were more willing than some of their counterparts in other countries to introduce reforms as 
they needed to legitimise their new parties, the communist regimes of Poland and Hungary, together 
with those in the Baltics, having been perceived as imposed by the Soviet Union, to a greater extent 
than those in other countries.164 In Poland and in Hungary the ruling parties had voted to dissolve 
themselves. However, of all the ex-communist parties these are the most radically different from 
their predecessors with a degree of membership discontinuity as well as what are, officially, new 
political organisations.165  
In the Czech Republic and Lithuania the former communist parties each faced a strong social 
democratic competitor, the Czech Social Democratic Party and the Lithuanian Social Democratic 
Party (LSDP), which may partially explain the absence of a name change for the CPBM as the party 
needs to maintain a separate identity from its new rival. The historic Czech Social Democratic Party 
continued to dominate the democratic left until 1998 but after this time the economic problems and 
failures of minority governments led to an increase in support for the CPBM166 which has accepted 
parliamentary democracy, private property, the market economy and the rule of law.167 The revived 
social democratic parties fared badly, except in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, and when the 
electorate in each country became dissatisfied with economic reforms, the social democratic parties 
did not benefit but the communist parties did, often achieving substantial parliamentary 
representation in the second round of post-communist elections as dissatisfaction with economic 
reform led to nostalgia for the former economic stability.  
The reform of the ex-communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe has largely been 
achieved by a move away from communism and towards social-democracy. None of the successors 
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to the communist parties, not even the CPBM, has called for a return to communism168 and all the 
former communist parties, including the CPBM, are thought to be genuinely committed to the 
market reforms and pluralist democracy that they now advocate169 as opposed to the change of 
policies being simply an attempt to retain or regain power. Of the most reformed successor parties, 
the Polish party emphasised its managerial skills and the Hungarian party emphasised its ability to 
govern competently, arguing for the reforms to continue but with greater care for those who were 
disadvantaged by them.170 
In Slovakia, the PDL gradually transformed itself into a modern social democratic party but 
it has never managed to win more than 15 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections and 
therefore has been unable to govern as the major party in any coalition.171 Its loss of support is partly 
a result of the more hardline regime (than Poland or Hungary) and partly the fact that other left wing 
parties adopted parts of the PDL’s programme.172 The HSP adopted social-democracy in place of 
communism and declared its support for the European integration process173 and has been described 
as the first of the ex-communist parties to transform itself into a party of the modern European Left, 
its success being a result of the fact that it had already become a social democratic party, so 
monopolising the left wing of the party spectrum before other parties were able to develop.174  
 As in the case of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), it was reformers in the 
PUWP who led the party away from communism and towards the European Left.175 The DLA, an 
electoral alliance whose largest member was the SDPR, formed in 1990 following the dissolution of 
the PUWP and claimed to support political pluralism and parliamentary democracy and oppose the 
clericalisation of social life.176 While the SDPR tends to direct its appeals towards industrial 
workers, pensioners and others who have fared badly in the transition, the party has been able, at the 
expense of ideological coherence, to attract a wide variety of supporters. By continually stressing its 
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commitment to economic reform it has, like the HSP, been able to gain the support of many 
businessmen.177 
In Poland, the DLA won the 1993 elections as a result of its ideological reformation, its 
organisational strength and the fact that the right had tried to blame declining living standards on the 
communist past.178 After 1993, the emergence of the Union of Work gave the SDPR a left-wing 
competitor. The party was formed by left-wing members of Solidarity (the former opposition 
movement during the communist era) and reformers from the PUWP. This party claimed 
specifically to represent those who had lost out under economic reforms179 however, the DLA won 
the presidency in 1995 and 2000. In 1997, although the DLA increased its share of the vote, it lost 
control of parliament because the previously divided right united to form a coalition180 but won the 
2001 parliamentary elections. The DLA registered as a party in April 1999 and moved away from 
Marxism and towards the centre.181 The new party deliberately set out on a social democratic path 
benefiting from the advantages of experience of organising and loyal members working for the 
party.182  
In Germany, the PDS differs from its communist predecessor in its organisation, its 
programme and its leadership.183 There is continuity between the PDS and its predecessor in terms 
of legal identity, membership and to some extent, ideology. 184 It became the largest party in East 
Germany after the March 1990 elections, however, after reunification, was reduced in the December 
1990 elections to a minor party with support limited to former East Germany and Berlin.185 The PDS 
managed 16.4 percent of the vote in the GDR’s first democratic election but lost support as 
unification approached and afterwards, obtaining only 11.1 percent of the vote in the elections 
following reunification. However, with rising unemployment in the East, the party began to regain 
support.186 
Before reunification, the PDS claimed to be a reformed socialist party and benefited from the 
support of those concerned about the consequences of reunification187 but afterwards, there was a 
                                                 
177
 Ishiyama, 1997, p.323. 
178
 Curry, 2003, p.41. 
179
 op. cit., p.43. 
180
 op. cit., p.33. 
181
 op. cit., p.45. 
182
 op. cit., p.26. 
183
 Oswald, 1996, p.191. 
184
 op. cit., p.174. 
185
 Bortfeldt, H. and Thompson, W.  “The German Communists” in Bell, D. (ed.) Western European Communists and 
the Collapse of Communism, Berg Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1993, p.145. 
186
 Baylis, 2003, p.141. 
187
 Bortfeldt & Thompson, 1993, pp.144-45. 
 43 
move away from Marxism-Leninism and towards social-democracy.188 The fact that the programme 
still includes references to Marx and Lenin makes reform appear limited.189 In common with the 
CPBM  and the LSDP, the party has a large social democratic competitor so environmentalism and 
feminism feature prominently in the new philosophy of the PDS, a trend in common with reformed 
communist parties in Western Europe.190 The PDS criticises the injustices of capitalism in particular, 
unemployment and reductions in welfare provision and the disadvantages that East Germans face.191  
The BSP has abandoned democratic-centralism in favour of internal democracy and allows 
factions to exist within the party (such as the Union for Social Democracy and the Marxist 
Platform).192 The BSP began a review of its policies while it was losing members in large numbers 
and decided to include reform communists and those in the party who were prepared to support 
social democracy in the leadership. The centrists gained control of the party and marginalised the 
Marxists and social-democrats193 and managed to avoid the party splitting. It retains a strong 
organisational structure, considerable resources and a functioning press194 but lost the 1997 
elections. The BSP tried to transform itself into a party capable of representing the interests of a 
wide spectrum of people, including workers, the middle class and the new capitalists. However, it is 
often characterised as the party of the new business class which emerged from the political elite of 
the previous regime.195 The party remains deeply divided and despite commitments to market 
reforms and democratic socialism and the marginalisation of hardliners, the party leadership has 
generally followed a middle course, avoiding complete rejection of the past.196  
 In countries where the population is divided along ethnic lines, nationalism also forms a part 
of the new identity of the former communist parties. In Yugoslavia, the SPS, the ex-communist 
party, has turned into an extreme nationalist party, promoting Serb interests, violently, against those 
of Muslims and Croats. The SPS claimed in its programme to be working towards Serbia being a 
socialist republic. The party won elections in 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1997 but from 1992 onwards 
had to form coalitions in order to govern. In 2000, it was defeated by the Democratic Opposition of 
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Serbia.197 Without the violence, in the Baltics, in the early 1990s, the former communist parties or 
new ‘successor’ communist parties, have presented themselves as the representatives of the Russian 
minorities198 in order to achieve the same result. 
 Programmatic renewal has also been taking place in Western Europe, particularly among 
social-democratic parties, to compensate for changing electorates and changes in the way elections 
are fought. Centralisation and democratisation also form a major part of the debate on party 
development in Western Europe. Non-communist parties of the left faced similar problems in the 
1980s to those facing Western communist parties, these being loss of electoral support, identity 
crisis and the need to find a new programme.199 This new programme has been found, by the end of 
the 1990s in a general shift to the centre on the part of West European social-democratic parties. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, social-democratic parties have changed more in terms of 
ideology than at any time since World War II as social democracy has moved beyond the debate 
over resource distribution to address the organisation of production and the conditions of 
consumption in advanced capitalist societies.200 Social security, full employment and income 
equality, formerly the primary concerns of social-democratic parties, are now taking second place in 
the programmes of West European centre-left parties to environmentalism, support for increased 
market competition, citizens’ autonomy and protection from state surveillance which are promoted 
as possible means of increasing their share of the vote.201 The traditional social democratic concerns 
were undermined by mass unemployment, industrial restructuring and the rise of the new right. 
Confronted with poor electoral results, a growing middle class and declining working class, social 
democratic parties had little choice but to reassess their policies.202 One example of the result of 
these pressures has been the rewording by the British Labour Party of clause 4 of the party 
constitution, a clause of great importance to many party members, which stated the party’s 
commitment to the public ownership of the means of production. After many of Britain’s utilities 
had been privatised, the Labour Party clearly felt that this clause had to be reformed if the party was 
to have a realistic chance of winning future elections. 
The Norwegian, Dutch and British Labour Parties have all had to deal with the same 
problems during their respective policy reviews. All were closely identified with the public sector, 
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the trade unions and the welfare state, associations that they wished to alter. The Norwegian Labour 
Party began its reorientation in 1981 after electoral defeat and focused particularly on finding a 
broader social base that would include other groups besides trade union members.203 In the case of 
the Dutch Labour Party, their report in 1991, ‘A Party to Vote For’ stated that it was no longer 
possible to sustain a mass party in an individualistic society and highlighted the fact that the party’s 
close identification with the welfare state was increasingly problematic as the state was being asked 
to cut back while still functioning efficiently.204 
Of transitions from communism made by parties in Western Europe, the same trend is 
noticeable away from socialism and towards social-democracy and the pacifist, environmentalist 
and feminist concerns of recent decades as has been noticeable in the non-communist parties of the 
left. The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) is notable particularly for its ideological 
transformation that anticipated Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’ by several years.205 The new declaration 
of principles made in 1984 was characterised by the acceptance of multi-party politics and the 
existence other conflicts in society besides that between capital and labour, the rejection of the 
identification of state with party and state policy with a specific ideology.206 Although Marxism had 
not been specifically rejected,207 the result of this reformed ideology was to split the party: 
hardliners left the CPN to form the League of Communists of the Netherlands, however, the CPN 
merged with Green Left in response to the events of 1989 and 1991. 
 The move towards environmentalism was echoed in Norway where both the Norwegian 
Communist Party (NCP) and Marxist-Leninist Red Electoral Alliance fought the 1989 election as 
members of the ‘Solidarity and the Environment’ umbrella organisation.208 By 1990, the NCP had 
become the Left-Socialists and were campaigning primarily as an environmental party with 
socialism taking second place.209 However, in Finland and Sweden the communist parties did not 
move quickly enough to distance themselves from their discredited counterparts in Eastern Europe 
and lost much of their electoral support to new environmental movements in the 1980s.210 While a 
change of name had been planned before 1989 by communist parties in both countries, it was not 
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until 1990 that the Swedish Left-Party Communists became the Leftist Party and the two Finnish 
communist parties, along with their umbrella organisations merged into the Leftist Alliance.211 
 Other communist parties in Western Europe have shown far less inclination towards reform. 
The freedom to express dissident opinion was denied and democratic-centralism reaffirmed in the 
Spanish Communist Party (SCP) in the early 1980s212 but after a dramatic decline in electoral 
support and a great loss of members, there were a series of ideological swings and conflicting 
programmatic declarations213 which alienated many remaining supporters.214 After the acceptance of 
parliamentary democracy and the monarchy the SCP, by 1994, had effectively become another 
leftist ‘catch-all’ type party and as such participates in the United Left electoral coalition.215 
 In the opinion of the French Communist Party (FCP), the reason the communist regimes of 
Eastern Europe were unsuccessful was not because they were socialist but because they were 
insufficiently so.216 The FCP had never had any major reformist tendency, there had been little 
support for ‘Eurocommunism’ or a ‘Third Way’ and there had been much enthusiasm for the Soviet 
Union.217 There was a similar attempt to resist reform in the face of communist collapse by the 
Portuguese Communist Party and despite dissent within the party, Marxism-Leninism and 
democratic-centralism were still defining characteristics of the party in the 1990s.218 
 However, it is the decline of the FCP that shows the most parallels with that of the CPRF. In 
particular, the FCP clings to democratic centralism and, whilst it was once the dominant party on the 
far left in France, the decline of communism in France has led to challenges to the FCP on the far 
left.219 The small political parties in competition with the FCP could be compared with those that 
challenge the CPRF in terms of the larger parties failure to  draw support from the far left and cover 
the ideological territory that the smaller parties represent. The FCP’s electoral performance has been 
influenced greatly by its Leninist origins and these origins have shaped its political choices.220 By 
the 1970s, the party was facing a reorganised Socialist Party whose leadership was determined that a 
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successful electoral strategy would overshadow ideological convictions.221 The socialists succeeded 
in appealing to the growing middle classes as well as the more financially secure sections of the 
working class, adapting to changes in the composition of French society that the communists could 
not or would not see. The FCP was overtaken in terms of support and membership by the Socialist 
Party as the CPRF has been by United Russia.  
The party’s support base remains employees of heavy industry as it has been unable to draw 
support from elsewhere.222 However, as with the CPRF in recent Russian elections, the loss of 
support for the communists in the ‘Red Belt’ (around Paris) was noticeable by 1981.223 By the 
1990s, the party was aiming its appeal at a left which did not exist, it overestimated the 
revolutionary nature of the workers and underestimated their support for reform.224 The party 
remained focussed on support from the industrial sector as Western Europe was moving towards a 
post-industrial economy with the result that it ceased to be a national party.225 The party’s decline is 
to some degree due to the continued use of democratic centralism as this hinders the party from 
expressing changes of opinion in society.226  
The FCP is largely unchanged as a Leninist party with a hierarchical and sizeable but rigid 
organisation227 and the party also faces a challenge from the far right which has taken over some of 
the communists’ former areas of support in the electorate.228 The party is also constrained in its 
ability to change by the need to balance the demands of hardliners and modernisers.229 In an attempt 
to modernise the party’s ideology, references to collective ownership, central planning and working 
class (or rather party) supremacy have been dropped in favour of left-wing patriotism. Also in 
common with the CPRF, the party specifically rejected social democracy and reform230 and as did a 
notable section of the CPRF, the FCP supported the conservatives in the CPSU at the time of the 
1991 coup.231 
 The experience of democratic centralism in the French and Italian communist parties has 
been very different with the Italian version having moved away from the Leninist model while the 
French version did not. As a result, the Italian party was able to be more flexible in its approach to 
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social change. Democratic centralism was not criticised in the French party while the party was 
electorally successful but has been questioned since the decline began. It has been argued that it is 
too late by this stage for a communist party to abandon democratic centralism once activist support 
has waned, the leadership is under threat and the party has lost public support.232 The decline of the 
class that the party claimed to represent, in common with other left wing parties, has led to the 
decline of the party. Any left wing party that leaves behind its Leninist structure and beliefs is no 
longer communist.233 This was understood well by those interviewed for Chapter 5 and explains, in 
part, the opposition to social democracy within the communist movement. Those left wing parties 
that have been able to reinvent themselves are those that never claimed to be communist or where 
the leadership and members have been able to abandon their emotional attachment to the ideology. 
Raymond notes that a decision to join the FCP was not like joining any other political party and 
acquiring a set of beliefs, it was an act which defined one’s being.234 This is also the case with the 
CPRF as demonstrated by interviewees in Chapter 5. It was commitment to and belief in the cause 
that motivates members first and foremost, rather than a wish to progress up the political ranks. 
 
ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND COALITIONS 
After their initial defeats in the first post-communist elections, the ex-communist parties in 
many countries of Central and Eastern Europe achieved good results in the second round of post-
communist elections. By this time, however, many communist-successor parties were far from being 
communist in their ideology and were moving towards the centre of the political spectrum. These 
parties were then re-elected as the economic reforms caused hardship to many and voters wished to 
return to the greater financial security of the recent, communist past. Elsewhere in post-communist 
Europe, communist-successor parties were not re-elected and began to form coalitions in order to 
increase their chances of being returned to power. This is a tactic Zyuganov adopted, as will be seen 
in Chapter 3, early in his leadership and it remains a central part of his vision for the party. 
The Communist Party of Lithuania (CPLith) had declared its independence from the CPSU 
as early as 1989 but the party split internally. The CPLith had split in 1989 into the independent 
Lithuanian Communist Party (CPLith) and the LCP(CPSU). To the party’s advantage was the fact 
that the reform communists within the LCP had been supported by the opposition forces which 
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enabled them to take control of the LCP in 1988.235 Renamed in December 1990, the successor to 
the CPLith, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) returned to power in the 1992 
elections to the Lithuanian parliament. The party dropped any reference to Marxism-Leninism236 
and adopted nationalism in terms of support for Lithuanian independence which became an 
important part of the party’s appeal to the electorate.237 The LDLP presented itself to the voters as a 
party that could effect reform at a manageable pace238 and in 1992, the LDLP was still Lithuania’s 
largest party with 15,000 members.239  
In the 1990s, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), a revived historical party, 
became the LDLP’s greatest competitor on the left. In 1993, the LDLP leader, Algirdas Brazauskas 
was elected President but was defeated in the following elections in 1996, a loss attributed to many 
of the party’s working class and rural dwelling supporters not bothering to vote.240 The LDLP and 
the LDSP fought the 2000 elections as a coalition. and the parties merged in 2001 to become the 
Social Democratic Party.241 The two parties found common ground on welfare, privatisation and 
education issues.242 In common with other former communist parties, voters for the LDLP tended to 
be older and from the rural population.243 
 In Hungary, although younger, reformist members who took over the leadership of the 
party244 were successful in returning the HSP to power, in 1994 the HSP formed a coalition 
government with the Free Democrats in order to indicate their intention to continue democratic 
reforms and also in order to avoid a monopoly on power.245 The party was defeated in 1998 but after 
electing a new leader and former finance minister from outside the party to be the candidate for 
Prime Minister,246 the party returned to government in 2002 with the Alliance of Free Democrats as 
its coalition partner.247 As a result of ideological change, the HSP was able to portray itself as the 
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party of business in Hungary.248 The CPRF has also tried to attract support from business but this 
has not resulted in the same degree of electoral success as the CPRF has consequently alienated 
many of its supporters and handed ammunition to its opponents.  
In Poland the SDPR, as part of the DLA, formed a government with the Polish Peasants’ 
Party (which had been incorporated into the communist regime in the past) after the 1993 
elections.249 The former communist trade union also mobilised members to campaign for the SDPR 
which enabled the party to appear to have a permanent presence in the community rather than a 
temporary campaign just before elections.250 Unlike Hungary, however, there was considerable 
fragmentation in Poland with three leftist parties and the SDPR forming an ‘external’ coalition of 
leftist groups in an electoral coalition as opposed to Hungary’s ‘internal’ coalition of factions inside 
the party.251 The SDPR did not benefit from the support of reform circles that gave the HSP its mass 
base252 and so needed to join a coalition, for this reason as well as the fact that the left was split. 
That coalition, the DLA, varied in its composition across the country but often included a 
communist trade union, the reconstituted Socialist Party, the socialist youth movement and co-
operative and women’s groups.253 In 2001, the DLA coalition won the parliamentary elections 
because it appeared competent, professional and united, in comparison with the former governing 
parties.254 
 As in Russia, the Ukrainian successor party was refounded by activists in 1993.255 In the 
parliamentary elections of 2002, no party won a majority but for the first time, the CPU did not have 
the largest number of seats, with around half the total they received in the 1998 election.256 In 2006, 
the CPU formed a coalition with the Socialist Party and the Party of the Regions and, initially, Our 
Ukraine.257 The CPU also faced ‘spoiler’ parties sponsored by President Kuchma,258 in much the 
same way as the CPRF has faced those sponsored by President Putin. Forming coalitions helped the 
party retain a substantial political presence. This tactic has also served the SDL in Slovakia well  
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after uniting in a coalition for the 1994 elections with three smaller left-wing parties to try to ensure 
that collectively they would succeed in achieving representation in the parliament.259  
No coalitions were needed by the successor parties in Moldova or Albania. The PCRM, won 
parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2005 and the party’s first secretary, Vladimir Voronin has 
served twice as President of Moldova having only entered the post-Soviet parliament in 1998.260 The 
party succeeded in being re-elected in 2005 as a result of economic growth attributed to the party’s 
actions and also due to the opposition being divided.261 By contrast, the Albanian Party of Labour 
remained in power through the first elections in March 1991 by retaining control of the media and 
intimidating the opposition and remained in power until 1992. The opposition Democratic Party 
won the second elections in 1992 and 1996 but the 1997 election, which was called due to near-
anarchy resulting from the collapse of pyramid investment schemes, was won by the SPA successor 
party.262 The SPA won again in 2001 and has succeeded in restoring law and order and improving 
the country’s infrastructure.263  
The CPBM was the second largest party in the 1992 elections and the third largest in the 
1996 elections. In 1995, the party defined its medium-term goal as the formation of a broad left-
wing, patriotic, anti-right wing coalition government of the left.264 This gives the party something in 
common with the CPRF as both parties are unable to return to power without a coalition. In the 2002 
parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, the CPBM gained seats and a 7.5 percent increase in 
its share of the vote on the 1998 result and benefited from a low turnout.265 The Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSDP) moved from the left to the centre over the course of the 1998 to 2002 
parliament266 but lost the protest votes it had secured before to the CPBM in 2002 especially in areas 
of high unemployment.267 The CPBM’s increase in popularity from 1998 onward was helped by the 
disappearance of the far-right Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, 
some of whose voters switched to the CPBM.268 
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 Zyuganov’s decision to persuade the party to participate in the 1993 elections rather than 
remaining an extra-parliamentary force has proved to be a sound decision as many of those 
communist formations that did not take part in the first elections have since disappeared. In 1995, 
the CPRF lost some of the left-wing party list vote to three parties that failed to gain representation - 
the Communists and Labour of Russia for Restoration of the Soviet Union bloc, the Agrarian Party 
and the Power to the People! bloc - a total of 10 percent that could have guaranteed them a further 
40 seats and a majority in the Duma.269 Despite the clear need for a broad coalition, the left still 
failed to unite for the 1999 elections with five blocs competing - the CPRF, Communists and Labour 
of Russia for Restoration of the Soviet Union, Stalinists for the Restoration of the USSR, Party of 
Peace and Unity and the Movement in Support of the Army.270 The end of co-operation between the 
CPRF and the Agrarians also reduced support for the CPRF as in the 1993 and 1995 elections the 
parties had co-operated in forming their party lists in order not to compete against each other.271  
The CPRF has formed coalitions such as the National Salvation Front (1992) and the 
National Patriotic Union of Russia (NPUR), which Zyuganov leads (formed in 1996) and in which 
other parties are always junior partners. Sometimes local alliances differ from those existing 
nationally as in Altai in 2003, the CPRF and the Agrarians formed the ‘For Our Altai - CPRF, APR, 
National Patriotic Union of Russia!’ Bloc despite the alliance between the two parties having ended 
nationally and the National Patriotic Union having ceased to exist over four years earlier.272 The 
CPRF’s attempts to form coalitions, however, have been a little misleading as the Communist-
Nationalist bloc was never as broad a coalition as it tried to appear.273  
During the 1996 Presidential campaign, the opposition to Yeltsin complained of unfair 
practices during the campaign, in particular the government’s near monopoly on the electronic 
media and the regularly repeated claims that Zyuganov intended to return to the worst excesses of 
the Soviet era. This greatly boosted Yeltsin’s support and won him the reluctant support of many 
anti-Yeltsin and undecided voters that the ‘people’s patriotic’ bloc had tried but failed to attract.274 
Yeltsin benefited from a temporary alliance of oligarchs due to concern that a communist victory 
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would lead to their downfall. This gave the Yeltsin campaign the benefit of substantial extra 
financial and administrative resources. Yeltsin presented the election as a referendum on continued 
reform as opposed to a return to communism yet he also appropriated communist themes in an 
attempt to draw support away from Zyuganov.275 Zyuganov and the CPRF made their biggest 
mistake by assuming from the result of the 1995 Duma election that ‘anti-communist’ sentiment was 
waning and that general opinion was moving to the left and that they just needed to consolidate the 
left wing share of the vote and win the support of the non-communist opposition with patriotism. 
This, however, was at the expense of trying to appeal to centrists and democrats. This move enabled 
Yeltsin to wage his successful campaign against Zyuganov as a referendum on a return to 
communism. The CPRF’s unwillingness to work with centrists and any social groups that they saw 
as ‘bourgeois’ led to poor electoral tactics. Zyuganov had little understanding of the centrists while 
Yeltsin had access to data from several polling organisations which enabled his campaign to 
carefully target swing voters. Zyuganov campaigned in areas with already high nationalist and 
communist support while Yeltsin spent much time visiting key marginal regions.276  
The CPRF’s misreading of the electorate was also due to their economic determinism which 
led them to believe that the 1995 leftward turn of the electorate was permanent and the party only 
had to wait for power to come to it by default. Zyuganov’s electoral message was incoherent as he 
sought to broaden the communist-nationalist coalition but avoid alienating the party’s core support 
and coalition partners. He was vague about such topics as the renationalisation of private property 
and so the electorate didn’t know what to expect from a communist victory, which played into 
Yeltsin’s hands.277  
The CPRF has used coalitions, narrow as they may be, well at the local level. Between 1995 
and 1998, the CPRF candidates ran in 69 regional legislative elections and won seats in 55 
regions.278 In some regions from 1995 to 1998 the RCWP has co-operated with the CPRF, to the 
extent of forming formal coalitions in Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk oblasts and in St Petersburg, and in 
others it has run candidates against those of the CPRF while in other regions, the CPRF and the 
Agrarians worked together.279 The CPRF and its sympathisers controlled a third of regional 
legislatures in 1999.280 In one of the first post-Soviet local elections, in Penza, the CPRF won 40 of 
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the 45 seats in the regional assembly.281 In Pskov, a region that had been supportive of the CPRF, an 
alliance in 1996 between the CPRF and the right wing Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 
led to the LDPR candidate beating the incumbent, a Yeltsin appointee.282 In the 2000 regional 
elections many incumbents were communists and as incumbents tended to do well in many regional 
elections as a result of resources already available, many communists were returned to power.283  
However, by the end of 2003, many regional executives that had previously been 
sympathetic to the CPRF or indifferent, had aligned themselves with United Russia so reducing the 
CPRF’s access to administrative resources.284 Many governors had defected by 1999 as the CPRF 
had been unable to provide benefits for traditionally communist regions.285 The last gubernatorial 
elections were held in December 2004 and were largely won by United Russia and incumbents. The 
regional elections of 8th October 2006 resulted in considerable losses for the CPRF. In the 
Presidential election of 2000, the party gained votes outside the traditional Red Belt, with gains in 
the far East, West and East Siberia, the North and the North Caucasus, however, there were losses in 
the Red Belt, south of the 55th parallel.286  
There was an overall decline in support for the CPRF in 2003 but a particularly marked 
decline in support in regions where there were a higher than average percentage of the working 
population engaged in agriculture - in indicator of support in previous elections.287 According to 
national opinion polls, the party’s support had been in decline in the period before the 2003 
election288 and during the election the CPRF had far more competition than previously from 
national-patriotic parties, in particular Motherland and United Russia where before the CPRF had 
been the party that had monopolised this stance.289 
 
SPLITS AND INTERNAL DIVISIONS 
 In Chapter 5, respondents spoke in 2003 of their satisfaction with Zyuganov as a leader in 
terms of his being able to keep the party united. Since interviews were conducted, however, splits in 
the party have led to a decline in membership in stark comparison with the more reformed HSP. 
Unlike the CPRF, the HSP has been particularly successful, managing to keep the various left wing 
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factions it contained united within the one party so preventing a proliferation of parties on the left.290 
The reformers gained increasing influence in the HSWP towards the end of the 1980s and entered 
round-table negotiations with the opposition291 with the new party coming into existence before the 
end of communist rule rather than as a reaction to the collapse of socialism.292 Unlike the CPRF, the 
HSP was able to avoid becoming either the party of former apparatchiks or the party of the losers of 
the social transformation as this role was taken on by a small group of HSWP members who formed 
a new party, now called the Workers’ Party.293  
Particularly in 1990, there was an enormous growth of new political parties in 
Czechoslovakia. These parties split, merged, changed their names and their ideologies as frequently 
as their counterparts in neighbouring countries.294 Most major parties suffered splits over 
organisational matters as well as programmes and in some cases these splits changed the political 
orientation of the party. In other cases small parties had the foresight to form coalitions or join larger 
parties to avoid failing to reach the five percent threshold in elections for parliamentary 
representation.295 In the years immediately following the transition, there was very poor 
parliamentary discipline with parties forming temporary coalitions on individual bills. The CPBM 
was the only exception to this lack of parliamentary discipline which had left the government unable 
to rely on a fixed majority in parliament.296 Over time, however, a degree of discipline has been 
established as the management of parliamentary parties has become more centralised and voting has 
become more predictable on important issues.297  
In Romania, no party claimed to be the successor to the Communist Party of Romania 
(CPRom). There was no negotiated transition, the NSF, a group of dissidents and communists who 
had fallen out of favour with the previous regime took power claiming to be leading the 
revolution.298 Members of the NSF did not generally see themselves as members of a communist 
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successor party299 although members of the new NSF had generally been members of the CPRom300 
and the NSF took ownership of the property of the CPRom including the media.301 The local NSF 
committees that were formed were led largely by the same communist officials who had led the 
local CPRom organisations.302 After promising it would not stand in the parliamentary elections it 
was organising, the NSF changed its mind and, as a result of monopolising government resources 
and the media, the NSF won. 
The NSF lost support by 1992 and split into two parties - the NSF and the Democratic 
National Salvation Front (DNSF) neither of which developed a clear programme.303 In 1993, the 
DNSF merged with three much smaller parties to form the Party of Social Democracy in Romania 
(PDSR). The PDSR and Iliescu were voted out of power in 1996.304 From 1996 the PDSR began to 
redefine itself as a party of the centre left.305 In Romania, there was no social democratic tradition 
and when the successor party adopted a new ideology, it was social democracy that was chosen with 
no understanding of  the ideology but the end result was populism and nationalism.306 The PDSR in 
Romania claimed to be a social democratic party but its election platform in 2000 was critical of the 
market economy and was nationalist.307 The PDSR and the Romanian Democratic Party merged in 
June 2001 to form the Social Democratic Party and formed a coalition with the Humanist Party of 
Romania in 2004 - the National Union Electoral Alliance - and in 2004, the alliance gained the 
largest number of seats of any group in the new parliament.308 
While the CPRF should now be more united as various factions on the right have left the 
party this also poses the problem that the core of CPRF supporters must be growing smaller as a 
result of the splits. Duma Speaker, Gennadii Seleznev, formed the ‘Rossiya’ group within the party 
in May 2000, considered to be either as a result of pressures within the party for a move towards 
social democracy or as a result of personal ambition encouraged by the Kremlin.309 Seleznev was 
expelled from the Party in May 2002 for refusing to resign in protest as Duma Speaker when other 
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Communist Deputies were removed from their posts on Duma Committees. The following 
September, he was elected head of the Party of Russia’s Rebirth but his electoral Bloc, Party of 
Russia’s Rebirth-Russian Party of Life, received only 1.9% in the 2003 Duma elections. 
Various splits have been reported in the successor organisation to the Soviet era communist 
youth movement which, like its predecessor, is known as the Komsomol. There was a split with the 
CPRF in 1997 after which the CPRF founded a Union of Communist Youth in 1999310 and the 
leader of the Komsomol in 1999, Igor Malyarov, left the group to join the youth movement of 
United Russia.311 The splits and reformations must surely be as regional as the alignments of the 
regional CPRF organisations as the Komsomol group in Moscow that Malyarov was said to be 
leading after the split with the CPRF declared its support for Putin312 while in St Petersburg the 
Komsomol was aligned with the CPRF in 2003 (see interviews in Chapter 5) and had been for some 
years. 
There have been various challenges to Zyuganov’s leadership of the CPRF over the years, 
the most serious of which was in 2003 before the 2004 Presidential election. This challenge was 
avoided by putting forward Nikolai Kharitonov as the Presidential candidate for the CPRF. At the 
conference in December 2003, delegates voted for Nikolai Kharitonov, proposed by the leadership, 
to be the Presidential candidate against Gennadii Semigin.313 In mid 2004, a few days before the 10th 
Party Congress on 3rd July, a group of members held an alternative plenum at which they elected 
Vladimir Tikhonov, Governor of Ivanovo oblast leader of the party. They then held their own 
congress but the Ministry of Justice recognised the original CPRF’s Congress as that of the true 
CPRF in August.314  
Semigin, a businessman, had been appointed Duma Deputy Chairman and Executive 
Secretary of the NPUR coalition of which the CPRF was a member, the NPUR having been 
resurrected in September 2000.315 This appointment was meant to increase the CPRF’s ability to 
influence the Kremlin but in fact had the reverse effect as Semigin increased the Kremlin’s ability to 
influence the CPRF by funding the NPUR’s regional leaders (who were often also the CPRF’s 
regional leaders) and the party’s regional press with Kremlin funds.316 Zyuganov accused Semigin 
of trying to ‘buy’ the party’s regional secretaries while Semigin predicted that Zyuganov would be 
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replaced at the next party congress.317 The Presidium of the CPRF voted on 18th May 2004 to expel 
Semigin, claiming he was causing dissent in the party’s ranks and undermining its reputation. 
Semigin formed a new party in August 2005 called Patriots of Russia. After a meeting on 31st May 
2004, six members of the party’s Central Committee called on Zyuganov to resign, blaming him for 
the party’s poor election results in 2003 and for discrediting the party by establishing links with 
oligarchs and their organisations, such as Boris Berezovsky, Aleksei Kondaurov and Sergei 
Muravlenko (at Yukos), TNK and Bank Neftyanoi318 and the casino owner, Vladimir Semago (and 
Semigin was also said to have bought his place on the CPRF electoral list).319 
 Semigin claimed that around 100 people took part in the alternative plenum that elected 
Vladimir Tikhonov leader of the party. At the official plenum, Zyuganov declared that only the 
presidium of the party’s Central Committee could call a plenum and that they were all present at the 
official meeting.320 There were press reports of Kremlin manipulation of the ‘split’321 and support 
for Tikhonov.322 In the 40 regional plena held after the ‘split’, all those regions voted to support 
Zyuganov and local party officials who supported Tikhonov were forced to give up their posts or 
were expelled. Such competing congresses were also seen with the Liberal Russia party, the Party of 
Pensioners and the Agrarian Party - very useful for the Kremlin as the Justice Ministry then decides 
which congress was the legitimate one.323 Tikhonov was contacted by President Putin after the 
alternative congress and Tikhonov reported that he had not ruled out finding compromises with the 
presidential administration.324  
 The CPRF then had a funding crisis as Semigin was funding the new party rather than the 
CPRF. The new group planned to take CPRF property such as furniture and computers from party 
offices as it was registered in the names of individuals rather than the party.325 They formed the All-
Russian Communist Party of the Future and intended to join the National Patriotic Union of Russia 
coalition.326 Over the course of 2004, the CPRF expelled six Duma deputies for participation in the 
founding of the new party.327 The All Russian Communist Party of the Future managed to recruit 
several CPRF regional organisations and, apparently, 51,000 members, however, the party was not 
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registered by the Ministry of Justice as it did not qualify due to having too few regional 
organisations. The party joined the Patriots of Russia movement in October 2004.328  
 The CPRF then suffered from competition on the left in terms of a national-patriotic 
competitor in Motherland and several former CPRF members or sympathisers stood for election on 
Motherland’s party list, including Sergei Glaz’ev.329 Motherland merged with the Party of 
Pensioners in August 2006, in what was seen as an attempt by the Kremlin to create a stronger party 
that could draw support away from the CPRF and part of an attempt to manufacture a two-party 
system in which two ‘establishment parties’ compete with each other.330 In October 2006, These two 
parties also merged with the Party of Life, to form A Just Russia political party.331 Where 
Motherland aimed to draw national-patriotic support away from the CPRF, A Just Russia has been 
created to draw socialist support away and to that end, the new party identifies itself as socialist.  
A Just Russia’s website speaks of the challenges posed by globalisation and terrorism and 
the party’s claim to refuse to tolerate hunger and poverty in the world. Their attempt to cover the 
same political ground as the CPRF also extends to their claim that one half of the world prospers to 
the economic and ecological detriment of the other as this echoes the CPRF’s accusations of 
exploitation by the ‘Golden Billion’ (see Chapter 3). The party further shadow’s the CPRF’s 
pronouncements through remarks on tension between those countries that export raw materials (ie 
Russia) and those that import them (the subtext should be read as ‘Russia is being robbed by the 
West’). The party places considerable emphasis on the preservation of jobs and social protection of 
the vulnerable and investment in infrastructure.332 In the 2007 Duma election, A Just Russia, despite 
considerable help from the Kremlin, polled worse than the CPRF. The party is trying to merge with 
as many leftist groups as it can and the suspicion is that the Kremlin hopes to merge the CPRF into 
A Just Russia.333  
 
CONCLUSION 
While the CPRF is the successor to the longest-lived communist party which ran the longest-
lasting communist regime, it cannot now return to power under present political conditions in 
Russia, in contrast with other communist and former communist parties of the region. It is not just 
Russia’s ‘managed democracy’ that hinders the party as the CPRF has also been out-manoeuvred. 
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The political space on the left it could move into is too crowded and social democracy is not an 
option as it lacks support from the electorate. Over the course of fourteen years, the CPRF has gone 
from electoral success to electoral decline with the prospect for a return to power, even if Zyuganov 
or a future leader can unite the left, now looking unlikely. 
The most profound effect of the transition for the former ruling parties has been the extent of 
anti-communist sentiment which shaped party formation and development and electoral strategies in 
the years immediately following the transition.334 The ideological shift away from communism for 
many has increased the competition ex-communist parties face as the ideological space they are 
entering is already filled, in Western Europe and the Czech Republic, by social-democratic parties. 
However, communists were mostly stronger organisations than their rivals and returned to power 
quickly after rejection. Across the region, communists are still in power but communism, in general, 
is not. Former communist parties have become competent political actors in a multi-party 
environment. 
Factions existed in all the different communist parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. They were not monolithic and some factions favoured reform. The faction that favoured 
reform took over in Hungary, the faction that opposed reform in Russia. The CPRF became a very 
different party from the HSP as its reformers left the party to found new parties instead of trying to 
move the CPSU towards the centre ground. Former communist parties across the region united 
believers and non-believers, the ideologically-motivated and careerists so there was a sharp fall in 
membership at the end of the communist era - those on the right left parties that remained 
communist while those on the left deserted parties that moved towards social democracy. Whilst the 
parties are now more united in terms of their members’ support for the ideology, further divisions 
still exist in many countries over the national composition of electoral alliances the parties have 
formed. There is notable variation across the Russian Federation in terms of allegiance to the CPRF 
leadership in Moscow and the electoral alliances forged with regional CPRF branches contesting 
elections in alliance with different parties across the country. 
Communist parties have endured as organisations but their goal now is to retain or regain 
power (at least in the short term). The achievement of communism has been abandoned either 
altogether or has been relegated to a very distant future task. Environmental circumstances dictate 
whether a communist party can return to power as all returns to power by communist parties are due 
to the specific conditions of that party’s change and the particular political conditions in that 
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country. Reasons for the return of the communist parties are sometimes the financial and 
organisational strengths of the former ruling parties against those of their main rivals and (in the 
early post-communist era) the greatly needed administrative capabilities of the ex-communist party 
cadres for the functioning of society.335 As this chapter has shown, the role for communist parties in 
the modern world now revolves almost as much around a defence of national interests as around a 
defence of the interests of the working class, despite the fact that this undermines the international 
message of communism. 
There has been much ideological change on the left in general with a marked move towards 
the centre ground. In Western Europe, many communist parties dissolved themselves while socialist 
parties have also moved towards the centre. West European communist parties were changing 
anyway with a few exceptions but this process speeded up, to the point of dissolution for some, with 
the 1989 revolutions. The one exception has been in Italy where they have been coalition-formers in 
the recent past along with the senior partner in the coalition - the former communist party - the Party 
of Democratic Socialism. 
The CPRF adopted patriotism as a defence of communism and therefore of Russian history 
and what Russia had achieved in the twentieth century. The manner in which the CPSU ended and 
the Soviet Union disintegrated, with increasing nationalism in many republics and opposition to rule 
by Moscow combined with a loss of status for Russia led to a defensiveness amongst some of the 
electorate that the CPRF successfully exploited in the first years of its existence. It is this defence of 
the communist past that now characterises the CPRF, in stark contrast to many more forward-
looking ex-communist parties. The following chapter considers the end of the CPSU through a 
consideration of programmatic renewal in the party’s final years, the reaction to the demise of 
communism in Eastern Europe, the formation of platforms in the CPSU, the formation of parties 
outside the CPSU and the creation of a Russian Communist Party. These developments shaped the 
successor party and determined the early course of its development. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE LEGACY OF THE CPSU        
 
 While the CPRF has not achieved the same degree of electoral success as many of its 
counterparts elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it has nevertheless played a 
significant part in political developments in the Russian Federation. The CPRF’s calls for the 
restoration of the Soviet Union and efforts to increase Russia’s status abroad first appealed to an 
electorate that regretted the nation’s loss of prestige and later influenced the policies of other 
political parties. By continuing along the same nationalist path as its predecessor, the CPRF has 
survived as the strongest opposition party in Russia. The nationalist origins of the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation can be seen in the manner of the demise of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU). The degree of change that took place in the CPSU in the six years from 
Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary in 1985 to August 1991 brought about the coup by 
conservatives who saw their party, their ideology and their empire (the Soviet Union) slipping away 
from them. The battle between reformers and conservatives is illustrated well in the formation of a 
Communist Party of the RSFSR within the CPSU that was, effectively, the predecessor of the 
CPRF. Conservative concerns that were articulated via this party continue to be seen in today’s 
CPRF.  
 The final years of the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev’s leadership, were years of economic 
crisis, rising unemployment and, eventually, political chaos. The increasing possibilities from the 
late 1980s to voice dissent enabled the open expression of nationalism across the republics. This 
became a deeply divisive force which led, in large part, to the end of the Union. A climate of 
growing despair and depression pervaded society as old certainties and the stability of the past 
disappeared to be replaced by shortages of food and other basic goods. Concerns about pollution of 
the environment were increasingly expressed and Gorbachev’s failed campaigns against alcoholism 
and corruption together with the long-running housing crisis also led to further disillusionment with 
the communist regime. The programme of economic reform was overtaken by political and 
economic disintegration. Problems arose from the attempt to democratise the political system at the 
same time as launching an economic reform programme – both of which took place during an 
economic crisis. 
In considering the final years of the CPSU, this chapter makes use of Fond 89 which 
includes a wide range of documents which are copies of papers held in the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History and the Russian State 
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Archive of Contemporary History. Documents in the collection reveal the nature of the changes in 
policy and the difficulties the party faced as it underwent reform from a revolutionary, vanguard 
party designed to lead the proletariat eventually to communism, towards becoming a parliamentary 
party and, as Gorbachev’s reforms moved the USSR from a socialist political and economic system, 
towards a market economy. These documents also indicate the difficulties encountered by the party 
with respect to the unexpected results of electoral reform, the divided support within the leadership 
for democratisation and the inability on the part of some of the leadership to accept the loss of 
support for the party. Concerns about the loss of legitimacy for the party as fewer workers were 
being elected and about control over the media and deputies newly elected to the Soviets being 
weakened are also evident. Many of these documents are copies of reports to the Central Committee 
by various departments and individuals, minutes of meetings and letters by ministers on political 
matters which reveal the manner of the disintegration of the CPSU.  
 Fond 89 shows the Politburo and the CPSU facing the challenges of democratisation and the 
realisation that power was slipping away from them. Many of these documents share common 
themes such as the fear of the party hierarchy that break-away groups from the CPSU, in particular 
the Democratic Platform, would succeed in their attempt to gain ownership of a proportion of CPSU 
funds in terms of membership dues and property in the form of party publishing companies and 
possibly television stations. The documents studied from Fond 89 cover the formation of platforms 
within the CPSU, the formation of new parties outside the CPSU, the loss of CPSU power through 
increasingly free elections, the formation of a Russian Communist Party within the CPSU, the 
CPSU’s evaluation of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe – which strongly indicated their 
failure to accept the rejection of communism as an ideology, the referendum on a renewed Union 
and the break up of the Soviet Union. This chapter begins with a comparison of the 1986 
Programme and the Draft 1991 Programme which also indicate direction of policy changes in the 
years covered by the documents from Fond 89 and articles from the party journal Kommunist, and 
the consideration of a move towards social democracy on the part of Gorbachev and his supporters. 
The roots of the CPRF can be seen in the conservative opposition within the CPSU to Gorbachev’s 
reforms and ideological shift away from traditional Marxism-Leninism towards the end of the Soviet 
era. 
 
THE 1986 AND 1991 PROGRAMMES 
 To put the scale of the evolution of policy into context, it is helpful to compare the 1986 
Programme of the CPSU with the draft Programme of 1991 which cover the same time period as the 
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documents studied from Fond 89. The 1986 Party Programme was approved by the 27th Congress of 
the CPSU in March that year but by the end of the Soviet era, the July 1991 Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU had approved a radically different Draft Programme to be discussed by the 
party. This was the sixth version of the Draft Programme that had been released for discussion after 
the June plenum and it is believed to have been written under Gorbachev’s direct supervision.336 The 
Central Committee approved the Draft almost unanimously in a resolution that stated that it was “an 
acceptable basis for additional work and discussion”337 which would indicate that there was fairly 
widespread support in this body for a move towards social democracy by this time, if only to save 
the party in the face of growing opposition. The Programme was due to be adopted by the party at 
the 29th Congress, scheduled for November 1991 which never took place as the party had been 
suspended following the August coup and banned on 6th November by decrees from Russian 
President, Boris Yeltsin.338 
The difference in tone between the two programmes, written just five years apart, is 
considerable and represents a recognition of the new political reality after the rejection of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the diversity of political opinion already apparent in the Soviet 
Union by this point. The assertion of the inevitability of the triumph of communism in the 1986 
Programme gave way to an admission in 1991 that the party needed to reform and that democracy 
should have been indivisible from socialism from the start. The 1986 Programme refers to 
“revolutionary struggle” and “the building of socialism” and describes the CPSU as a “worthy 
successor to the ideas of the socialist transformation of society proclaimed in the first programmatic 
document of the communists - the Communist Manifesto, to the unfading exploit of the heroes of 
the Paris Commune and to the revolutionary traditions of the international working class and of the 
Russian revolutionary democratic movement.”339 The “world historic mission of the proletariat as 
the creator of the new, communist system” and the claims of the existence of “objective laws of 
social development”, discovered by Marx and Engels and their “theoretically proved ... inevitability 
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of the collapse of capitalism,”340 however, are replaced by a more cautious tone in the 1991 draft 
Programme.  
 It is concern with democratic reforms and their progress in a “difficult and contradictory 
manner” along with reference to social, political, economic and inter-ethnic tensions that introduce 
the 1991 Programme. An objective valuation of the past and present is described as necessary along 
with a “realistic programme of action ... of consistent progress towards a humane, just and 
democratic society”.341 The declaration of “necessary and radical renewal of the party itself and a 
new understanding of its role and place in society”342 contrasts sharply with the previous 
Programme’s confident claim that the CPSU was “leading the Soviet people along the course of 
communist creative endeavour ...”343 The stated intention for the Programme to “answer the 
questions of the moment, to serve for the ideological basis of consolidation of communists of all 
sides of the socialist spectrum”344 acknowledges the change in policy to end the negative portrayal 
of social democracy.  
 In several articles in Kommunist in 1991, the idea of a change of direction towards social 
democracy was discussed. A recent growth of interest in the traditions and values of social 
democracy was remarked upon and the need for communists to compare social democracy with the 
path that they had been following and to see what they could learn in the interests of furthering 
perestroika.345 In an article in July 1991, it was pointed out that the “new spectrum of political 
powers” in Eastern Europe by this time were characterised by “the weakening position of left-wing 
parties and movements” and that a “notably diverse and intense battle has developed between the 
different political wings” and “important features of the situation appear to be widespread growth of 
an anticommunist mood in the countries of the region and the ‘repudiation of socialist values’”,346 
which reflects what must have been a growing understanding in the CPSU that it was the political 
system which had lost support. An article from the following issue asked whether “[a] new 
conception of socialism, worked out in the process of perestroika, allows a clear social-economic 
demarcation between socialism and communism, taking into account not only the experience of our 
country but also development of the socialist movement throughout the world,”347 implying that the 
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party sought to minimise the differences between the movements.  
 In the first issue of Svobodnaya Mysl’, which replaced Kommunist, the party’s theoretical 
journal, immediately after the August coup (and in which articles that had already been submitted 
had not been re-written to take into account the new political conditions), an article considered the 
new draft Programme. Deep concern was noted on the part of communists about moves towards 
social democracy by the CPSU. The perception of social democracy in negative terms as a result of 
“ideological stereotypes” of the Stalin era “when social democrats were considered to be ... 
irreconcilable opponent[s]”348 was something the article aspired to change. It noted that the old 
perceptions had continued up to the present in the minds of many party members which had resulted 
in a “fundamental review of approaches to the social democratic movement.349 The article 
concluded that the danger for the Communist Party was not in any move towards social democracy 
but rather in allowing the “real chance to overcome the enormous inflicted damage of the split to 
slip away and to slow down the formation of an international co-operation of left-socialist 
powers”.350 Indeed, despite claiming to see a need to work with other left-wing groups, communists 
in St Petersburg, interviewed for the fifth chapter of this thesis, continued to view social democracy 
in a very negative light. 
 It is a measure of how far the leadership of the Communist Party had moved away from the 
idea of the party automatically knowing what was right (as demonstrated by the tone of the 1986 
Programme) that by Spring 1991, the Central Committee was instructing the Departments of 
Organisation, Ideology, Humanities, Public Organisations and Socio-economics and Politics to look 
for inspiration for party organisation to opposition powers and make recommendations to the 
Central Committee. They were to “learn the tactics” of these parties and study their “ways and 
methods of acting”.351 There were no directions as to which parties were to be studied but clearly 
those that were successful in gaining and retaining power, were primarily of interest rather than 
those representing a similar ideology. 
  While the earlier Programme claimed that the CPSU had been and would continue to be a 
party of Marxism-Leninism and of revolutionary action,352 the 1991 draft referred to the CPSU as a 
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party of social progress, democratic reforms, social justice and values common to all mankind, of 
economic, political and spiritual freedom.353 While the 1986 Programme promotes the working class 
(and no other), the 1991 draft offers protection for the working class, in whose name, it reminds 
readers, the party was formed, during the “transition to the market”, but also specifically promises 
protection for the interests of the intelligentsia, women and ethnic minorities354 indicating a change 
of emphasis which could be considered consistent with moves towards the CPSU becoming a 
parliamentary-type party which would require it to have broad support and the recognition that 
groups other than those the party defined primarily as workers, also had rights.  
 The 1986 Programme claimed that “[t]he Marxist-Leninist theory of building the new 
society has been verified in practice on an international scale, socialism has asserted itself on vast 
expanses of the earth and hundreds of millions of people are following the road of creating a 
communist civilisation. More and more nations are losing their confidence in capitalism; they do not 
wish to associate their prospects of development with it and are persistently searching for and 
finding ways for the socialist transformation of their countries.”355 While five years later, and two 
years after the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe, the 1991 draft reflected the new political 
reality: it stated that the CPSU did not idealise the past but neither did the party renounce it.  
 Gorbachev’s avoidance of the official drafting commission set up by the 28th Congress in 
order to oversee the writing of the draft has been attributed to a wish to split the party into social 
democrats and conservatives with Gorbachev leading the social democratic successor to the CPSU. 
The outcome of such a split would have given Gorbachev a reformist support base that would have 
enabled him to challenge Russian President, Boris Yeltsin.356 However, the conservatives decided to 
accept the draft at the July plenum with the intention of challenging it at a scheduled 29th Congress 
in the autumn. Gorbachev’s attempt to provoke a split by drafting a programme that he knew the 
conservatives would not accept failed as the conservatives decided not to challenge the draft 
immediately and as the coup, two weeks after publication of the draft, effectively ended the 
CPSU.357 
As early as 1987, in a speech to the Central Committee, Gorbachev had referred to the need 
for ‘democratisation’ of the political system in order to achieve economic reforms358 but this was in 
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the context of the existing system. However, with the advent of his policy of glasnost’ (openness) 
which changed Soviet society in terms of what could be said and published, by the time of the 28th 
Congress, in 1990, with communism rejected across Eastern Europe and platforms coalescing in the 
CPSU for the first time since 1925, he declared that the CPSU would in future seek to remain the 
ruling party through winning majority support in elections. The Congress itself was divided with 
Democratic Platform members calling for the CPSU to become a parliamentary party competing in a 
multi-party political system while the conservatives called for it to remain a Leninist, vanguard 
party.359 Just over a year later the CPSU ceased to exist, banned after the coup which hoped to halt 
the move towards social democracy and the break-up of the old Soviet Union. Only two and a half 
years later, shortly after the ban on the lowest levels of the CPSU was lifted, did the conservatives 
manage to form a successor party. 
 
REACTION TO THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Both the documents in Fond 89 and articles in Kommunist show that the CPSU reacted to the 
fall of communism in Eastern Europe by blaming the East European communist parties. The blame 
for the fall of communism in the region was placed on the “authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes” in 
Kommunist in an article which acknowledged dissatisfaction with the ideology and noted the 
emergence of “slogans of renewal” including the word ‘socialism’ in a negative context in Eastern 
Europe, giving the examples: “Freedom, not socialism!”, “Socialism no longer!” and “No socialist 
experiments!” The authors of this article asked whether this signalled the breakdown of the socialist 
idea or just a temporary ‘allergy’ to anti-democratic regimes which called themselves socialist.360 
That it had become possible, by May 1990, to ask openly whether socialism was breaking down and 
to suggest that the breakdown of socialism was even possible (even if the authors were trying to 
suggest that it had not), is a measure of the extent to which Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ had 
progressed. However, this article refers to these countries, as a group of socialist states which were 
enduring “a crisis which a few people evaluate as ‘the end of socialism’”361 which indicates that at 
this stage the party was still denying the extent of what had clearly already happened. 
By comparison, an article in the same journal, just four months later admitted that the 
“difficult transformation” in Eastern Europe was from authoritarian single-party regimes, “operating 
under the flag of socialism (which was in fact not built), to pluralist parliamentary democracy, to 
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civil society and to a market economy”362 and that it was time for socialists to reorganise their ranks 
and adapt to new conditions.363 By July 1991, it was being reported in Kommunist that the number 
of members of communist parties in Eastern Europe had fallen by more than a third from 1990 
levels364 so admitting that there had been a loss of support for communism in Eastern Europe, rather 
than just a loss of support for those who had been in power. The party had finally accepted, perhaps 
in the face of growing pluralism in Russia by this time, that many voters really did want to choose 
parties other than the one that had claimed to govern in their interests for so long. 
A report to the Central Committee dated April 1990, “On the line of the CPSU on measures 
in support of Communist and Workers’ Parties in East European countries”, noted that the majority 
of East European communist and workers’ parties were in a state of deep ideological crisis and 
organisational disorder as a result of the swift political change in these countries.365 In an article 
published in Kommunist, nearly a year after the rejection of communism in Eastern Europe, it was 
claimed that the Communist leaders had discredited the idea of socialism in the eyes of the majority 
of workers, the intelligentsia and the young.366 It was also noted that the “weight of former 
mistakes” and “gravity of responsibility for deformation in socialist construction” was so great that 
none of the communist parties, with the exception of the Bulgarian party, had been able to survive 
and as a result they all had to undergo a deep transformation.367 It was not until September 1991, 
however, that an article was published in Svobodnaya Mysl’ debating whether or not socialism had 
any future.368 
The loss of the ‘buffer zone’ between the Soviet Union and Western Europe concerned the 
CPSU greatly. In a report to the Central Committee on a meeting of the Politburo on 2nd January 
1990 ‘On events in Eastern Europe and the position of the USSR’ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Defence, the KGB and the International Department were instructed to analyse the 
defence situation and make suggestions to the Politburo on what should be the furthest concessions 
the USSR should agree to in disarmament negotiations in order to guarantee the safety of the 
Union.369 The resolution of the Secretariat ‘On the development of the situation in Eastern Europe 
and our policy in this region’ noted that real or potential threats to the military security of the Soviet 
Union from Eastern Europe were inadmissible and that the region must remain free of any foreign 
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bases and military powers.370 In turn the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe was to be 
carried out with the maximum precautions for the safety of the military personnel leaving the region, 
which suggests that attacks on the Soviet Army as they left Eastern Europe were feared. The 
resolution also stated that the USSR was interested in the peaceful development of Eastern Europe 
and the transformation of the former communist countries into a “region of stability and co-
operation with constant progress towards a united European space” and the participation of the 
USSR in that space. As these countries were investigating the possibilities of establishing close links 
with what was then the EEC and other Europe-wide organisations and co-operation with NATO, the 
promised co-operation and the proposed “united European space” which would include the Soviet 
Union may have been an attempt to limit the influence of the West in the region. 
Concern was expressed in a resolution of the Secretariat ‘On the development of the 
situation in Eastern Europe and our policy in this region’ about the threat of ‘Balkanisation’ of inter-
state relations in the region, that regional conflicts might arise and a ‘belt of instability’ be created 
along the western borders of the Soviet Union.371 It was also feared that there was a serious danger 
that relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would further suffer as a result of the 
“authoritarian and nationalistic tendencies” which were emerging in the former communist countries 
and the effect the move away from communism might have on the Soviet Union. The continued 
existence of the USSR as a unified state, especially after recent events in the Baltics, the possibility 
of future claims on CPSU property and funds by republican parties declaring independence from 
Moscow and even of calls for the re-drawing of the Union’s internal borders were also reported as 
matters for concern.372 Concern was expressed that these states should not become an external 
catalyst for national separatism and “centrifugal tendencies” in the Soviet Union and that they 
should not become sources of anti-Soviet feeling or conductors of political power with plans to 
redraw the political map of Europe.373 The resolution promised a new era of co-operation on the part 
of the Soviet Union in European politics. In order to guarantee the interests of the USSR in Eastern 
Europe the decision had been taken that considerable value should be attached to existing and 
potential co-operation between the CPSU and other political parties in Eastern Europe, where these 
parties were influential.374  
 The resolution also noted “the stormy character of change” in the region which “urgently 
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demanded a new interpretation of the Soviet Union’s interests, aims and strategies in the region”. 
The reorientation of trade links with Eastern Europe towards Western markets was reported to 
involve greater difficulty than had previously been expressed by the party.375 The resolution noted 
that Eastern Europe was the Soviet Union’s natural market for its industrial products, for foreign 
investment, “enterprise and other economic activity” and that in the context of market reform the 
region’s significance for the Union would increase.376 It seems from this resolution that the party 
had underplayed the importance of Eastern European markets for the Soviet economy. The view was 
expressed that the Union’s main economic interests in the region should remain protected for the 
foreseeable future in order to “strengthen internal measures for the stabilisation of the national 
economy of the USSR.”377 
As well as political links, it also highlighted the concern about the USSR’s continued 
cultural presence in the area and the promotion of the Russian language, noting that there should be 
no economising on funding for this policy as “we are talking about capital for the future”.378 This 
concern with Russian culture and language was also evident in the CP RSFSR and, since its 
formation, has been a defining feature of the CPRF (such concerns were expressed by interviewees 
in St Petersburg for Chapter 5). Concern was expressed that although the old system had collapsed 
in Eastern Europe, it had not yet been replaced with a new one and that loss of interest in the region 
on the part of the Soviet Union was perceived to be the case by the West. The view was expressed 
that this was not so despite the “huge material and spiritual investment” on the part of the Soviet 
Union having ended.379 The region’s “geopolitical, historical-political and ethno-cultural” links with 
the Union were to remain one of the most important considerations for Soviet politics according to 
the resolution, despite political relations having deteriorated and the outlook for the future, with the 
election of governments hostile to the Soviet Union, being regarded as bleak.380  
 
THE EFFECTS OF GLASNOST’ 
 For most of the duration of the Soviet Union, the media were strictly censored. All forms of 
media were controlled by the party, editors had to be approved by the party, newspapers, journals 
and television stations were told what they should report and how.381 Glasnost’ was not an entirely 
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new idea - it had already been mentioned by Brezhnev - apparently meaning that the authorities 
should inform the public about decisions which they had already taken, in order to keep the public 
informed about the activities of the party.382 This idea was revived by Gorbachev, becoming a policy 
of ‘openness’ intended, for example, to help expose inefficiency in the economy in order to help 
drive economic reform and by 1986 including political reform as well.383 By 1989, however, 
demands for greater political choice and greater freedom of information led to glasnost’ gradually 
becoming equated with, and later superseded by, the idea of freedom of speech.384 On 1st August 
1990 a law “On the Press and Other Media of Mass Information” came into effect. This law 
effectively legitimised the voicing of anti-communist views and officially removed the media from 
communist party supervision with the result that censorship officially ended (with a few exceptions) 
and the law allowed for the private ownership of newspapers, radio and television stations, provided 
they registered with the state.385 Problems arose for the Politburo with the results of glasnost’ as 
some members could not accept that, given greater freedom to report more widely on elections and 
other events, the demands and promises of alternative candidates were being reported and voters 
were believing whatever they chose. 
Various documents in Fond 89 consider the effects of changes in the media resulting from 
glasnost’ and the increasing concern that power was slipping away from the CPSU towards other 
political organisations. Frolov - a member of the Politburo and chief editor of Pravda, complained to 
the meeting of the Politburo on 22nd March, 1990, that too much attention was being paid to 
“Democratic Russia and others” (the various platforms that were forming in the CPSU - discussed 
below) by the media which amounted to publicity for their causes386 and similarly, there appears to 
have been concern that the party was losing control over the release of information to the public and 
that information was being released as it became available rather than after CPSU approval. 
Vorotnikov complained that the television programme ‘Vremya’ had named “some comrade 
Ruzhitskii” as an RSFSR People’s Deputy. He complained that there was no basis for any such 
declaration on television, then confirmed that this candidate had indeed been elected and that this 
would be confirmed by the Central Electoral Commission shortly when that organisation published 
the list of elected deputies.387  
 As late as March 1990, when this meeting was held, there seems to have been a lack of 
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acceptance of the effects of glasnost’. V. A. Kryuchkov - a member of the Central Committee and 
Chair of the KGB - informed the Politburo of his seemingly contradictory ideas on the press. He 
praised Pravda for improving and becoming more interesting (but without specifying what he felt 
made the publication more interesting than it had been in the past) and reported that he understood 
that interest in Pravda was increasing but then criticised the paper for not keeping to what he called 
“an accurate orientation” and for a lack of clarity about the political orientation of the writers. He 
complained in particular that it was impossible to tell whether an author was supporting a left- or 
right-wing point of view. He concluded by saying that Pravda “must give a clear line on all 
matters.”388 Other concerns raised about the media included a report to the Central Committee, also 
in March 1990, which expressed concern that Pravda should retain its role in “strengthening [the 
party’s] ideological-political influence on the masses” during the “process of root transformation of 
all spheres of life of society ... and the renewal of the party, its style and methods of its activity”.389 
In a report to the Central Committee in April 1990, “On the reorganisation of the work of 
television and radio broadcasting”, V. A. Medvedev, a member of the Politburo, Yu. A. Manaenkov, 
a Central Committee Secretary and M. F. Nenashev, Chairman of the State Committee for the Press, 
noted that radio and television were not only the means of mass information, but also the most 
important instrument of protection of society and state interests and assistance in guaranteeing law 
and order and peace in the Soviet Union. They remarked that “[i]n society there is an intense battle 
between different organisations and groups for influence on television and radio broadcasting”390 
and that the absence of “legislatively strengthened norms and rules” for journalists working in radio 
and television, particularly programmes going out live, was preventing the effective regulation of 
the broadcast media.391 This “intense battle” may have been a reference to Democratic Russia’s 
potential to gain control of television in Leningrad after its successes in the elections. Nenashev 
informed the meeting of his concerns about sharing power with Democratic Russia, he urged serious 
consideration of who would head the militia, television and radio. He suggested that a decision be 
made as to what extent the Leningrad television station was regional and to what extent all-Union 
and said that the majority (but did not say a majority of whom) were in favour of defining it as All-
Union television,392 presumably to ensure continued CPSU control of the station and therefore 
control of the output.  
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 Nenashev also explained that there was a difficult situation in Moscow as Central television 
had effectively got seven deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR including three people who 
worked for the current affairs programme ‘Vzglyad’.393 Nenashev continued by recommending a 
reconsideration of electoral law. He explained to the meeting that in America there was a very clear 
position on such matters “I am not exaggerating”, were his precise words, (suggesting that foreign 
experience of elections was so far removed from electoral experience at home that he wasn’t 
expecting those listening to believe him), as he told the meeting that those who worked in the media 
in America were barred from standing for election and even from participating in the election 
campaign. Whereas in Russia, they could be, and were, deputies. “They will become completely 
uncontrollable”394 was his next remark, indicating that the party was still aiming to direct those who 
had been elected rather than allow them to act independently.  
This was not the only opinion expressed on the subject. In a further discussion of Leningrad 
television later in the meeting, it was suggested that the party should withdraw from its role at the 
station. Medvedev pointed out to the meeting that the country was standing on the threshold of 
multiparty politics and that maybe they should not be hindering this development but going into the 
process recognising that it would bring “greater political clarity” and “far clearer demarcation of 
powers”.395 However, no support was registered in the minutes for this suggestion. The CPSU had 
enacted electoral changes but could not accept the outcomes of those changes as though the party 
had not expected to lose power, perhaps just a few deputies. It seems that the voters were still 
expected to vote the ‘right’ way, even when they had a choice. They were not expected to choose 
‘against’ their interests. 
 V. A. Ivashko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and member of the 
Politburo, used the phrase “I am telling you openly and directly” to preface his remark that workers 
were not interested in political struggle, which suggests that this subject had not been fully 
addressed before. Ivashko explained that he felt it was necessary for him to say this as the current 
conditions allowed for “confrontation and dissemination of all kinds and for many unfounded 
rumours to circulate”.396 He went on to describe a particular situation in Ukraine where someone, 
whom he described as looking like a “solid, intelligent person”, had stood in front of a metro station 
in Kiev and yet had told people not to vote for Ivashko as he had “sold his dacha for 200 thousand” 
and passers-by had come up to this person and asked him for further details. It appears Ivashko 
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meant this as an example of, as he saw it, the “slanderous remarks” being made by “any 
unprincipled person”.397 The reason, then, according to Ivashko for workers not standing for 
parliament and not voting in the numbers that they had done previously appears to have been the 
negative propaganda against the regime. One remark from an interviewee in Chapter 5 refers to 
workers not being interested in politics as a particular problem for the CPRF. 
 Outside influence on events within the Union evidently worried the CPSU leadership as 
well. A report to the Central Committee, dated 15th March 1991, by the Department of Ideology and 
the International Department on the reports by western radio stations on the activities of opposition 
groups in Russia noted that on 25th February, on Voice of America, the co-chairmen of the 
Republican Party of the Russian Federation - Lysenko and Sulakshin had set out their party’s 
programme in detail, appealed to communists to leave the CPSU and join their party instead. It was 
also noted (presumably with some concern) that the telephone number for people to contact them if 
they wanted to join the party had been advertised twice during the radio programme. According to 
the report the co-chairmen admitted making statements criticising the CPSU, President of the USSR 
and the Union government.398 The rest of the report covered concern about the nature of broadcasts 
in Russian on Voice of America, the BBC and Radio Free Europe because of their coverage of the 
work of opposition parties. However, by this time the law “On the Press and Other Media of Mass 
Information” had been effective for seven months meaning that such coverage was perfectly legal. 
Further political change was clearly envisaged before the demise of the CPSU but because of 
the coup, this further democratisation could not be implemented. A resolution of the Secretariat in 
April 1991 instructed the Department of Ideology to prepare a survey on “Foreign experience of the 
functioning of a state federal system” to be sent to party committees.399 An article in Kommunist in 
June 1991 discussed the idea that an important precondition for stability in the USSR was inclusion 
in the world community400 and the need for such inclusion may have influenced the leadership’s 
move towards social democracy and away from communism. An article in the first issue of 
Svobodnaya Mysl’ mentioned three fundamental reorganisations of the CPSU: firstly, an end to 
totalitarianism in the party and society; secondly, an end to the discredited nomenklatura and a 
reduction in the apparat for the transformation of the CPSU into a strong democratic party and, 
thirdly, the development of clearly divided legislative, executive and judicial powers.401 Had the 
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coup not taken place when it did, this article would have been published while the CPSU was still in 
power. 
 
LOSS OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER THOSE ELECTED AND ELECTORS 
 In January 1987, Gorbachev proposed to the Central Committee that one-candidate elections 
should end and the first elections with more than one candidate took place the following June. In 
September 1987, Gorbachev announced publicly the new doctrine of ‘socialist pluralism’ - that 
public opinion did not have to appear completely unanimous any longer402 and in the following 
elections to district, city and regional soviets 57 per cent of the newly elected deputies in the 
Russian Republic were not party members - a surprise result for the CPSU.403 Before the electoral 
law of 1988 was passed, there were no more candidates on the ballot paper than there were seats 
available but it was possible to vote against a candidate or candidates by crossing their name(s) out 
but this required the use of a polling booth whereas an unmarked ballot paper counted as a vote in 
favour.404  
A draft Resolution of the Central Committee of February 1987 on elections to the Soviets of 
Peoples’ Deputies included in Fond 89, began the process of making Soviet elections more 
democratic and slightly less of a foregone conclusion. In this resolution the established practice, in 
which electors could take their ballot papers straight to the ballot box, as an unmarked paper counted 
as a vote in favour of the candidate, was criticised. It was strongly recommended that this practice 
be replaced by electors having to go to the polling booth in order to mark their papers in secret. It 
was noted that this meant alteration of the location of the booth in polling stations and that an 
improvement in construction of the booths would be necessary. It was further suggested that the 
marking of ballot papers on behalf of electors who did not turn up to vote be forbidden as such a 
practice led to a distortion of the actual picture of participation of electors in elections.405 
 This significant step along the path to democratisation was followed by various political 
reforms including, eventually, the rewording of Article 6 of the Constitution which guaranteed the 
CPSU’s monopoly on power to allow other parties to exist. The article in the January 1990 edition 
of Kommunist tried to justify the party’s past undemocratic actions, noting that the CPSU was 
“brought into political crisis by its transformation from a political party into a state structure” and 
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that this transformation had already occurred by the end of the 1920s. The article also noted the 
probable inevitability of such a development in “conditions of a totalitarian structure with a single 
party system”.406 It mentioned the “highest level” of the party having recognised that the process of 
democratisation of the party was well behind the democratisation of society and that the Central 
Committee had noted on 18th July that year, that the source of the crisis was not the party itself but 
its “outdated style and methods of work”.407 In view of the demise of communism in Eastern Europe 
and increasing opposition to its own rule in the Soviet Union, the CPSU was becoming acutely 
aware of the belated need to justify its actions to the population. 
 Politburo member V. I. Vorotnikov informed a meeting of the Politburo on 22nd March, 
1990, that about 70 per cent of the electorate had taken part in the elections on 18th March 1990 for 
the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies of the RSFSR.408 He also pointed out that a sharp drop had been 
noted in the number of women, workers and kolkhoz workers elected and that a further problem had 
arisen in the form of organisations being represented by more than one deputy. Vorotnikov is 
reported as having said: “we had determined that any one organisation might nominate only one 
candidate but ‘Argumenty i fakty’ has got 5 deputies in the Supreme Soviet because they were 
nominated by different organisations, that is by enterprises, scientific collectives and higher 
education establishments.” Moscow State University had also ended up with high representation.409 
Once again, there is a sense of political events running out of the party’s control. 
 Later in the meeting there was a debate about whether the election of workers was more 
important for legitimacy for the party or the election of business directors and others who 
represented the direction in which the economy was being reformed. Ivashko informed the Politburo 
that 85 per cent of the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet in Ukraine were communists, of which 
75 per cent were what he described as “our people”. He asked where the votes and support of the 
workers had gone, appearing to complain that over a quarter of the deputies were “big leaders” - 
enterprise directors - representing the party in the Supreme Soviet. However, this was something 
that a previous speaker, A. V. Vlasov, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Chair of the RSFSR 
Council of Ministers and candidate member of the Politburo, seemed to consider a good idea, saying 
that the parliament in Russia consisted of “well qualified people”, including 22 per cent of those 
elected being enterprise directors, directors of organisations, kolkhozes and infrastructure and 12 per 
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cent being representatives of science.410  
This was a problem that had also been raised three months earlier. The report to the Politburo 
in December 1989, “On measures to improve the work with People’s Deputies from the number of 
workers”, by V. Yarin (a People’s Deputy) noted the difficulty posed by the low number of workers 
elected.411 Yarin noted that in the course of the electoral campaign it had become clear that “... under 
new conditions, the biggest difficulty in the battle for the democratic mandate is with representatives 
of different categories of the intelligentsia ... As a result ... only 18 per cent of deputies are workers.” 
The new dominance of the intelligentsia in elected bodies reflected a general change taking place in 
the party at this time as the CPSU was losing its presence in the industrial sector in 1990 in terms of 
members and becoming a party of the intelligentsia and bureaucrats.412  
Yarin went on to explain that workers were having difficulties understanding matters being 
discussed in the Supreme Soviet and advised that it was the responsibility of the Communist Party to 
help them by appointing a team of communist consultants to help the recently elected workers. He 
suggested that the lack of assistance available to workers had “serious consequences for their 
popularity with the electors”413 which indicates a perception that if workers can be made to appear 
more competent, more of them would be elected. Frolov asked the meeting if Soviet power in 
Russia could still be considered worker-peasant power to which Vorotnikov replied that workers and 
peasants made up 6.7 per cent of those elected to the higher organs of power, not counting kolkhoz 
directors. Gorbachev asked whether it was possible to consider government in Russia to be ‘worker-
peasant government’, to which no direct answer was offered. It was clear that communists were no 
longer in power but, according to the minutes of this meeting, no one was prepared to acknowledge 
this directly. 
 There appears to have been a lack of understanding that voters did not want to vote for the 
CPSU anymore or an inability to believe that voters would choose ‘against’ their interests by not 
choosing the CPSU. Vorotnikov told the meeting that the electors faced difficulties in deciding who 
to vote for as ballot papers listed as many as twenty-eight candidates in some areas. He remarked 
that “it was simply a lottery” as to who won the elections as sometimes people were confused by the 
large number of candidates.414 He also remarked that there was much pressure and influence exerted 
on electors (presumably by other parties engaging in electoral campaigning), “which influenced the 
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electorate”.415 Again, the way Vorotnikov’s remarks were phrased appears strange. What did he 
think was the point of electoral programmes, if not to win the support of the electorate for one 
candidate at the expense of the others? He reminded the meeting that this “pressure and influence” 
broke the “Law on Elections”,416 however, the election laws for the Congress of People’s Deputies 
permitted campaigning on the part of all candidates. Article 38 stated that the programme of 
candidates to become people’s deputies of the RSFSR was to set out their proposed future political 
intentions once elected and the only limitations in the laws on the contents of the programme were 
that candidates must not support violent change of the constitution, war propaganda or calls for 
racial, inter-ethnic or religious intolerance, calls to break the law or infringe the rights of citizens.417 
Article 39 stated that candidates were allowed five agents to help with carrying out their electoral 
campaigns, to assist with “agitation” for the candidate’s election as a deputy.418 Article 40 stated that 
organisations that had nominated a candidate would not be hindered from campaigning on that 
candidate’s behalf. They were also guaranteed the right to campaign for or against candidates at 
meetings, in newspapers and on television and radio.419 It is hard to believe that Vorotnikov was not 
familiar with the new law. 
 There was further concern that of the 1029 deputies, about 20 per cent were considered to be 
supporters of Democratic Platform, with a further 10 per cent considered to be wavering supporters, 
according to Vorotnikov. He also accused the “democratic powers” of openly breaking the laws by 
calling for a boycott of the elections.420 Vorotnikov pointed out that Moscow and Leningrad seemed 
to be their centres of influence and that other areas had not seen similar defeats of communists. 
Gorbachev asked if it were possible to come to the conclusion that the working class in Moscow 
already supported their ideas - Vorotnikov replied that it seemed so.421  
 Yu. A. Prokof’ev - First Secretary of Moscow City Branch - informed the meeting of the 
Politburo of the CC CPSU on the 22nd March 1990 that 69 per cent of those elected to the Supreme 
Soviet were party members, 58 per cent of those elected to the Moscow Soviet and 64 per cent to the 
regional Soviets. He remarked that only 21 of the 64 people elected to the Supreme Soviet supported 
the position of the party, the other 43 were supporters of ‘Democratic Russia’ and of those 43, 23 
definitely did not support the party, 7 were in the ‘Democratic Platform of the CPSU’, 7 were 
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members of the group ‘Moscow Elector’ or ‘Memorial’ and 4 were social-democrats. Prokof’ev told 
the meeting that it was the opinion of some (but he did not specify who) that ‘Democratic Russia’ 
was a just pre-electoral bloc and that how they would vote and which programme they would 
support remained to be seen.422  
 Another indication of the vastly different experience of elections in the Soviet Union from 
that in democratic systems is provided by the following exchange on the promotion of under-
represented ethnic groups in elections. Gorbachev asked at the meeting of the Politburo of the CC 
CPSU on the 22nd March 1990 if this promotion had finished everywhere, to which Vorotnikov 
replied that it had not. There had been a problem in the national-territorial okrug of Kabardino-
Balkaria. Vorotnikov informed the meeting that the situation was now difficult (although it appears 
from the minutes that this promotion had ended in the region) as all the deputies elected were 
Kabardinians. Negotiations had taken place with the first secretary, Kotovii, who suggested he be 
given a quota for Balkars. Vorotnikov had explained to him that this could not be done any more 
and told the Politburo that it was necessary to educate the electorate to choose the sort of candidates 
who would win.423 In comparison with earlier comments, this indicates either an understanding of, 
or acceptance of, the fact that the results could not be manipulated in a democratic election although, 
understandably in view of ethnic tensions in the Union, it also shows the wish still to direct the 
electorate towards making the “correct” choices for electoral candidates. 
 Ivashko noted that the party’s fortunes were very uneven in the elections. He informed the 
Politburo that in Ukraine, many party organisations were not sufficiently prepared for electoral 
competition and so meetings were being held with secretaries of raikom parties later that month to 
explain to them that it was necessary to “fight for real” which suggests that it had not been realised 
by some regional committees how much effort was needed in elections when alternatives to the 
Communist Party were available. However, in some oblasts, where the party had previously been 
encountering difficulties, the reverse was true and communist candidates had won. Ivashko 
explained: “[p]arty organisations were beginning to compete and were doing so competently, they 
had been asking themselves how they should act and devising campaigning methods.”424 He 
continued by saying that serious consultation was going on within the Communist Party in Ukraine 
as to their future course of action and they had decided not to hinder the creation of other political 
parties. The Ukrainian Communists had come to the conclusion, he said, that opposition to the 
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formation of other parties would only strengthen their authority.425 
 
FORMATION OF PLATFORMS WITHIN THE CPSU 
 As well as a growing sense of loss of control over the electoral process, the CPSU began to 
lose control over its own members. While democratic centralism had been an important mechanism 
for controlling any dissent for decades, in the past it had been backed up by a more totalitarian 
regime. Democratic centralism “... provided for full discussion of issues until a decision was 
reached; after that, there was to be no further debate, and action on implementing the decision was 
required of all members and organisations”,426 however, by 1989 glasnost’ had reached the point 
where it had become possible to express a range of opinions and as a result, divisions had increased 
within the party to the point of platforms forming within the CPSU. 
 The Democratic Platform was the first faction to be established in the party since factions 
were banned in the 1920s. It was based on the ‘Communists for Perestroika’ Moscow Party Club 
which had been set up in April 1989. A year later similar clubs existed in all republics of the Soviet 
Union and in over a hundred cities, an All-Union Co-ordination Council had been formed and a 
newspaper established - Democratic Platform - with a circulation of 50,000.427 The Democratic 
Platform held its first conference in Moscow on 20th and 21st January 1990 which was attended by 
party members from 13 Soviet republics. This conference adopted a charter which called for a 
transition to a multiparty parliamentary political system,428 a demand that would have been 
completely unthinkable just over a year earlier. Other factions formed and it has been suggested that 
with eight different “strands of opinion” having been identified in the party at the end of 1989 and 
three groups having published their programmes or platforms, the CPSU could effectively be seen as 
a “pluralist institution” by this time.429  
A report to the Secretariat “On the faction ‘Communists for Democracy’” by the deputy 
manager of the Department for Organisation gives details of the formation of the faction at the Third 
Extraordinary Congress of the People’s Deputies of the RSFSR on 3rd April, 1991.430 The faction 
had declared its formation to be the result of disagreement with the “destructive and inflexible 
position of the parliamentary group Communists of Russia” and its strategic aim to become a mass, 
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social-political organisation. The faction anticipated an all-party discussion of confidence in the 
leadership of the CPSU, an extraordinary meeting of the Congress of the party and re-election for 
the current leadership of the CP RSFSR (see below).431 The report noted that in defiance of the 
statute which forbade factions, the group intended not to leave the party but to “carry out their 
destructive work in remaining members of the CPSU.”432 The report noted deep concern at the 
formation of this faction, comparing it with the “destructive activity of ‘Democratic Platform in the 
CPSU’ and other groups, which had arisen on the eve of the 28th Congress”.433  
 A resolution of the Secretariat, dated August 1990, “On recommendations to party 
committees in connection with the claims of representatives of the Democratic Platform” took a 
very conciliatory tone. It was reported that many members were leaving the party for various 
reasons, a particular worry having been the numbers of members in scientific-research institutes and 
colleges of further education where there were “many hesitating people”.434 It was considered 
necessary to “show tact and understanding towards each communist supporter of the Democratic 
Platform,” many of whom were reported sincerely to want the renewal of party life and were 
thought to be prepared to work for the renewal of the CPSU rather than genuinely wishing to leave 
it. It was suggested that they be supported and their views respected, that they should be actively 
included in party work as their radicalism was expected to have a positive effect on party reform. 
The level of support for the Democratic Platform was unclear but the importance of “establishing 
dialogue with doubting communists” was emphasised in order to discourage them from leaving the 
party.435  
There were two very pressing reasons for the CPSU leadership to discourage Democratic 
Platform members from leaving the party. The first was the steady fall in CPSU membership in the 
final years of the party’s existence and hence the party’s income from membership dues and the 
second was the Democratic Platform’s claims to a share of CPSU property. There was a debate 
within the Platform because some members were concerned that the Platform might lose any claim 
to party assets if members left the CPSU so some called for a split in the CPSU rather than for 
members to leave the party. At the Platform’s second conference on 16th and 17th June 1990, 
however, it was decided that if the platform’s proposal to transform the CPSU into a democratic, 
parliamentary party was not accepted by the party then the platform should leave and set up a 
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separate party.436 
  A report by the sub-Department of Propaganda of the Ideology Department “On the visit by 
V. I. Belov and V. N. Lysenko, People’s Deputies of the RSFSR, to Blagoveshchensk and Irkutsk as 
representatives of the Democratic Platform” at the end of July 1990 claims that the basic motive for 
the meetings was criticism of the CPSU. The party was criticised for being a totalitarian type of 
party and the apparatus was accused of trying to preserve its monopoly on power and doing all it 
could to curtail perestroika.437 The report lists the following as typical extracts from the meetings: 
that members of the Democratic Platform left the CPSU as the 28th Congress showed that the party 
was incapable of reforming itself; that statements at the Congress claiming that the majority of 
Democratic Platform members did not support the proposal to leave the CPSU were just provocation 
orchestrated by the leadership; support was voiced for Yeltsin, who was described as a “wise 
political actor and consistent democrat”; and that the aim of the Democratic Platform was to 
encourage opposition to the “all-powerful apparatus of the CPSU”.438  
The writers of the report also noted that direct questions from the floor were not answered 
directly or that answers were ‘very evasive’ although the report lists none of the questions that were 
asked and gives no example of ‘evasive’ answers.439 It was reported that the leadership of 
Democratic Platform felt that this would subsequently allow them to officially demand the division 
of property of the CPSU and that a proportion of it be handed over to the Platform and that 
membership dues paid by Democratic Platform members from the time of registration of members 
of the Platform in the CPSU up until the time the Platform would separate from the CPSU be 
handed over to the Democratic Platform. It was assumed by the leadership of the Platform that the 
funds they wished to claim could be transferred into the Platform’s bank accounts in Moscow or the 
regions. Their main claims on CPSU property are reported to have focused on Communist Party 
publishing companies, which the Democratic Platform claimed should be nationalised, and on the 
buildings for which the Communist Party did not pay taxes to the Soviets.440  
 This is one of the main issues which emerges from the Fond 89 documents studied: the 
preoccupation of the Democratic Platform with obtaining a share of CPSU property and the 
preoccupation of the leadership of the CPSU with preventing them from doing so. According to the 
report by the Department of Ideology’s Sub-department of Propaganda to the CPSU Central 
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Committee “On the visit of representatives of the Democratic Platform to Blagoveshchensk and 
Irkutsk”, it was seen to be necessary to redefine the party’s position on property and party work 
before too much criticism could be levelled at it on these counts by the Democratic Platform. The 
report noted that local party committees believed that action was necessary to ‘set the record 
straight’, as they saw it, in terms of the Democratic Platform’s programme. Above all, they saw a 
clear position on the property of the CPSU, especially its publishing industries and the role of party 
organisation in the army, MVD, KGB and workers’ collectives as being most necessary in the 
circumstances. It was suggested in the report that these questions be addressed at a Central 
Committee Plenum, before the start of the conference being held by Democratic Platform 
supporters.441  
 Whilst the resolution of the Secretariat “On recommendations to party committees in 
connection with the claims of representatives of the Democratic Platform” claimed that the illegality 
of the property claims of Democratic Platform should be made clear in party organisations,442 it was 
conceded, however, that organisations and citizens, claiming property of the CPSU, had the legal 
right on the basis of article 29 of the Civil Code and other acts to bring the matter to court. However, 
by law 10 per cent of the value of the property under dispute had to be paid in state tax and the 
resolution pointed out that the money would be forfeited whether the claimant won or lost the 
case.443  
 
FORMATION OF PARTIES OUTSIDE THE CPSU 
With the adoption of the law on political parties on 9th October 1990, it became possible for 
parties other than the CPSU to exist legally and they began to form very quickly after this law was 
passed. The potential of the new parties that began to form outside the CPSU to threaten its position, 
especially after defeating communist candidates in local and republican elections in 1990, concerned 
the party to the extent that a lengthy Politburo meeting was devoted almost entirely to analysing the 
problems which had arisen due to the loss of communist control of the city Soviets in Moscow and 
Leningrad. Prokof’ev noted that the Communist Party’s opponents had presented a “very attractive 
but entirely unrealistic” programme to the electorate.444 This programme, which had led to the loss 
of CPSU control of the city Soviets in Moscow and Leningrad, had been the work of the coalition 
“Democratic Russia”. Prokof’ev noted at the meeting that there were people who were said to have 
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joined Democratic Russia just to get elected as a deputy.445 Frolov asked why the party was losing 
prominent people; he feared that this sustained loss would ruin the party. He pointed out that 20 per 
cent of deputies were party and Soviet employees and that it was no victory when the party 
apparatus or workers involved in running elections won and that it was clear to him that old cadres 
had to be removed more energetically, if not entirely from power and that the party was suffering 
because of the type of members who were being elected. He remarked that if anyone who thought 
that the CPSU differed notably from communist parties in Eastern Europe they were mistaken and 
that if some kind of open voting went ahead then, membership of the party would be revealed to be 
in serious trouble.446 Clearly it was recognised by this point that people had joined the party for 
reasons other than ideological conviction and that it was necessary for the party to find strong 
candidates who would be seen as effective and competent deputies. 
 Prokof’ev informed the Politburo that two weeks earlier he had held a meeting in Moscow to 
try to avert a possible split in the local party organisation. He had recommended at that meeting that 
a political platform be formulated for the Central Committee democratisation of the party was the 
preferred solution of the Politburo to the present difficulties, rather than a split. Prokof’ev reported 
that this was agreed in principle and two representatives from Moscow Higher Party School had 
been appointed to work jointly on this proposed platform. Prokof’ev also remarked that a meeting of 
Moscow Higher Party School had been held on 18-19th March at which opinion on the future of the 
party was divided (60 people had participated altogether of whom 36 were members of Soviets from 
over 20 cities). At this meeting Yu. N. Afanas’ev, Editor of Kommunist and the first prominent 
person to resign from the CPSU in April 1990, T. Kh. Gdlyan, a lawyer who investigated high level 
corruption and was expelled from the CPSU later in 1990, I. Chubais, a member of the Democratic 
Platform, and N. V. Ivanov, a lawyer, also expelled from the CPSU later in 1990, had insisted that 
the party should split immediately (before the 28th Congress), that they should leave the party, 
declare the existence of a new party and so attract new members. They felt they had to leave the 
CPSU in order to increase their influence considering their presence in the Communist Party to be a 
hindrance.447 The manoeuvring for members and property of the CPSU began in 1990 as some 
CPSU members had the foresight to realise that the party was going to split and that multiparty 
elections, as were about to happen in Eastern Europe, were inevitable in the Soviet Union too. 
 The Democratic Platform left the CPSU and some CPSU members were expelled for 
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supporting the platform. Members then formed the Republican Party of the Russian Federation 
(RPRF) and held a Constituent Conference in Moscow on 17th and 18th November, 1990 and 
declared the new party in favour of a market economy and social democracy.448 A report to the 
Central Committee, by I. Polozkov - member of the Politburo and leader of the CP RSFSR, dated 
December 1990, informed the Committee of the founding congress of the RPRF. The report noted 
the average age of those joining the party as 36-50 and the fact that many were well educated, that 
they were “representatives of middle layers of the scientific-technical intelligentsia” and that the 
majority were former CPSU members.449 Grave concern was noted at the RPRF’s anticipated ability 
to deepen opposition between the Russian government and that of the Soviet Union.450 The report 
noted that in spite of the party’s small membership, it represented a serious danger to the CPSU in 
that its strength was electoral competition, its leaders used “pseudo-Marxist terminology”, were 
strong supporters of human rights and publicised their “irresponsible” activity in the media. As a 
remedy to the adverse effect of this party on support for the CPSU a discussion in the media of 
problems with the RPRF’s programme (and of the programmes of other parties) was proposed in 
order to show how they would not solve the most urgent social and economic problems.451 The 
CPSU leadership was concerned that the party was losing some of its most able members to an 
organisation that it could see was going to create further division in the rapidly disintegrating Union. 
 Another major cause for concern was the republican communist parties that broke away from 
the CPSU or split into pro- and anti-independence parties. This happened in all three of the Baltic 
states and their bases of support declined drastically.452 The Georgian and Moldovan parties also left 
the CPSU453 and in most of the other republics Marxist platforms and platforms calling for reforms 
had been established by July 1991.454 The splits were driven by competition from nationalist 
platforms and parties in each of the republics that quickly drew considerable support.  
Again, the division of property and income became an issue for the party. A resolution of the 
Secretariat, from August 1990, “On details of the meeting and discussion of party assets with 
Communists and workers in the Lithuanian SSR” noted that the separatist leadership deliberately 
postponed the negotiations in the hope of the situation in Russia worsening, attempting also to gain 
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the maximum amount of time for preparing legislation directed at the “further destruction of the 
economic and legal basis of the Soviet socialist state of Lithuania, and namely: the continued 
denationalisation of the means of production, the forced de-collectivisation of the economy and full 
dismantling of Soviet power and restoration of a totalitarian bourgeois dictatorship in Lithuania.”455  
 A report was submitted to the Central Committee, dated 4th July 1991 (only a month and a 
half before the coup) by the Organisation Department and by N. Kruchina, the business manager of 
the Central Committee “On the question of registration of the Communist Party of Estonia 
(independent).” The report stated that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic 
was considering the question of the application of the Communist Party of Estonia to be registered 
as the CPE (independent) and declared the legal successor to the Estonian Communist Party which 
had been founded in 1920. The report stated that the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the republic on the registration of CPE(independent) was in contradiction to the law “On 
the unification of citizens” (art.26) and constituted “a unilateral exit … from the CPSU.”456 
However, the law on the formation of political parties had already been passed by this time and this 
represents another instance of the CPSU trying to avoid adhering to a law that it had enacted. The 
report declared the CPE leadership’s actions illegal in terms of Estonian law and that this action 
infringed the political interests of communists who wished to retain ideological and organisational 
unity with the CPSU.457 Again property considerations were a matter of concern with the report 
declaring the impossibility of the CPE using any CPSU property after the split had taken place.458 It 
was argued that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic had unlawfully taken 
upon itself the function of determining the legal successor to the CPE and that it was not correct to 
consider the registration of the party as the legal successor to the CPE founded in 1920 on either a 
legal or factual basis.459 
 Despite a similar split in Latvia, a resolution of the Secretariat, dated 1st August 1991, “On 
the work of the Communist Party of Latvia in conditions of political opposition” noted that the 
CPLat had overcome the split in its ranks despite being in opposition and facing an anticommunist 
campaign in the republic, was still capable of political action and had begun to carry out a renewal 
of its programme. The resolution noted that the party still campaigned for a socialist Latvia and the 
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interests of workers and rights of citizens.460 Communist deputies were campaigning actively against 
the adoption of “anti-popular laws”, making alternative suggestions, using the platform of 
parliament for propaganda and to defend the ideas of the party and maintain close links with 
electors.461  
 However, after this positive assessment the Secretariat recommended various measures to 
the Central Committee of the CPLat and party committees of the republic to increase the efforts for 
overcoming “crisis phenomena” in the party. The CPLat was instructed to strengthen the party in 
organisational terms; restructure the style of work of party committees; support the “flourishing 
perestroika movement for national rebirth of Latvia”; strengthen important relations to Latvian 
language and culture and local traditions; actively campaign against nationalist extremism and for 
freedoms for citizens; to show enthusiasm for the strengthening of an atmosphere of real democracy 
in the republic and about international agreement and agreement between people.462 The party was 
also to “urgently become familiar with the tactics of blocs and unions”463 and pay particular 
attention to electoral campaigns suggesting that the central leadership felt that the republican party 
was losing elections, at least partly through incompetent campaigning. 
 Whilst political change in Eastern Europe had not resulted in intervention by the Soviet 
Union, internal threats to the Union, most evident in the Baltics, resulted in violent repression in 
Lithuania and concern that what had happened in Eastern Europe could happen next to the Soviet 
Union. A resolution of the Secretariat from February 1991 “On information of Central Committee 
departments on the situation in the Baltic Republics” recognised that the Baltic crisis had entered a 
“new and dangerous phase” for the Union.464 “... [N]ew, anti-Soviet regimes have come to power, 
exploiting slogans of democratisation, glasnost’ and ideas of national revival, in their practical 
activity they have done nothing positive.”465 The resolution reiterated the declaration of the January 
1991 Political Statement of the Control Commission: “the time has come for each person to be 
conscious of the civil and moral choice: whether to uphold the noble aims of renewal of society, the 
movement of a single country, peace in our multinational home or be silent and connive at the 
infringement on life and safety of people or, worse, help kindle the fires of inter-ethnic and social 
tension ...”466 By this time, however, the Baltic parties had split and lost support to the nationalist 
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oppositions. 
 
THE CREATION OF A RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
There had been no Russian communist party separate from the CPSU since 1925 (except for 
the existence of a Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR in the CPSU from 1956 to 
1966)467 but the increasing nationalism in the other republics of the USSR, especially the Baltics, led 
some Russian conservatives in the CPSU to see the formation of a Russian communist party as a 
possible focus for Russian national concerns (such as the preservation of the Union, and therefore 
Russia’s influence and status) as well as a potential mechanism for opposing Gorbachev’s 
increasingly radical reforms. The United Front of Labour (UFL), a faction formed inside the CPSU 
and organised from Leningrad (and which combined Marxism-Leninism with Russian nationalism), 
was one of the conservative groupings that demanded the creation of a Russian communist party 
along with the Communist Initiative Movement (CIM), a group which the UFL had also helped to 
found468 for the purpose of organising a Russian communist party. After the CPSU had been banned 
in Russia, following the coup, the UFL and CIM founded the Russian Communist Workers’ Party - 
a group to which many who later joined the CPRF belonged during the period of the ban on party 
activity, as noted by two interviewees in Chapter 5. It is thus possible to see the line of development 
of the CPRF from a particular section of the CPSU in Russia. 
Gorbachev had opposed the creation of a Russian communist party for fear of increasing 
separatist tendencies in other republics but he came to see a need for a separate Russian communist 
party to counterbalance the anti-communist tendencies amongst those elected to the Russian 
Congress of People’s Deputies and to Yeltsin (who had left the CPSU at the 28th Congress in July 
1990), who had been elected Speaker of the Congress.469 In the election for Speaker, Yeltsin beat 
Polozkov, the 1st Secretary of Krasnodar Communist Party (who was later elected leader of the new 
CP RSFSR), and Vlasov, RSFSR Prime Minister, who had been Gorbachev’s choice. 
The March 1989 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU had authorised the Russian 
Bureau to convene a Russian party conference to prepare for establishing a Russian communist 
party in acceptance of pressure for greater recognition of Russian national interests by the end of 
1989. However, the Russian Bureau failed to lead the process at sufficient speed for many 
nationalists in the party as the CPSU leadership at that time did not want to see a Russian party 
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established, fearing the creation of a rival centre of power.470 There was a change in attitude on the 
part of the CPSU leadership as a result of the popular campaign for a Russian party and from a 
perception that the CP RSFSR could prove to be a conservative balance to the views being 
expressed by Yeltsin.471 The intended creation of a Russian Communist Party was debated by the 
Central Committee on 7th June 1990 and the increased interest of the CPSU leadership in creating a 
Russian party with some speed can be seen from a report submitted to the Central Committee by 
Medvedev, G. P. Razumovskii, a Central Committee Secretary and candidate member of the 
Politburo and Manaenkov. The report stated that a new Secretariat had been created consisting of 18 
people and its recommendations were adopted at a Central Committee meeting the following day.472 
The authors of this document suggested that the situation had arisen where communists of the 
Russian Federation now believed the immediate creation of a Communist Party of Russia to be 
useful and that it was necessary to take a decision on this matter at the next Conference of the 
CPSU. The authors argued that it would be expedient to consider including a motion at the 
conference on the possibility of giving the Russian Conference of the CPSU the status of Founding 
Congress of the Communist Party of Russia.473 
This same document indicated also that there was concern for the new party to at least 
appear to be representative of the party as a whole as the document stated that the social 
composition of the leading organs was, through a process of consultation on candidacies, to reflect 
the social composition of the Communists of Russia.474 It was clearly feared that the organisation 
could become a vehicle for one tendency in the party and, while counterbalancing the anti-
communist views being expressed in the Congress, also act as an opposition to reform. 
 The CP RSFSR did indeed become a conservative-dominated party and a focus for Russian 
communists with a republic-level leadership that was strongly opposed to further democratisation 
and any radical economic reforms. Urban and Solovei contrast the position of the CP RSFSR’s 
leadership with that of the CPSU with its range of views from traditional Marxism-Leninism to 
social democracy (by 1991).475 The fears expressed in the report discussed above, proved well-
founded. The party was finally established on 19th June, 1990. There was agreement on the 
organisational form the party should take. In the words of a member of the Central Committee, it 
was decided that “It must be a party of the Leninist type, built on Leninist organisational and 
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ideological principles, free from social-democratic tendencies in the programme and in activity”.476 
However, the party had great difficulty agreeing on a programme. The first draft programme was 
published in August 1990 and a second draft programme published in October, 1990. 
The nationalist ideology of the CPRF can be seen in the origins of the CP RSFSR as the 
Russian nationalist organisations that had been formed in the late 1980s were seen by the leadership 
of the CP RSFSR as being the key to gaining new support and as early as 1990, the CP RSFSR was 
already trying to unite nationalists and communists with the aim of saving the Soviet Union.477 It 
was soon clear that Polozkov was concerned with the survival of Russia as a nation rather than the 
aim of achieving communism and, by the autumn of 1990, he was calling for a “union of patriotic 
and democratic forces in the name of the Fatherland”, similar to the pronouncements of the Writers’ 
Union with which Polozkov and Zyuganov, a member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CP 
RSFSR and the future leader of the CPRF, worked to try to increase support for the renewed 
Union.478  
Zyuganov’s tactics for maximising support for the CPRF were also evident in the actions of 
Polozkov during his leadership of the CP RSFSR. At the November 1990 plenum of the CP RSFSR, 
Polozkov declared that the party had agreed to suspend the political struggle in the hope of saving 
Russia (and preserving the Soviet Union). 479 Polozkov had already declared the CP RSFSR ready to 
work with the Russian Orthodox Church at a conference in February 1991 entitled “For a Great, 
United Russia!”480 Further, in a speech to the party’s Central Committee the following March, 
Polozkov referred to Lenin as having implemented a programme of national salvation. 481 All of 
which indicates a considerable ideological continuity from the CP RSFSR to the CPRF. 
 However, the inability to agree on a final programme and elusive party unity led to 
Polozkov’s replacement at the party’s Central Committee plenum in early August 1991482 by V. A. 
Kuptsov, CPSU Secretary with responsibility for mass organisations. This leadership was short-
lived as the coup two weeks later followed by the ban on party activity ended the CP RSFSR until 
the verdict of the Constitutional Court that the CP RSFSR’s primary party organisations could 
resume activity on 30th November 1992. The nationalist direction of the movement was continued 
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after the ban by Zyuganov. In January 1992, Zyuganov was elected chairman of the co-ordinating 
council of the People’s Patriotic Forces of Russia, in June 1992, he became a co-chairman of the 
right-wing Russian National Assembly and in October 1992, Zyuganov was involved in the 
founding of the National Salvation Front and also became one of its co-chairmen.483 The CPRF 
became the largest of the post-CPSU communist parties and claims to be the legal successor to the 
CP RSFSR. 
 
THE USSR REFERENDUM  
 As seen above, the future of the Soviet Union depended on the new Union agreement in 
order to appease republican parties by reducing Russia’s dominance of the Union. A referendum 
was conducted throughout most of the USSR on March 17th 1991 on the preservation of the USSR 
as a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. Gorbachev had proposed holding a referendum on the 
renewal of the USSR as the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics in December 1990 in an attempt to 
“speed up the signing of a new Union Treaty”.484 With several republics already having declared 
independence, the existing Union was already falling apart and the party risked being left with a 
much smaller union of states grouped around Russia if it refused to cede at least some power to the 
other republics. The revised draft was to give the republics a much greater say in policy making, 
their ownership rights were to be strengthened and the republics were to be responsible for deciding 
on their own mechanism for seceding from the Union, rather than that power being held by the all-
Union parliament485 as a recognition that the Union could not be sustained in its current form. 
 In an attempt to strengthen public opinion in favour of the new Union, Kommunist had 
published an editorial article in February 1991, in the run-up to the referendum, entitled “Why We 
Need the Union” arguing that continued unification of the fifteen republics was in the interest of all 
the republics and that it was impossible to carry out reforms in one republic as they would only 
work if carried out on an all-Union basis.486 A positive result in the referendum was in the interests 
of the CPSU for two reasons: firstly, as it probably would not have been able to continue to exist in 
the same form if the USSR disappeared; and secondly, as was already clear, the end of the Union 
would result in loss of status for Russia internationally.  
The Resolution of the Secretariat “On the plan of action of the Secretariat of the Central 
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Committee of the CPSU on the realisation of tasks resulting from the resolution of the Politburo of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU: Political results of the USSR referendum and tasks of party 
organisation”487 of April 1991 covers the CPSU’s reaction to the referendum results. A wide range 
of orders to various departments dealt with many problems. The document gives the impression of a 
well co-ordinated, but perhaps desperate attempt (with a heavy burden placed on the Department of 
Ideology) to try to convince the population that a renewed Union, in the form envisaged by the 
CPSU, was in their interests. 
 Part I of the document is a set of practical measures to do with interpreting and publicising 
the results of the referendum. An improvement in economic conditions was obviously considered 
necessary to increase support for the signing of the new treaty as the Departments of Organisation, 
Ideology, Socio-economic Politics and Agrarian Politics were to recommend that party committees 
pay particular attention to the implementation of urgent measures in the economic sphere, connected 
with the reconstruction of economic links, increasing manufacturing output, the strengthening of 
order and the introduction of “other stabilising measures” with immediate effect.488 What precisely 
these measures were is not specified but in the section of the document on “aims for creating an 
anti-crisis programme”, the same departments and the Department of National Politics were ordered 
to spend the months May to August of that year organising, with the assistance of party committees, 
a constant review of the reforms being carried out on retail prices and measures to protect the 
population from the increases; to carry out an analysis of the agreement concluded between union 
republics; to prepare an analysis of the economic and social consequences of the actions of extremist 
powers which are leaving the USSR’s separate republics, and send them to party committees for the 
purpose of informing the population.489 Declining living conditions were clearly feared to be 
reducing support for the intended future Union. 
 The Departments of Organisation, Ideology, Humanities and others were all recommended to 
analyse the reasons for the comparatively low support for the idea of preserving the Union among 
the population in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Sverdlovsk and Rostov-on-Don - the Resolution of the 
Secretariat of the CC CPSU called on the above departments to work with local party committees 
and learn the tactics of the opposition490 as the CPSU was aware that it needed to counter the views 
being put forward by new organisations that were already more experienced than the party in 
competing for public attention. There was also to be an on-going campaign combining “all forms of 
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mass-political propaganda and teaching work” by the Department of Ideology to emphasise the 
necessity of preserving the renewed USSR, and the signing of a new Union agreement and the 
Department was also to have a series of articles published in various party publications in April and 
May which were to evaluate the referendum results, and the importance of the will of the majority of 
the people in the renewal of the USSR. Reports to this effect were also to be broadcast on television 
and printed in local newspapers.491 While support for a renewed Union was in doubt in the last days 
of the Soviet Union, it will be seen in Chapters 3 and 5 that the voluntary reunification of the Soviet 
Union is now a goal of not just the CPRF but also of some of their political opponents who hope to 
capitalise on nostalgia for Russia’s former super-power status. 
 The second section of the document focused on the work on preparations for the conclusion 
of the new Union Agreement. The Department of National Politics and Department of Legislative 
Initiatives and Legal Matters were to consider possible amendments to the Agreement on the Union 
of Sovereign Republics at the April meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat.492 Regional 
conferences were to be organised on the theme “Russia - consolidating power of the USSR” by the 
departments of National Politics, Organisation, Ideology, Humanities, the Institute of Theory and 
History of Socialism and the Academy of Social Sciences in conjunction with the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR in April and May.493 The document conveys a 
sense that the party was aware that power was slipping away and Russia might need to function 
without most of the other republics. 
Preparations were clearly underway for dealing with a negative result. The Central 
Committee instructed the Social-Economic Commission to spend April to June 1991 preparing 
recommendations and analysis for party committees of the political consequences of the destruction 
of the single financial credit and banking system of the country and the necessity of restoring and 
strengthening the functioning of the unified state as an important economic foundation and also on 
the realisation of CPSU policies on the transformation of state forms of property.494 They were also 
to study the work of party committees on “the party guarantee of implementing the conversion of 
defence production, the social protection of workers and to present their results to the Central 
Committee of the CPSU and prepare suggestions for the realisation of measures for the social 
protection of the population in the conditions of transfer to a market economy.”495 However, the 
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party was clearly unwilling to abandon the planned economy altogether as the Department of 
Agrarian Politics was charged with spending the rest of 1991 conducting seminars with the 
secretaries of party committees and leaders of Soviets and agro-industrial organs on “the role of 
special-purpose programming in conditions of a market economy.”496 
 It was in an earlier resolution of the Secretariat from November 1990, “On information for 
party committees ‘on the idea of a new Union agreement’”, the passing was noted of a resolution at 
the 28th Congress on paths to voluntary union, peace and agreement between peoples that, while not 
actually recognising that the former Union was not voluntary, it was stressed that the intended next 
one should be. The resolution noted that “[a]n appeal from the Central Committee to party 
committees, letters and statements of citizens, appearing in the media, prove that the majority of 
people see that the Union agreement is the only possible way to prevent a further escalation of 
tension, to create the necessary conditions for the growth of the democratic transformation ... 
guaranteeing real sovereignty for the republics.”497 However, in view of the unpopularity of the 
economic reforms and increased ethnic tensions in the final years of the Soviet Union, this could be 
seen as the reverse of what was happening, particularly in the Baltics, where leaving the Union came 
to be seen as the answer to people’s concerns. 
 The end of the Soviet Union is summarised well by Mitchell and Arrington: “[s]ome of the 
Union republics were willing to support a restructured union based upon real federalism (the so-
called Novo-ogarevo scheme) and four republics agreed to sign a new union treaty at a ceremony in 
Moscow on August 18th 1991. The coup of August 1991 was spurred by the prospect of this 
agreement, which was seen as marking the end of the Soviet Union. However, this was not the only 
precipitator of the coup. In July, Gorbachev had persuaded the Central Committee to approve a new 
Draft Programme for the party. The Draft Programme rejected Marxism-Leninism and endorsed the 
principles of private property, freedom of religion, and a pluralistic political system. For the coup-
makers, the prospect was that of a loose federation with no basis whatever in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.”498 So ended the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with conservatives trying to 
prevent the loss of its founding ideology and the loss of territory that added to Russia’s status. 
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CONCLUSION 
Various documents from Fond 89 demonstrate through the orders to departments and the 
records of discussions that took place that the party was well aware of its rapid loss of authority and 
legitimacy towards the end of its tenure, however, there had been a failure to face reality soon 
enough. The lack of recognition of the demise of communism in Kommunist, in which an article 
referred to the East European states as socialist even in May 1990 and suggested the loss of support 
for communism was only temporary, reflects this state of denial. There was clearly a degree of 
unwillingness in the party to accept the overthrow of communism in Eastern Europe as being a 
rejection of communism itself, rather than just a rejection of the parties that had been in government 
in the region and a failure to accept that the end of the communist-led regimes in Eastern Europe 
could lead to the end of the CPSU. The movement in political orientation of reformists in the party 
was considerable over the final years of the Soviet Union as the increasing number of articles in the 
party’s theoretical journal on the merits of social democracy show but by this time the CPSU was 
running to catch up with the rest of Soviet society. 
The leadership of the CPSU lost control over the membership of the party in its final years as 
a result of changes in the law that it had itself enacted. By allowing a choice of candidates in 
elections followed by a choice of political direction represented by different candidates at elections 
combined with the policy of glasnost’ gathering pace and being extended beyond what the party had 
intended as it became possible to express and discuss different opinions and eventually criticise the 
CPSU, the party unwittingly brought about its own demise. Despite the new choices available in 
elections, the CPSU clearly expected the voters to choose the party that claimed to govern in their 
name and, as can be seen from the documents considered above, there was a failure to understand 
that voters would use the choices given to them rather than vote for the CPSU despite that choice so 
the expectation that the party’s legitimacy would be increased in the face of political choice led 
instead to a loss of power as opposition groups were elected in large numbers to the surprise of the 
party leadership. Fond 89 reveals a sense of events taking over and moving reform forward faster 
than had been intended leaving the CPSU leadership to catch up and by the end of the Soviet era, it 
can be seen that the fight was about retaining power rather than preserving the ideology. 
The ideological origins of the CPRF can be seen in the demise of the CPSU as the 
conservative reaction to reforms introduced by Gorbachev and his supporters. CP RSFSR and its 
opposition to moves towards social democracy and its aim to save Russia and the Soviet Union, as 
Russia’s empire, make it the forerunner of the CPRF. The CPSU was losing elections in its final 
years but the CPRF was winning them from 1993 onwards, showing that there was still support for 
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communism in terms of ideology and as a Russian national tradition. As the CPSU gave up its 
Leninist party organisation it began to lose control but the CPRF, adopting the Leninist model was 
competing successfully against a fragmented opposition499 in its early years. The CPSU effectively 
abandoned democratic centralism as it began to allow a diversity of opinion in the party but the 
CPRF adopted this element of party organisation immediately and it has been retained. As will be 
seen in chapter 3, the CPRF has rejected any move towards social democracy as outlined in 
Gorbachev’s final draft programme, the hated ideology that it blames for the demise of the Soviet 
Union. 
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CHAPTER 3         
ZYUGANOV’S PHILOSOPHY 
 
While the first concern of the CPRF was to reject Gorbachev’s attempt to move the CPSU 
towards social democracy in favour of calls to save the nation, many other issues and concerns 
raised towards the end of the communist era are still present in the writings of the present leader and 
in the new programme. Fears about the presence of ‘foreign powers’ in the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence voiced by the CPSU leadership as Union republics began to demand independence are 
now regular features of Gennady Zyuganov’s writings, in particular since East European and former 
Soviet countries have joined NATO. Concerns raised by the CP RSFSR about Russia’s cultural 
presence in Eastern Europe and the promotion of Russian language and culture are another of 
Zyuganov’s main themes. However, the building of communism now takes a very distant place in 
the list of party priorities behind restoring Russia’s status as a superpower in a multi-polar world. 
In the fifteen years that he has been leader of the CPRF, Zyuganov has written a substantial 
number of books and articles, and interviews with Zyuganov about his political beliefs have 
appeared in Russian newspapers on numerous occasions. Although there have been several 
leadership challenges in recent years, Zyuganov has so far survived all of them and, in view of the 
fact that the social democratic tendency within the party has recently been reduced with the 
departure of Gennady Semigin and Vladimir Tikhonov, it can be assumed that the membership is 
braodly supportive of the left-patriotic direction in which Zyuganov has led the party. Due to the 
adoption of patriotism as part of the new ideology some of his pronouncements are, however, 
directly opposite to what would normally be expected of a communist party leader. This chapter 
includes an examination of Zyuganov’s views on Marxism and socialism, nationalism, geopolitics, 
religion, the media, Zyuganov’s thoughts on returning the CPRF to power, restoring the USSR and 
the CPRF’s influence in the world communist movement and the left in general now that the party’s 
influence in Russia is waning.  
This new direction is based on the merging of communist and nationalist theories, the 
continuation of a trend seen in the CP RSFSR. The unification of traditionally left-wing and 
traditionally right-wing ideas in Zyuganov’s writing replaces calls for the unification of the working 
classes across national boundaries with calls for saving the nation from catastrophe. It is this move 
towards more nationalist policies that Zyuganov sees as making the party electable. The focus for 
Zyuganov and the party now is on finding a way to regain power rather than preserving the 
ideology. Although communism has not been abandoned altogether, it’s achievement is seen as a 
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very distant future event. 
Born in 1944, Zyuganov was a teacher of mathematics and physics in Orel and worked for 
the Komsomol and CPSU from 1968 until 1983. From 1983 to 1990, he worked for the Propaganda 
and Ideology Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A founder member of the CPRF, 
he was elected its first, and so far only, leader in 1993 and convinced the party that it should 
participate in the December 1993 elections to the State Duma. He has led the CPRF in the Duma 
since that election and through the 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007 Duma elections and twice stood for 
election to the presidency of the Russian Federation, losing in the second round to Boris Yeltsin in 
1996 and in the first round to Vladimir Putin in 2000. He did not stand in the presidential election of 
2004 as it was clear he could not win against Putin and a heavy defeat could have triggered another 
challenge to his leadership from within the party. In his place, Nikolai Kharitonov won 13.7 per cent 
of the vote. 
 In the introduction to his autobiography, My Russia, Zyuganov claims to have been born at 
what he describes as the “birthplace of the Russian nation”, on the border of the steppe and forest 
between the Oka and Volga rivers.500 He also claims “I am a communist and for this choice I will 
not apologise. I joined the party for ideological reasons,”501 in order to distinguish himself from 
those who joined the CPSU for career reasons. He informs his readers that he worked his way up the 
ladder of the CPSU Central Committee and claims that as deputy chief of the CPSU Department for 
Ideology, where he worked on Russian matters, he actively supported the idea of creating a separate 
Communist Party of the RSFSR as a means of safeguarding Russia’s national interests.502  
He also claims that, as Ideology Secretary, he welcomed perestroika and claims he did his 
best “to facilitate its advent” (despite now being deeply critical of Gorbachev), as he could see that 
the Soviet model of socialism “was in need of a qualitative change”.503 This shift in philosophy now 
also accommodates religious belief in the form of Russian Orthodox Christianity, as support for 
Russia’s national church is vital if claims of patriotism are to be believed. To convince his readers, 
Zyuganov now argues that communism and Christianity are compatible: “the communist idea, 
which is over two thousand years old, most profoundly expresses people’s needs and hopes. It is in 
accord with the Russian traditions of communality and collectivism, which meet the fundamental 
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interests of my country.”504 He now dates the emergence of the communist idea as far back as the 
birth of the Christian era, with which he claims it is linked (see below), rather than to the publication 
of the Communist Manifesto in 1848.  
 
MARXISM AND SOCIALISM 
When asked, in 1994, if the party was going to change its name (after other parties in Eastern 
Europe had done) as some voters saw the word ‘communist’ in negative terms, Zyuganov replied 
that he did not have a problem with the word and that people were no longer judging politicians by 
their labels but by their minds.505 However, this retention of the term ‘communist’ in the party’s title 
seems incongruous in the context of some of Zyuganov’s remarks, particularly those on the party’s 
representation of the working class. As seen in Chapter 1, many other communist parties have 
changed their names to replace the word ‘communist’ with ‘socialist’, the two other notable 
exceptions being the CPBM, which has a social democratic competitor, and the recently electorally 
successful PCRM. 
 Zyuganov’s revisionist view of Russian and Soviet history encompasses some unusual ideas 
for a communist. When writing that the October 1917 revolution was not a “Bolshevik experiment”, 
as some writers have claimed, but a huge scale “forced step” which the people of Russia took 
despite the preconditions for socialism not having been met, he claims they took this chance out of 
the necessity of “national-state survival” when Russia was facing economic collapse, territorial 
disintegration and the bourgeois government was unable to function.506 The first part of this 
reasoning, that the revolution was about the survival of the nation and the state, is the opposite of 
what Marx and Lenin envisaged and of what the communists at the time declared: that the working 
people had taken power as the first stage of an international, proletarian revolution. Even when it 
became clear that the revolution was not spreading abroad, as predicted, there was still no 
declaration that its real aim had been to save the state. However, in line with traditional communist 
thinking, Zyuganov does claim that the revolution was accomplished by the working people.507 
 In another departure from the standard communist view of the 1917 Revolution, he claims 
that many Russians always considered Russia to be their “beloved native land” rather than seeing it 
as part of the new political structure that became known as the USSR and that they fought for this 
Russia in the civil war as patriots rather than for socialist reasons. Zyuganov contrasts this with the 
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views of those who considered Russia to be only a “bundle of brushwood for the bonfire of world 
‘permanent’ revolution” and a “testing ground for brutal experiments, inexhaustible reserves of raw 
materials and ‘human resources’”.508 This implies that Zyuganov sees Lenin and other prominent 
Bolsheviks as having betrayed Russia by not seeing the country primarily as a great nation. He 
claims that the Revolution was not an experiment in Za gorizontom but also refers to “brutal 
experiments” in the context of the Revolution in Derzhava so reducing the clarity of his argument 
(these two books were written only around a year apart).  
For Zyuganov, Russia differs economically from Western Europe and he claims that the 
‘free market’ is inappropriate for Russia.509 He writes that “Russia has always had its own path. It is 
chosen not from books but from centuries-long tradition and from life. Life tells us that today we 
have only one way forward. This is the road to socialism. The road to the restoration of Soviet 
power. The road to the revival of a Union state.”510 His argument runs that socialism is the natural 
choice for Russia in order to create a just society, provide free education and medicine and 
guarantee work and a fair wage to all workers and that government should be via soviets in order to 
protect citizens’ rights.511 He argues that the Soviet Union should be restored “[i]n order to revive a 
strong power so we can all live in a respected country. To reunite the divided Russian people. To 
restore the historical brotherhood of nations. In order to protect our borders and interests in the 
world”512 rather than to reunite the proletariat of the former Soviet Union. He writes this in answer 
to his own question: why does Russia need a Union?513 
In contradiction of the traditional communist position on the international solidarity of the 
working class, Zyuganov goes so far as to claim that “the Marxist-Leninist idea of class struggle was 
directly counter to the interests of the Russian people, united as they were by shared cultural-
historical bonds.”514 In further recognition of the need to promote the party’s patriotic policies, the 
2003 Election Platform speaks of the party’s intention to “protect the culture, language, beliefs and 
customs of all the peoples of Russia.”515 However, the Party Programme of 1995 refers to the party 
as being “faithful to the interests of the working people”516 and also reaffirms more traditionally 
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communist concerns such as the establishment of popular power or self-rule by the people, the right 
to work, free education and medical treatment, decent accommodation, and “an end to the 
exploitation of man by man and all types of parasitism, ... the equal rights of nations, the friendship 
of peoples”, “socialism in its renewed and future constitutional forms” and “communism as the 
historical future of mankind.” Less usual, until recently, for a communist party are the references to 
the need for “ecological safety”, patriotism as party policy and “the unity of patriotic and 
international authority”.517  
Zyuganov explains in Za gorizontom (1995) that Russia’s current internal difficulties are the 
result of antagonism between ruling regimes which aspire to destroy Eurasian civilisation and the 
remaining population.518 This implies that he believes the class struggle in today’s Russia takes a 
distant second place to a struggle between leaders. However, a class-based interpretation of the 
world is obviously not entirely redundant as Zyuganov also writes that “the class approach remains 
valid even today for the examination of key problems, especially in the spheres of production, 
employment, social security, foreign policy and international relations.”519 It would seem that the 
class approach is still valid so long as it does not interfere with Zyuganov’s geopolitical theories.  
His reasoning for finding a new perspective on Russia’s difficulties is that by the end of the 
20th century there were more factors affecting modern reality than at the time when Marx, and later, 
Lenin were writing. The main reason for this, he asserts, is the influence of “inter-civilisational 
relations” on world development which, according to Zyuganov, were only just taking shape in 
Marx and Lenin’s time and only emerging in their “final system-formational contours” towards the 
end of the twentieth century.520 Use of the word ‘final’ shows Zyuganov’s continued belief in the 
communist idea of a linear development of history: that there is an ‘end point’ to be reached at 
which time the development of society will cease as it will have reached a fully developed state. His 
argument that “class antagonism is absorbed into inter-civilisational and within-civilisational 
relations to some extent, but not completely, and this has reduced its confrontational components”521 
is perhaps an attempt to explain why the anticipated worldwide, proletarian revolution did not 
happen and why the CPRF is not expecting it in the foreseeable future. 
Zyuganov considers the faults of the Soviet era to date from the 1960s onwards522 and writes 
of the “crisis of de-industrialisation”523 in the late 1980s. In reference to the success of reforms in 
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China, he notes that Gorbachev did not achieve anything similar and that workers’ collectives, party 
organisations, economic leaders and large sections of the intelligentsia were discouraged from 
taking an active part in the renewal of society and that this role was taken by a “limited circle of 
leading personalities ... ‘national fronts’, national-egoists, an elite of ‘informal associations’”.524 It is 
this failure, as he sees it, to involve the party in the reform process that led to the break-up of the 
Soviet Union.  
Zyuganov’s current view of communism is demonstrated clearly by his view of the coup of 
1991 and his participation in this failed attempt to stifle democracy. Zyuganov usually refers to the 
coup as the “so-called coup” and throughout his writing the word coup, in terms of the events of 
1991, is referred to in inverted commas.525 This implies he considers it not to have been an illegal 
action. He writes that the coup was long expected before the actual attempt526 and explains away the 
failure of the coup leaders by saying that they were too early. He writes that from the start it was 
only “window dressing” and was carried out in a timid and indecisive manner and that the 
organisers never planned it seriously. Despite this criticism of the leaders and organisation of the 
coup, Zyuganov was involved in drafting the Word to the People (a document published in 1991 
calling on all sections of society to work together to save the Soviet Union from impending 
disaster). Zyuganov writes that it was assumed by the coup leaders that “a demonstration of 
decisiveness and power on its own” would save the Soviet Union if ‘stabilisation measures’ were 
introduced.527 
 The banning of the CPSU in the aftermath of the coup is an action Zyuganov sees as having 
been mistaken and divisive. In his speech to the Constitutional Court in 1992, as part of the 
investigation into the legality of the ban, Zyuganov said he wished to speak of the “state CPSU” and 
of the role of the judicial process in the possible deepening of the split in society if the party 
continued to be banned. Zyuganov recounted the USSR’s achievements and noted that other states 
had followed the USSR’s example.528 He admitted that the CPSU had made mistakes and attributes 
them to the long-term monopoly of political power, the party having lost the experience of political 
competition, having lost sight of the “real values” and the support of the masses, allowing 
incompetent careerists to progress up the party ranks.529  
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 In Zyuganov’s view it was not the party as a whole that had been at fault, but the “anti-
national regime” of Gorbachev. It was this widely held “anti-regime” feeling that led to the 
formation of the National Salvation Front, of which the CPRF is a member, along with various 
right-wing and other left-wing groups. The “Political Declaration of the Left and Right Opposition,” 
of September 1992, which Zyuganov signed in his capacity as president of the Union of National 
Patriotic Forces of Russia, showed that the left and right had found a degree of common ground in 
calling for measures to be taken to avoid an economic crisis. This document called for: increases in 
production and consumption of domestically-produced goods; the restoration of state co-ordinated 
agricultural production; the restoration of the link between prices and wages; the programme for 
‘landslide’ privatisation to be stopped; investment in agricultural production; increased state 
regulation of the economy to bring about economic stabilisation; and a more general call for an end 
to the “threat of mass hunger and total economic collapse”.530 The declaration also called for the re-
establishment of the USSR, a united defence policy for the restored Union, recognition of private 
property, the creation of a “real system of popular power” and freedom of choice between political 
parties. In 2003, the CPRF called for the unification of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine into a single 
state531 as a scaled-down version of the dream of a restored Union. 
 On the question of why socialism was rejected in 1991 and why the USSR collapsed so 
quickly afterwards, Zyuganov writes that people will seek answers to these questions for many 
years. However, he claims that the Russian people never renounced socialism but were “deceived by 
demagogy and false promises.”532 In Derzhava (1994), he writes that a thorough analysis of the 
causes of the crisis in the model of socialism which developed in the USSR is both needed and 
expected of the CPRF by communists abroad. They are further expected, he writes, to make a new 
contribution to the theory of socialism,533 thereby attempting to justify the move away from 
orthodox communism.  
 In Uroki zhizni (1997), in the chapter entitled ‘The Lesson of Mass Organisation’, Zyuganov 
writes of privatisation, criminality and poverty as being the results of the fall of the USSR instead of 
the promised freedom and prosperity.534 He complains that another result has been international 
wars involving a million people and he claims that the only way to “end this madness” is to create a 
durable political organisation, in effect recreate the Soviet Union, that would be able to express the 
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interests of all those who want to halt the “downward spiral in which Russia finds itself” in order to 
prevent catastrophe. He further claims that without the “activity of national-patriotic powers” Russia 
will be doomed to failure.535 In this respect, the Programme at least partially coincides with 
Zyuganov’s writings in that it refers to the need to “unify a social-class and national liberation 
movement into a single mass opposition movement”.536 
Zyuganov refers to overcoming the economic crisis in 1996 as being a difficult process 
requiring the “mobilisation of all resources” in his pamphlet, Znat’ i deistvovat’ (1996). When asked 
if this “mobilisation of all resources” is to be aimed at enabling a return to socialism, he replied that 
it is. He claims that he is not alone in thinking that such a move is necessary but that the “history of 
mankind” in the 20th century indicates a necessity of moving “forward to socialism”. He claims that 
the “positive experience” of socialism was not rejected but “attentively and critically analysed” for 
better use in the future.537 However, just on the following page he writes that “[e]ven our ideological 
opponents cannot understand why we destroyed what was working well.538 The form of socialism 
that Zyuganov calls for the reconstitution of is one “free of deformations, fatal mistakes and 
including all that is progressive that has been worked out by mankind in the modern era”539 but 
again, no concrete details are offered. In writing that socialism was “[w]orking well” and that there 
were “fatal mistakes” Zyuganov contradicts himself. 
Zyuganov writes that by mid-1991 “[t]he party had, if not everything, then almost everything 
necessary for the efficient management of the economy and society as a whole. ... [but] its central 
organ turned out to be decidedly lacking in energetic and purposeful political will. The attempt to 
fill in this gap,  the creation of the CP RSFSR, did not have the expected effect. It did not have 
enough time”.540 However, as seen in Chapter 2, the assumed reason for the CPSU leadership 
agreeing to the formation of the CP RSFSR was not just a result of the popular campaign for a 
Russian party but also an expectation that it could provide conservative opposition to the views 
being expressed by Yeltsin. Zyuganov also writes that “[f]urther, the CP RSFSR was acting in the 
most difficult conditions. Against it, with the blessing of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, was 
concentrated the fire of practically all mass media and its leading body was discredited.”541 How the 
CP RSFSR would have achieved, given more time, what the CPSU failed to achieve in many 
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decades, Zyuganov does not explain. 
In terms of reform of the party, he writes that work on the draft programme of the CPRF was 
difficult but that such difficulty was to be expected. He writes of overcoming and exorcising 
“theoretical stereotypes” that held a “death-like grip of dogmatism” over some communists.542 
Theory and practice were clearly not compatible in Zyuganov’s eyes as he sees this as having led to 
inflexibility. In Za gorizontom, Zyuganov writes that “[t]he party succeeded for the most part in 
overcoming the sectarian position caused by the aspiration to express narrow class interests.”543 If he 
really means the party is to move away from just representing the working class, this represents the 
single most significant shift in policy as the Communist Manifesto, the founding document of 
communist thought, begins: “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles”544 and continues: “[i]n the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, 
[communists] point out and bring to the fore the common interests of the entire proletariat, 
independently of all nationality.”545 While the CPSU claimed to represent all sections of society 
from late 1930s onwards, as separate classes were deemed to no longer exist, the 1986 Programme 
still referred to the ‘working class’. The incompatibility of nationalism and communism at the level 
of their most basic unit, class or nation, appear to be irrelevant to Zyuganov, instead he focuses on 
animosity to the West, liberal democracy and capitalism and belief in collectivism and 
authoritarianism in the search for cross-class unity.546 
When asked if the CPRF considers itself a party of the working class, Zyuganov replied that 
it does because the majority of its members are working class as are those who vote for the electoral 
bloc of which the party is a member.547 He defines the working class broadly to include pilots and 
computer operators as well as people working in heavy industries and he claims that “scientific-
technical progress long ago united the work of the [industrial] worker with intellectual work”.548 It is 
clear the party needs to redefine the ‘working class’ for the 21st century as the working class, and 
therefore its traditional support base, is shrinking as patterns of employment change. He claims that 
“workers, that is people living on account of their work, are interested most of all in the building of 
a society of social justice as is called for by the CPRF.”549 If workers are all people who “live on 
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account of their work” then that must be most of the population and if their greatest interest is in 
building the kind of society that the CPRF wants to see built, then this raises the question as to why 
the CPRF has not already been elected to government. The Programme also includes a definition of 
the working class to include “a considerable part of the engineering-technical intelligentsia”.550 
Zyuganov writes of the progressive movement of history having a cyclical character which 
seemingly contradicts his (implied) ideas, outlined earlier, on the linear development of history. The 
exact way Zyuganov phrases this in Russian is “cyclical-undulating spiral character,” a phrase 
which has no sense but which the Programme expresses as: “[c]ommunists believe that the historical 
process happens in evolutionary and revolutionary forms.”551 Zyugnov writes of various thinkers 
over the centuries acknowledging that such cycles occur over decades and centuries.552 If there are 
such cycles, this implies that society is destined to go through phases of communism and non-
communism: that there will be a return to communism only for it to be rejected again. If this were to 
be the case, Zyuganov has answered his own question about why socialism was rejected - it came to 
the end of a historical cycle. There is a clear lack of logic and coherence in his reasoning. 
Writing in 1997, Zyuganov claims that “[s]ocialism in its Russian form promoted the 
preservation of the integrity of the state and its transformation into a world power ... but as we 
know, the Russian form of socialism has serious defects ... Consequently, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the national economy of the USSR began to display signs of stagnation. This occurred because the 
rigid system of state ownership of all property, including so-called ‘co-operative’ ownership, stifled 
incentives in commerce and manufacturing, delayed the introduction of new technologies and 
destroyed the motivation to work.”553 He also argues that “monopolistic state ownership contributed 
to the creation of a rigid political system which, by the end of the 1980s, encompassed the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and various bodies of Soviet power. A virtual merging of 
party and state had taken place, permeated by a uniform ideology. Thus, a consummate political-
managerial system throttling any attempts to change the status quo developed with self-preservation 
as its basic function.”554 He does not indicate how his acknowledgement of defects in the ‘Russian 
form’ of socialism fits with his continuing support for the idea of moving forward to socialism or 
whether a variety of forms of property ownership would be retained once communism had been 
achieved or if such a move would be a temporary measure and how party and state would be kept 
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separate in a future socialist state. Later works, discussed below, indicate some consideration of 
these issues. 
He claims that Russia operates according to different economic laws from those governing 
economic activity in the West.555 Zyuganov sees the suggestion that all countries are doomed to 
follow the same path of capitalist development as misguided and that their own circumstances can 
dictate otherwise. He writes that “[t]he history of our party is witness to the fact that communists 
have obtained real achievements exclusively when and where they have followed objective logic 
and necessities of development of the country, society and state, when they have relied on the 
national soil, soul and the distinctiveness of the peoples of the Union. And, conversely, in those 
conditions when they permitted themselves to be fascinated by distracting constructions, success 
ceased to accompany them.”556 This concentration on national development as opposed to 
international co-operation between the working classes of different nations provides considerable 
reason for questioning retention of the term ‘communist’ in the party’s title. 
 In terms of the reform of the economy, Zyuganov certainly appears to be in favour of 
increased competition: “[i]nside our country the state form of ownership, in essence, became a 
monopoly in the whole vast USSR, effectively liquidating any basis for competition and 
competitiveness and turning them into mere formalities. As a consequence, the natural, objective 
source of progress within the social system disappeared.”557 Zyuganov also writes of a move away 
from a planned economy and a reliance on state controlled industries. He refers to the term ‘market 
economy’ as being “greatly compromised”, saying he prefers to speak of a mixed economy “which 
develops according to objective laws and is most acceptable for our national form”.558 How a mixed 
economy will develop according to “objective laws” that are known in advance, he declines to 
explain.  
In reply to the question of whether he would reject the market economy on coming to power, 
he replies that while the “negative effects” of state regulation of the economy must not be forgotten, 
it does have beneficial effects as well such as investment, credit and tax systems.559 As investment 
and credit and tax systems also exist in a market economy, Zyuganov does not succeed in making a 
case for a planned, mixed economy being better than a market economy. He also suggests that he 
would keep the market economy but re-introduce some elements of state planning but once again, 
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there is no explanation of how this is to work in practice. He also talks about the “development and 
effective co-operation of different forms of ownership”560 without saying whether this means 
retaining privatisation where it has already occurred but does make clear that he no longer opposes 
private property as he promises that the population would not have their flats and allotments that 
they had bought confiscated nor would they lose the shares they had acquired in privatised 
companies.  
 He writes: “[n]ow the main work of the Great October – the world socialist system – is 
experiencing a period of defeat and failure. But the idea of socialism, which materialised with the 
October Revolution, is alive and it wins over more and more new millions of people on all 
continents.”561 These remarks are included in a pamphlet published in 1997 but Zyuganov did not 
inform his readers who the new millions being won over to socialism are. He continues: “[t]he 
twentieth century was the century of the Great October. The 21st century will allow the 
accomplishment of its immortal ideals.”562 It seems that Zyuganov does not consider that one of the 
most momentous events of the late 20th century was the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the “immortal ideals” of the October Revolution have already been rejected once. He writes that: 
“[o]ur slogan is not ‘Back to Socialism!’ but ‘Forward to Socialism!’”563 but once again, no analysis 
is offered of how the revolution is to succeed next time round. These declarations would indicate 
another area of agreement with the 1995 Programme (which notes that the battle between capitalism 
and socialism has not been concluded564), however, Zyuganov continues in the same book, a matter 
of a few pages later, to praise the 150 years’ old ideas “Moscow is the third Rome” and “Autocracy, 
Orthodoxy, Nationality” of the minister of enlightenment, S. Uvarov, looking backwards to an old 
imperial Russian philosophy. What he looks to, whether forwards or backwards, is hardly socialism 
as it has been known in Russia and Eastern Europe but this justification for communism, whilst as 
old as communist ideology, is nationalist. 
 As the CPRF’s influence in Russia decreases, Zyuganov writes that “[t]he Russian 
Communist Party successfully increased its prestige and influence in the left wing anti-globalist, 
anti-imperialist movement. ... Tens and hundreds of meetings with foreign delegations and 
politicians, discussing international problems, making joint presentations - these are an important 
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part of the everyday work of the CPRF.”565 By 2006, the CPRF was having to turn its attention 
abroad in order to appear influential. In a clear denial of reality, Zyuganov also writes that “[t]he 
CPRF is now situated in the ascendant and in the position of deciding serious matters. It is a very 
effective political organisation, which actively protects freedom of speech, democracy, the rights of 
citizens and the best traditions of Russian social and political life. It is clear that the political 
influence of the party is growing.”566 However, in Russia’s ‘managed democracy’ the CPRF is very 
limited in its ability to influence policy-making, no matter what the party may have decided on 
‘serious matters’ and the influence of the party is in fact declining, not growing. 
In a rare criticism of Putin, Zyuganov claims that “[t]he current regime is unable to protect 
the interests of Russia. Every day this becomes more obvious. Putin is occupied with travelling all 
over the world, meeting and holding negotiations with our geopolitical enemies, creating the 
impression of apparently raising the prestige of Russia, as if succeeding in securing some kind of 
concession to our benefit.”567 However, Russia’s influence is increasing along with the prices of oil 
and gas, irrespective of the number of meetings Putin holds with foreign heads of state. Whilst not 
invited to meetings with Russia’s “geopolitical enemies” Zyuganov travels abroad to meet the 
leaders of left-wing movements trying to raise the prestige of the CPRF. He writes: “socialist 
countries today form a system, playing a visible role in the world. China, Vietnam and Cuba: the 
countries of Latin America are fighting American globalisation. We communists are by no means 
alone in the world.”568 The “new millions” being won over to communism that Zyuganov referred to 
in 1997 but did not name, he now sees as the people of South America, but this shift to the left that 
he writes about is notable on one continent, not “all continents” as Zyuganov insists. 
 His 2006 work, Zashchishchaya Nash Mir: O Vneshnepoliticheskoi Deyatelnosti KPRF, 
begins with a lengthy evaluation of the achievements of Russia during the Second World War and 
recounts the history and achievements of communism in general and Russian communism in 
particular. The second section “The Battle Against Worldwide Anticommunism” attacks the actions 
of the Council of Europe which Zyuganov interprets as anti-Russian. References to Marx, Lenin and 
the Communist Manifesto are more numerous than in earlier works but there is little change in his 
arguments as the title of the conclusion: “Time to Change Course”, refers to the world, not the party. 
“Yes, the international range of contacts of the CPRF is broad and the forms of co-operation are 
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varied. And all these possibilities for its expansion are vast”569 is, perhaps, an admission that the 
CPRF now needs to look abroad for support for socialism. 
 
NATIONALISM 
One of Zyuganov’s themes that he returns to regularly, and which forms a central theme of 
Geografiya pobedy (1997), is that of Russia being a unique civilisation. This is a theory with a long 
history, acknowledged by Lenin in his work “On the National Pride of the Great Russians,” in which 
he also described nationalism as “a broad and very deep ideological current”.570 Zyuganov writes of 
a ‘national idea’ being necessary “which can turn into material power and unite around it all healthy 
patriotic powers in society”571 as a means to rebuild Russia. While patriotism is now clearly one of 
the most effective methods of appealing to voters who regret Russia’s loss of superpower status, this 
emphasis on a people uniting around a ‘national idea’ suggests that Zyuganov no longer sees 
communism as sufficiently attractive an ideology on its own to be strong enough to return the party 
to power.  
Zyuganov, and others in the CPSU were already writing nationalistic calls to the people 
before he became leader of the CPRF and their ‘Great Russian’ nationalism was already evident in 
1991 in the document Word to the People which begins: “Dear Russians, Citizens of the USSR, 
Compatriots!”572 He and his co-authors call on Russians before other ethnic groups in the USSR. It 
continues “[w]e turn to you with words of the utmost responsibility, to turn to the representatives of 
all professions and classes, all ideologies and beliefs, all parties and movements for all our 
differences are nothing before the general misfortune and pain, before our love for the Homeland, 
which we see as united, indivisible, unifying fraternal peoples in a powerful state, without which we 
would have no existence under the sun”.573 In a similar way, the Party of Democratic Socialism in 
Germany has become a representative of East German interests574 and the Party of Communists of 
the Republic of Moldova claims to be the “party of Moldovan statehood and patriotism” and now 
speaks of national identity while reducing references to internationalism and class interests.575  
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The most important contributions to current Russian right-wing thought have also influenced 
Zyuganov, Russofobiya, by Igor Shafarevich, and Postperestroika, by Sergei Kurginyan576 and 
CPRF appeals to patriots during 1991 led to the convening of the CP RSFSR sponsored conference 
“For a Great, United Russia” that brought together several future coup leaders, conservative writers 
and the representatives of about forty ‘patriotic’ cultural and political organisations, from neo-
communist to monarchist groups to further the goal of communist and nationalist unity. The 
establishment at this conference of a “Co-ordinating Council of Patriotic Forces,” headed by 
National-Bolshevik Eduard Volodin and Zyuganov, was one of the first steps towards long-term, 
close co-operation between left and right in Russia.577 Zyuganov claimed in an interview in Den’ in 
November 1991 that “no party in the future would enjoy mass support if it stayed indifferent to the 
national idea”.578  
Zyuganov writes that the ‘Russian idea’ is stronger than any other ideological or 
philosophical ‘scheme’. So does he see it as being stronger than communism? He writes of the 
reunification of the ‘red’ and ‘white’ ideals, ‘red’ being social justice, which Zyuganov says means 
“before God, all are equal” - one of many religious references in the context of socialism - and the 
‘white’ being ‘national-intelligent statehood’. He claims that Russia “finally finds the longed-for 
social, inter-estate, inter-class agreement and sovereign power bequeathed by tens of generations of 
ancestors ...”579 This “inter-class” agreement being nationalism. Zyuganov needs this “inter-class 
agreement” to be found without a socialist revolution because he has accepted a democratic route 
back to power. 
Zyuganov writes that the “‘ideology of patriotism’, can become not only a reliable 
philosophical basis of a functioning state mechanism of Russian power, but also lay the theoretical 
and philosophical preconditions of policy formation for Russia as a powerful alternative centre of 
world influence capable of embodying justice and self-government by the people.”580 Zyuganov’s 
ideas are a mixture of pre-Revolutionary Russian political thought, communism and ‘Great Russian’ 
nationalism and he writes of “national reconciliation”, saying that necessary preconditions include 
the changing of the “socio-economic course” and developing a “national-state doctrine” that takes 
into account the “thousand year experience of Russian statehood” and that it is clear that Russia can 
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not overcome the economic crisis without reverting to socialism.581 He writes that “[i]t is necessary 
to look closely at our own history and understand the world significance of the thousand-year 
Russian statehood and to try to understand the depth of its meaning over the centuries which 
inspired our ancestors to works and exploits of state construction”.582  
 Zyuganov claims that Russia, in terms of ideology, represents the traditions and values of 
communality, collectivism, “state self-sufficiency” and the “aspiration to embody the highest ideals 
of good and justice” and that Russia is an “autonomous mechanism” that is distinct economically 
from the West and its “free market model” of development. He writes that “[t]he foundations of 
Russian statehood have always been and still remain a great-power thinking, formational diversity, 
nationality, spirituality and patriotism, all of which is contained in the collective concept of the 
‘Russian idea’.583 The ‘Russian idea’ is, according to Zyuganov, one that is applicable to all the 
nationalities that he sees as rightfully belonging under Russia’s influence and therefore, sets all these 
people at odds with the West and capitalist forms of economic development. These people of the 
“Eurasian bloc” are also, in Zyuganov’s view, happy to be led by Russia in opposition to the West 
and capitalism. 
He recognises the identification of communism with nationalism in the minds of many 
Russians as he writes of ‘millions of honest communists,’ those “who saved the world from fascism 
and brought Russia to the level of one of the greatest powers in the world” so seeking to retain the 
support of those who feel betrayed by the post-Soviet governments.584 This approach recognises that 
for many, particularly older Russians, the CPSU had positive as well as negative associations. As 
well as being identified with “the brutality of the Soviet years” the party is also associated with the 
“achievement of industrialisation, victory over Nazi Germany, superpower status, and the 
development of a modern, urbanised and literate society.”585 It has been noted that this is probably 
the main reason why Zyuganov has resisted suggestions that the party change its name as the term 
‘communist’ is associated with an era of great pride in the Russian nation and its achievements.586 It 
will be seen in Chapter 5 that these views are indeed held by the party members in St Petersburg 
who were interviewed. 
Despite the attachment, among large sections of the population, to the name and what it 
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represents, it has been necessary in the post-communist era for the party to engage in ideological 
renewal as it could not hope to achieve much support in elections if it only represented a return to 
the recently-rejected political system of the past. The party also faced a problem with the majority of 
the reformers having left the CPSU to join the democratic parties. This absence of reformers within 
the new CPRF combined with the sense of loss of national status in Russia with the end of the 
Soviet Union has led to the CPRF adopting its present nationalist stance. In an attempt to claim 
patriotism for the communists, Zyuganov declares the ‘democratic opposition’, another group 
referred to in inverted commas, deceived no one with its ‘decorative patriotism’, however, 
patriotism has been recognised by most political parties in Russia as one of the key factors necessary 
for attracting support. 587 Zyuganov regrets his inability to make the CPRF’s patriotism clear earlier 
as he writes that the adoption of nationalistic policies was opposed by “frightened ‘extremist-
Bolsheviks’” in the party.588 He refers to the Zhirinovsky/LDPR electoral campaign as “literate and 
energetic”589 and claims the democrats were defeated because the electorate saw their ‘patriotism’ as 
shallow whereas Zhirinovsky’s and the communists’ was stronger which led to their success. 
Zyuganov writes that the communists’ success was the result of their being able to adapt to the 
changing situation.590 
Zyuganov is in favour of a ‘national-liberation’ movement in his most recent writings but 
where other nationalities have sought independence and defence of their national interests, he is 
deeply disapproving, especially if the countries concerned were once part of the USSR: “the 
aggressive separatism of the border regions … the January events in Lithuania … the hysteria of the 
‘democratic’ press, the defamation of the army and loss of all strategic allies”591 he writes of the 
demonstrations in Vilnius in1991. Had ethnic Russians been shot in a similar situation, no doubt 
their separatist intentions would not have been ‘aggressive’, the ‘events’ would have been a 
‘massacre’, the reaction of the press would not have been ‘hysterical’ and ‘democratic’ would not 
have needed quotation marks. Later, when the Baltic nations sought recognition for past oppression, 
he wrote that: “[f]rom September 2005 in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
began the rise of a regular anticommunist scenario. On the initiative of delegates from the Baltic 
States and with the support of right-wing conservative parties of Europe, a discussion of the report 
“The Need for International Censure of the Crimes of Communism” took place, the 
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recommendations of which were prepared for approval ...[and]... passed at the end of January 
2006.”592  
 The idea that Russians are oppressed by their own government in 2006, long after Putin and 
United Russia had adopted a patriotic stance, is one that Zyuganov has been unable to relinquish: 
“Russophobia has become the official ideology of the ruling regime, the main instrument of the 
destruction of the country. This is a dangerous form of extremism and nationalism.”593 He 
continues: “[t]he present line of the Kremlin is the path to new loss and humiliation. The CPRF and 
all patriotic powers of Russia declare that it is time to stop and stand up for the position of firm 
defence of our national interests.”594 How the government is undermining national interests he 
declines to explain. 
The fear of the destruction of the Russian nation is a concern that recurs in much of 
Zyuganov’s work. In Derzhava (1994), he speculates about two possible paths of future 
development for Russia. The first he defines as “cosmopolitan and stateless” which he claims will 
lead towards “rigid political, ideological, economic and informational unification within the 
framework of the ‘New World Order’”. While Zyuganov writes that any movement towards 
integrating Russia into a ‘single world community’ must be welcomed, he nevertheless feels that it 
will only lead to material prosperity for the ‘active’ part of the population and ultimately, is 
unpatriotic.595 In an interview with A. Prokhanov, editor of Zavtra, and published in Za Gorizontom 
(1995), Zyuganov reminisces about the Word to the People which, he recalls, they wrote together. 
He speaks about how relevant it is to the current situation in Russia and how what they anticipated 
would happen three years before this interview, has now happened. He speaks of how he does not 
understand why their compatriots “are … blindly … destroying our long-suffering great homeland” 
and asks why the people did not heed their warning.596  
The second model, however, he describes as ‘national’ and ‘historically distinctive’ and this 
model assumes that “the process of global geopolitical unification of peoples and states” is 
misguided in its attempts to establish a “planetary dictatorship” of the ‘developed’ minority over the 
‘backward’ majority.597 Instead, Zyuganov writes that “[h]ealthy and stable international, inter-state 
relations are possible on the basis of constructive joint action of distinctive national cultures which 
determines the balance of interests and powers in the international arena”. Zyuganov writes that in 
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order not to be drawn into the “fatal whirlpool of the ‘new world order’” Russia needs to follow its 
“rich patriotic, spiritual experience and its distinctive basis of moral-religious and social-political 
way of life.”598 He writes that “[t]his model has nothing in common with xenophobia nor with 
aggressive nationalism nor with arrogant pride as it is often represented.”599 Instead, Zyuganov 
claims to see this model as a positive way of refuting the policies being pursued at the time, which 
he saw as dooming the country to loss of sovereignty and its people to loss of spirituality, the 
disintegration of the national culture and loss of a sense of national awareness. 
Zyuganov claims the traditional, European uses of the terms ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’ are 
less relevant in the Russian context600 and under this pretext calls for coalition government or a 
government of national trust to save Russia. Whilst coalitions have been seen as useful tools by 
communist parties in the past to enable the communists to gain power, Zyuganov calls for unity 
based on patriotism rather than the emancipation of the working classes. The 2003 Election Platform 
calls for citizens of Russia to unite: “[i]n the face of the threat of colonialism and the extinction of 
our country, we, workers and peasants, engineers and academics, teachers and doctors, 
entrepreneurs and managers, artists and students, people of various views and beliefs, 
representatives of various parties and movements, have united in the National Bloc of the CPRF.”601 
Despite attributing blame for the problems in the CPSU to those who joined the party for career 
reasons, Zyuganov calls for those who do not believe in communism to join communists in a 
campaign to install the CPRF in power. 
In acknowledgement of the fact that his ideas stray quite far from conventional Marxism, 
Zyuganov asks whether it is permissible, from a Marxist point of view, to speak of different types of 
civilisation, their cultural and historical uniqueness and their differing paths of development. He 
arrives quickly at the conclusion that it is no contradiction in speaking of different types of 
civilisation within the context of the development of mankind ‘in its movement towards 
communism,’ as he must, if he wishes to continue to combine communism with his claim that 
Russia is a unique civilisation. His personal experience of difficulties in trying to convince people of 
the merits of communism after its collapse seems to be one reason for his change in philosophy. 
This is suggested by his remark that at public rallies people have stopped indicating their support for 
what they had been hearing if he has, as he puts it, “repeated the stereotypical slogans of recent 
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times”.602 Young communists in St Petersburg also spoke of the need to find new methods of 
engaging people in political debate (see Chapter 5). 
Although it is argued that Zyuganov has led the party in a radically new direction, to what 
extent do his ideas really constitute a deviation from the policies of the CPSU? Anti-Westernism and 
various other beliefs and values that include the idea of a third road to the modern world (neither 
capitalist nor socialist), may unite right-wing nationalists and communists,603 however, as far as the 
communists are concerned, this ‘third road’ appears to be a temporary measure aimed at the 
eventual achievement of communism in the long term. The unity of far-left and far-right in search of 
the ‘third road’ has in fact been seen before and been seen outside Russia and Eastern Europe on the 
basis that ‘red-brown’ coalitions have a precedent in “the many conversions from the socialist left to 
the nationalist and fascist right in early 20th century Europe” as, amongst others, Mussolini was 
originally a socialist and that Hitler and the early Nazis learned some of their propaganda techniques 
from the left.604 This alliance with the right, whilst genuine in terms of nationalist views shared by 
both sides, is no doubt viewed as another temporary measure on the road to communism. Having 
gained power, communist parties have a long history of suppressing former coalition partners. 
Within Russia, also, nationalism has a long history of being accommodated alongside 
official communist ideology. According to Lester, “[f]or all the internationalist rhetoric of Soviet 
Communists, few observers have ever really questioned the predominance or prioritising of a 
nationalist agenda.”605 As regards Zyuganov’s repositioning of the CPRF on more nationalist 
ground, it could be argued that it is difficult to criticise the communists for theoretical deviation 
from Marxism because of the lack of a definable Marxist theory of nationalism to deviate from.606 
However, Zyuganov’s idea that Russia is a unique civilisation that will lead others in a campaign 
against capitalism differs significantly from the traditional Marxist view of all nations being equal 
and the move towards communism being led by the working class across national boundaries. 
It was argued by Marx that a true community could be realised only when classes have been 
abolished and the state as such had disappeared and also that nationalities were destined to disappear 
along with classes.607 Yet Zyuganov writes that “[o]f course, class interests cannot coincide 
everywhere and all the time. But these differences were and must become anew a source for 
constructive social dialogue, as the engine of rational state reform, and not of discord, revolt and 
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war”608 rather than the “... violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie [that] lays the foundation for the 
sway of the proletariat”609 that Marx and Engels had in mind.  
When Marx and Engels wrote of the ‘withering away of the state’, what they intended was 
the disappearance of the state as a coercive mechanism and as the instrument of the dominating 
class: the bourgeoisie. The nation was expected to continue and assume the role of a unit around 
which an international society of the future was to be constructed.610 However, presumably there 
was not meant to be competition between nations as, according to the Communist Manifesto: “In 
proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one 
nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within 
the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.”611 Zyuganov, 
however, writes of a division between East and West in terms of a clash of civilisations and 
traditions rather than a division between classes that crosses national boundaries. 
Whilst Engels wrote that great national states in Europe are “the unavoidable precondition 
for the harmonious international co-operation of the peoples” under the rule of the proletariat,612 
Marx and Engels defended the ruthless expansion of imperialism, provided that it led to economic 
development,613 until they became committed to the idea of proletarian internationalism, from which 
point onwards they usually described nationalism as ‘narrow’.614 Lenin also tended to look on 
nationalism as a bourgeois prejudice, writing in his ‘Critical Remarks on the National Question’ in 
December 1913 that Marxism was “incompatible with nationalism” and in 1914 that the proletariat’s 
task was to “fight against all nationalism, and above all against Great Russian nationalism”.615 
Zyuganov has not been alone, however, in ignoring Lenin on this matter. 
Over the seventy-four years’ existence of the Soviet Union, theory and practice have not 
always coincided. Expediency has led the CPSU to adopt patriotism on a number of occasions, 
notably, with the increasing aggressiveness of the fascist powers, the Soviet government began to 
stress the importance of love for the ‘Soviet fatherland’616 and with the German invasion of Russia, 
the Marxist, internationalist tone of Soviet propaganda was replaced with Russian nationalism (“the 
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‘Second Imperialist War’ was transformed in Soviet propaganda into the ‘Great Patriotic War’”)617; 
and in the victory celebrations at the end of the war, Stalin focused on the ethnic Russians for 
special praise. Mamatey writes that “[h]enceforth, their primacy as the ‘oldest brother in the family 
of Soviet peoples’ was explicitly recognised. The theory that ‘Soviet patriotism’ differed from 
‘bourgeois nationalism’ was maintained, but the content and symbolism of Soviet patriotism were 
simply expressions of Great Russian nationalism.”618 Zyuganov now refers to ethnic Russians as the 
‘Big Brother’ in the family of Russian peoples (see below). 
The rise of the Russian nationalist movement from the 1950s onwards was the combined 
result of “the reinvention of the Russian national identity by a group of intellectuals in search of new 
political ideals in the aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress and of a decades-long policy 
pursued by the CPSU, which actively supported this reinvention in order to gain a new basis of 
political legitimacy.”619 The Soviet regime spent decades encouraging the very people whose ideas 
represented a direct challenge to its official ideology because of the important role nationalist 
intellectuals played in post-Stalinist communist society and those intellectuals were regarded as 
crucial to the communist regime because of their role as creators of national symbols and myths.620 
As the leader of an organisation that was not fundamentally different from its predecessor 
(the CP RSFSR), it was not a drastically new direction that Zyuganov introduced. As noted earlier, 
Zyuganov had worked in the propaganda department of the CPSU. This department had developed 
links with the Russian nationalist intellectuals over several decades, a consequence of which has 
been Zyuganov’s belief that Russian communists could retain power only if they adopted a Russian 
nationalist ideology.621 While Zyuganov may have been inspired by the events in Serbia (and was a 
staunch defender of the memory of Milosevic)622, where the ruling party became the only 
communist party in Eastern Europe to stay in power by adopting a deeply nationalist platform, it 
was in December 1990, at the Seventh Congress of the RSFSR Writers’ Union, where Zyuganov 
first indicated his reasons in calling for the ideological transformation of the CP RSFSR: the 
unification of all opponents of reform.623  
Zyuganov asks in Globalisation and the Future of Mankind: “[i]s mankind doomed to the 
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dismal fate which the Western creators of the New World Order and the ideologists who serve their 
interests are planning for us? Of course not! There is no such thing as fatal inevitability in 
history.”624 Unless that inevitability involves an outcome that Zyuganov sees as desirable as he also 
quotes Lenin on the “inevitable advent of socialism”.625 He further writes that “[t]he West seems to 
imagine that with the advent of globalisation it has found a way of outwitting history and stopping it 
in its tracks. This is nonsense and very dangerous nonsense at that.”626 Zyuganov’s ‘history’ is 
clearly meant to be future development, not past development and its direction is inevitable only for 
the communists. 
In characteristic denial of the facts, Zyuganov writes that “[t]he most important factors in the 
[Second World War] victory were the friendship and brotherhood of nations. All nationalities of the 
Soviet Union arose for the protection of the homeland.”627 In Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, 
and amongst the Russian peasantry, the Nazi invasion was initially welcomed by some under the 
mistaken impression that it would result in national sovereignty, the reopening of the churches and 
the dissolution of the collective farms.628 Zyuganov needs to convince his readers that all 
nationalities in the former Soviet Union were willing participants in that Union and would wish to 
see it restored. To this end, he tries to assure readers that other nationalities would not be oppressed: 
“[i]nternational means between nations, so that abolishing or denying national identity is no part of 
it. Internationalism, indeed is unimaginable without patriotism. Internationalism grows on the basis 
of peoples’ influencing and co-operating with each other, of cultures and languages enriching each 
other, of co-operation between national economies.”629 However, “internationalism” growing as a 
result of “peoples’ influencing and co-operating with each other, of cultures and languages enriching 
each other” is, judging by comparison with Zyuganov’s other writings, intended to convey the idea 
of other nations accepting Russian culture, language and leadership. Zyuganov has moved a long 
way from the traditional communist view that patriotism was a problem that hindered the 
development of unity between the working classes across national boundaries. Instead, he writes of 
removing the class boundaries within nations to “... open a broad highway to truly national unity and 
free national development.”630 
However, this “free national development” is for Russia to lead and other nations to follow. 
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In recent years, Zyuganov’s work has concentrated more and more on the reformation of the Soviet 
Union, again under the leadership of Russia. In a chapter of Globalisation and the Future of 
Mankind, entitled “Big Brother Returns”, Zyuganov writes that “[t]he main body of the new Union 
will consist of the two million-strong, united, three branches of the great Russian people, to whom 
all those who are ready to connect their future, can join.” He continues, “You see, so much irritation 
and sarcasm has been poured on us by haters of the Russian people, in recent times, deriding and 
discrediting [Russia’s] role as ‘big brother’ in the united family of our peoples! And what of it? Ten 
years have passed and now it is clearly obvious: ‘big brother’ will return. For without Russian 
national revival neither economic, political nor spiritual revival of the majority of peoples of the 
‘post-Soviet states’ is possible.”631 Zyuganov cannot be unaware of the use of the term ‘Big Brother’ 
by George Orwell in his novel 1984, to describe an unseen and all-powerful dictator as he cites 
Orwell when refuting the idea that his novel was a criticism of communism (it is in Zyuganov’s 
view in fact a criticism of state monopoly capitalism)632 and yet Zyuganov sees the term in a very 
positive, even glorious light when he applies it to ethnic Russians and their relation, as he sees it, to 
Ukrainians and Belarusians and Moldovans. Zyuganov claims “[t]he anti-Utopias of Orwell, 
Huxley, Zamyatin and many less gifted authors paint a portrait not of socialism, but of features of 
state monopoly capitalism transferred to the future and reduced to absurdity.”633 An official party 
document on nationalism even claims that only the unification of Belarus and Ukraine with Russia 
in the Soviet Union guaranteed the protection and independence of their cultural identity and the 
unification of Russia with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan protected those peoples 
from the actions of “aggressive neighbours”.634 
One further aspect of the CPRF’s ethnic Russian nationalism is anti-semitism, an 
undercurrent in Zyuganov’s writings that has been noted by various writers.635 Zyuganov writes that 
the CPRF is considered an anti-semitic party but makes excuses for the party instead of dealing with 
the issue: “Here we need to consider who exactly is calling the CPRF an anti-semitic and nationalist 
party. As regards nationalism, I have already explained my point of view - these are accusations to 
stop the growth of the national-liberation movement in Russia. As concerns the accusations of anti-
semitism, this is a secret from no one that it is the well-tested weapon of Zionists. And when such 
accusations are put forward by the media controlled by Gusinsky, Berezovsky, Friedman, 
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Abramovich and so on, it remains simply to ask: did you expect otherwise?”636 Notably, Zyuganov 
was also slow to condemn anti-semitic remarks by CPRF Duma Deputy Albert Makashov in 1998637 
and there are references in Zyuganov’s own writings to a “mercantile, oceanic, cosmopolitan 
oligarchy” that are interpreted as being coded anti-semitic remarks.638 
 
RELIGION 
In the words of the Communist Manifesto: “[l]aw, morality, religion, are to [the proletariat] 
so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.”639 
However, Zyuganov has moved away from the traditional atheism of the CPSU and now includes 
religion as an important factor in the development of the Russian state. He notes the importance of 
the conversion of Slavic tribes to Christianity in 988 in contributing to the emergence of a stable 
Russian state and the formation of the “unique ethno-political society that is known to the world as 
the ‘Russian people’.”640 He further claims that “every important period of Russian history has 
coincided with stages of the spiritual development of Russia” from that time onwards.641 It is a 
measure of how far he has moved away from the old communist terminology that he refers to the 
21st century of the “Christian era” rather than “our era” (the Soviet alternative) as being a turning-
point in the development of mankind.642 
It was not Zyuganov, however, who initiated the change of direction in communist policy to 
support the Russian Orthodox church. Religion came to be seen as an important part of the 
nationalist agenda that the communists could not ignore if they wished to rebuild their support. In 
1989, the United Workers’ Front and the Russian nationalist intelligentsia formed an anti-
perestroika alliance to fight the 1990 election to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, after which both 
groups played a significant part in assisting the nationalists and opponents of perestroika in the 
CPSU apparatus with the creation of the CP RSFSR.643 Ivan Polozkov, who was elected leader of 
the CP RSFSR, gave an interview in which he expressed Russian nationalist views on various 
topics, in particular, he proposed an alliance between the CP RSFSR and the Russian Orthodox 
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Church, which he described as the party’s “natural ally in the struggle to enforce morality and 
prevent inter-ethnic conflict”, the first time this view was voiced by a high-ranking communist 
official.644 Zyuganov’s support of the Russian Orthodox Church, and other religions which enjoy 
widespread support in Russia, is a continuation of a trend that had begun on the left before the 
formation of the CPRF and an aspect of Russian nationalism that he cannot afford to ignore if he 
wishes to claim that the CPRF is a patriotic party. 
In Znat’ i deistvovat’: otvety na voprosy, published before the presidential elections in 1996 
to try to dispel fears of what the CPRF would do if Zyuganov were elected president, Zyuganov 
replied to the question of how he views religion by saying that a politician who does not understand 
the “colossal role” which religion has played in Russia, and the uniqueness of the Orthodox faith, 
does not understand Russia itself and therefore cannot lead Russia out of its crisis.645 As a 
nationalist, he also supported the Orthodox church against the “invasion of foreign cults”646 which, 
in an attempt to discredit the regime of the time, he claimed the government was supporting. 
Zyuganov has written of his opposition to programmes on television about or, as Zyuganov claims, 
promoting, other religions and cults which are non-Orthodox branches of Christianity.647  
Again, in Uroki zhizni, Zyuganov returns to religion, writing of having studied the Bible and 
the Koran (the latter when studying the Caucasus). He claims that while the history of the Caucasus 
can be understood properly without a thorough knowledge of the Koran, Russian history is only 
clear in the light of understanding of the Russian Orthodox Church.648 However, he praises other 
religions besides Christianity, writing that religion provides a source of tradition that enables society 
to function in a constructive manner.649 When writing about a reorientation of foreign policy 
towards China and the rebuilding of Russian society, Zyuganov also refers to Confucianism in very 
positive terms. He notes that Confucianism always valued very highly “intense systematic work”, 
self discipline and the ability to work collectively,650 and praises its emphasis on respect by citizens 
for the state and care of citizens by the state, respect for the old and the importance of hierarchy in 
society. Respect for the old would be popular with the party’s older supporters but ‘hierarchy in 
society’ is surely out of step with traditional communist philosophy. Harmony in social relations, 
discipline and order being priorities along with care of ‘the fortress of the family’. He claims these 
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are the reasons for the ‘phenomenal success’ of the countries of Eastern Asia in economics and 
technology.651 
He has similar praise for Islam with respect for the old and care of the young being “natural 
behaviour for a Muslim” singled out for praise again along with collectivism taking priority over 
individualism which, Zyuganov claims, leads to great attention being paid to social justice.652 
Zyuganov argues that such religious traditionalism is necessary for Russia at the beginning of the 
new (Christian) millennium, that there must be a return to full-scale national spiritual traditions and 
that only these can guarantee the “necessary moral and philosophical base for a strategic jump into 
the ‘post-industrial’ world”. Here he returns to communist era terminology with the idea of 
‘jumping’ into another economic stage of development. It is also significant that there is a sizeable 
Muslim population within Russia, and of course within the borders of the former USSR, which 
Zyuganov hopes to reconstruct. 
Zyuganov has found a new nationalist cause in the defence of the Russian Orthodox church. 
he writes that: “[t]he main educator of the people, apart from school, has always been the church. As 
a result, the policies of the state must be directed towards supporting the efforts of the Russian 
Orthodox Church and other traditional Russian faiths by strengthening spirituality and morality in 
society.”653 However, the replacement of the role of the Communist Party in educating the 
population with the role of the church is no doubt a temporary shift in policy aimed at securing the 
nationalist vote. Zyuganov writes that religion is an ancient form of ideology and that the ancient 
religions are under threat from American globalisation,654 a new theme in Zyuganov’s writing that 
he now links with most aspects of his earlier writings. However, Zyuganov’s new-found approval 
and defence of major religions practised in Russia does not extend to Judaism and his approval of 
Islam seems to be based largely on the idea that Islamic countries are ideal partners for Russia in the 
campaign against capitalism. 
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GEOPOLITICS 
Geopolitics has influenced much of Zyuganov’s work and he uses various geopolitical 
theories to justify his change in emphasis from the inevitable unification of the working class across 
national boundaries to the necessity of Russia’s national survival and geopolitical development. 
Geopolitics can be defined as the study of factors that determine the control of territory by one 
political power or another, that affect the competition between political powers for the control of 
that territory and which often lead to the suggested redrawing of national boundaries to represent 
perceived ‘true’ boundaries of nations according to geographical features such as rivers and 
mountain ranges, population distribution and language groups. Zyuganov claims that “the historical 
experience of Russia, situated at the meeting-point of European and Asian types of civilisations and 
appearing naturally to be the core of Eurasia, [and] in many ways unique”655 makes Russia ideally 
situated to control the Eurasian landmass. He writes that Russia could guarantee a “balance of 
interests” in a multi-polar world656 and that since the demise of the USSR, Russia poses a threat to 
the “aspirations of the USA to world domination” and as a result the USA believes Russia must be 
broken up657 as a state as it occupies such a geographically important region. 
In his thesis, Zyuganov writes that “Russia is an exponent of cultural-historical and moral 
traditions, with fundamental values which are collectivism, state self-sufficiency and aspiration to 
the embodiment of higher ideals of good and justice.”658 His book, Geografiya pobedy (1997), 
combines his geopolitical theories with these ideas on nationality and the ‘Russian idea’ - a term 
coined by Fyodor Dostoevsky in 1860 and promoted by him and the religious philosopher Vladimir 
Solovev and banned during the Soviet era.659 In this book, Zyuganov considers in detail various 
theories put forward by western and Russian exponents of geopolitics about which countries are 
destined to ‘rule the world’; he then continues by applying various parts of these theories that fit his 
own, to Russia and its current difficulties. In one chapter, entitled ‘Science or Mythology’ (which is 
an indication of the difficulty Zyuganov is aware of in getting geopolitical ideas taken seriously in 
Russia where the Soviet regime tried to discredit them),660 he writes that geopolitics has been 
ignored in Russia for a long time, that it has been interpreted as “an exclusively ideological 
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phenomenon, as an ‘ideological guarantee of internal politics of the imperialist state’”.661 He 
explains that geopolitics was discredited by representatives of the ‘German school’ in the thirties 
who used it to justify Nazi Germany’s expansionist aspirations.662 Zyuganov is careful about whose 
theories he expresses agreement with but the detail in which he describes the ideas that fit his own 
view of Russia’s destiny indicates to the reader with which theories Zyuganov is clearly in 
agreement. 
Zyuganov recounts the work of German geographer Friedrich Rattsel who suggested that 
“the state has a tendency to grow into a ‘natural space’ and this eagerness [of the state] can only be 
satisfied in the borders of continents”.663 Zyuganov does not offer support or criticism of Rattsel’s 
work, it is merely included in his survey of geopolitical thinking but this idea would, however, 
confirm Zyuganov’s view of Russia’s territory being larger than its current borders (with references 
to the territory of the former Soviet Union as ‘Russia’). Zyuganov’s deliberate confusion of the two 
and his increasing calls through his later works to revive the Soviet Union on a voluntary basis along 
with specific remarks about Russia occupying the heartland of the ‘Eurasian space’ (see below) 
indicate that Zyuganov agrees with the idea of Russia occupying a larger area than currently 
encompassed by its present borders. Zyuganov regrets the loss of influence over territory outside 
Russia since 1989 under the “Gorbachev team” and the “Yeltsin team” and the reduction of what he 
refers to as “state safety” (by which he implies the loss of the ‘buffer zone’ of Eastern Europe) to a 
previously unseen level.664 He writes with concern or amazement that Russia’s external borders are 
now very similar to the borders of Muscovite Rus’ at the beginning of the 17th century.  
He also gives a résumé of the ideas of Halford MacKinder, a British geographer, whom he 
describes as “the father of the Anglo-American school of geopolitics”, who used the phrase ‘pivot 
area’ to describe Eurasia (a term used by Zyuganov in relation to Russia) in his paper for the Royal 
Geographic Society in 1904 entitled ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’. Zyuganov notes that 
MacKinder was worried that, as he saw it, Russia occupied the strategic position in the ‘pivot area’ 
around which, he believed, the “historical process” develops. He felt that “no social revolution can 
change its relation to the great geographical borders of its existence”.665 Zyuganov does not make a 
case for or against these theories but he pays considerable attention to them and they do seem to 
have informed his thinking on the subject as he has adopted MacKinder’s view of Russia occupying 
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a strategically important area of the globe. 
 Zyuganov claims that (after class conflict has been accepted as its most fundamental 
element) analysis of geopolitics from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th 
century was central to Marx’s and Lenin’s methodology.666 He goes on to write that geopolitics is an 
important element of “practically all realistic theories of world politics”.667 He argues that the class 
approach is still valid but also that geopolitics is a necessary theory to aid further understanding of 
the current political situation.668 He writes that geopolitics must consider all factors which permit the 
control of space and lists these as economic, geographical, natural resources, military, transport, 
demographic, religious and ethnic factors669 rather than just those which fit with traditional 
communism. 
His interpretation of Marx’s view that class divisions are the decisive political cleavage in 
society incorporates some strange and contradictory ideas. While he claims the ‘class approach’ of 
traditional communism is still valid, he puts greater emphasis on national divisions. He writes that 
the CPRF “is the party of the working people, Soviet state patriotism, social justice and communist 
aims and ideas”670 but this sits rather uncomfortably with some of his other statements, especially 
with the move away from more orthodox positions on class conflict. Zyuganov writes that the main 
influences on world politics are geopolitical, resulting from tensions between the rich North and 
impoverished South and conflict between different ethnic and religious groups and cultures.671 Not 
only does he not list class conflict as the first, most significant and most divisive schism but he does 
not list it in the communist sense at all. Instead he lists socio-economic tensions as the division 
between north and south rather than between the ruling classes and the oppressed workers. 
However, elsewhere he considers geopolitics and class conflict to have a more equal influence: 
“[t]oday, not only relations between classes but also relations between civilisations lie at the heart of 
the dynamic and development mechanisms of socio-political change.672 
 In Uroki zhizni (1997), Zyuganov claims that from a geopolitical perspective, Russia is the 
most important guarantor of stability between competing global powers, that it forms a ‘safety 
device’ which discourages ‘world powers’ from upsetting the carefully balanced ‘large spaces’ and 
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from attempts to create a uni-polar world.673 Zyuganov argues that with the end of the “bipolar 
mechanism for regulating international affairs”, which was determined by the Cold War, a new 
configuration of forces has taken its place composed of a larger number of participants. He sees the 
new arrangement as defined primarily by the USA, Western Europe (“in which a united Germany is 
not quite accommodated”, according to Zyuganov), Russia, which he describes as still a great power 
despite the internal instability it faces, and he goes on to mention China, Japan, Brazil and “Arab 
countries”.674 
 He continues by claiming that geopolitics rather than ideology has been the main cause of 
tension between Russia and her enemies. He writes that “the battle with the Soviet Union” was not 
really about opposition to communism and that this was just the excuse used to disguise the aim, as 
Zyuganov sees it, of humiliating Russia as a historical and geopolitical rival.675 This rivalry is a 
result, in his view, of Russia in its various incarnations as Muscovite Rus’, the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union (disregarding the inclusion of other countries in the last political entity), forming 
the main pivot of the “huge Eurasian space”.676 In a similar vein, Zyuganov claims the “New World 
Order”, a phrase used since 1991 to characterise world politics after the fall of communism, “is 
aimed at establishing a global dictatorship of the West to preserve the illusion of its political, 
economic and military leadership.”677 
Zyuganov writes of the formation of a multi-polar world and claims that today the world is 
in a transition phase: “politics in Russia must be aimed at the strengthening of the multi-polar world 
in opposition to the formation of a uni-polar world, that is in fact a dictatorship of the USA and 
NATO. Russia must support the aspirations of Germany, France, Japan and other countries to free 
themselves from the guardianship of the USA, to become independent centres of power which 
control near-civilisational regions.”678 He feels that Russia is further threatened by the eastwards 
expansion of NATO and that Russian politicians were shocked by this move on the part of NATO to 
expand into former USSR territory. He assumes that such moves to expand NATO show the USA 
and its allies were not fighting totalitarianism but “all along were hard pragmatists, not giving a half-
kopeck for their previous verbal promises and wishing to extract the maximum advantage from the 
temporary weakness of what was yesterday a formidable opponent.”679 He goes on to complain that 
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“NATO strategy in its actions is led not by abstract ‘ideals of democracy’ but by concrete 
geopolitical conceptions.”680 What else Zyuganov expected is unclear as this action fits with his own 
view of the ‘purpose’ of geopolitics - ‘natural’ geopolitical expansion is acceptable to Zyuganov 
where it concerns Russia but not when it relates to the USA. 
He writes that “[t]he main strategic aim of American-style globalisation is to prevent the 
unification of fraternal nations into a single state”681 which ignores the fact that many nations in the 
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe actively sought both independence from that union and 
alliances with NATO and the EU. Zyuganov also claims that “[p]ractically none of the former 
Soviet republics has real sovereignty. Under the pretext of the ‘war on terror’, the Americans and 
their NATO allies rule the territory of the Caucasus and Central Asia and dominate the ports and air 
space of the Baltics and Crimea.”682 While there may be an element of truth in this interpretation, 
such a change in alliance has been achieved by agreement rather than hostile military invasion. 
Zyuganov writes that “[t]he so-called post-Soviet space is non other than the historical Russian state, 
which existed here for hundreds of years. Therefore Russia simply must play not only a large role 
but a defining role here.”683 He is so convinced of his geopolitical theories that Russia has the right 
to dictate how these countries are run (as they form part of the same land-mass that Russia also 
occupies) that he cannot accept the idea that they have the right to choose their own political 
allegiances. The claim that the “geopolitical successor of the Russian Empire was the Soviet Union” 
was stated in the 1995 Programme684 and is therefore not just Zyuganov’s own personal belief but 
held more widely in the party. 
He claims Russia’s enemies are trying to draw Russia into disputes with Ukraine over 
Crimea, with the Islamic world over Chechnya and unleashing a wave of religious extremism to 
gain power in the Central Asian states and trying to hinder Russia from forming a partnership with 
China.685 However, ‘Russia’s enemies’ are only occasionally identified in his earlier works (and not 
at all in this instance) by references to the USA and NATO. By 2002, however, when Globalizatsiya 
i sud’ba chelovechestva  was published, the USA and the West in general were regularly identified 
as Russia’s enemies. Zyuganov argues that if Russia’s enemies succeed in these aims, then Russia 
will be mired in regional problems for many years and will “lose any geopolitical perspective,” by 
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which he presumably means international influence.686 
 Zyuganov’s solution to this dilemma is for Russia to undertake a new “gathering of the 
lands” in order to re-establish a new “union state” on the territory of the former USSR or the 
peaceful and voluntary integration of the “post-Soviet space” and restoration of control over what he 
refers to as the “heart of the world” (an area which covers Eurasia or Makinder’s ‘pivot area’) as the 
only alternative fate he can see for Russia is one of “degradation” and colonialism.687 He claimed to 
oppose the land reforms that were proposed in the 1990s on the grounds that Russia risks loss of 
sovereignty over her own territory if the land is sold to foreigners.688 It is Russia’s existence as an 
independent state and the Russian people - a “spiritual society of many centuries’ existence” - that 
are due to disappear from the face of the earth if Zyuganov’s recommended action is not taken.689 
He has written that Russia must “... begin the process of reunification. First of all, this concerns 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.”690 He claims that Russia is a ‘complicated ethnic community’ 
the nucleus of which consists of great-Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians so he clearly sees not 
just ‘Russia’ as extending beyond its current geographical borders but also argues that its population 
does as well to strengthen his territory-based reasoning for Russia reacquiring its empire.   
Zyuganov writes of the failure over several years to “neutralise” separatist tendencies in the 
CIS and that the ethnic conflicts in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and 
Pridnistria can only be resolved within a renewed Union.691 This argument does, of course, ignore 
the fact that these ethnic tensions existed during the Soviet era and many decades’ rule by Russia in 
the past could not resolve these matters but Zyuganov insists that there was no ethnic conflict in the 
USSR.692 Zyuganov also writes that: “[t]he real threat to the national and territorial integrity of 
Russia is not terrorism as such, but a fight between the criminal oligarchic gangs of the centre and 
the regions. It is they, not the various nationalities, who are waging a fratricidal imperialist war to 
carve up and share out Russia.”693 For Zyuganov’s theories about Russia’s mission to lead other 
nationalities against the West to be potentially viable in practice, he needs the ethnic minorities to 
want to be led by Russia and not in fact want independence as such aspirations do not fit with his 
vision for Russia.  
On restoring the USSR, Zyuganov quotes N. Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe (1869) to 
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support his claim that Russia, as the “centre of Eastern Orthodox civilisation” should establish a 
“Russian Big Space” by “gathering” other neighbouring states together to help construct a “multi-
polar world system”. Far from leading to ethnic and political conflict, Zyuganov considers that 
“internal contradictions” in the Big Space “will be overcome on the basis of a synthesis of 
millennial spiritual traditions and the technological achievements of the twenty-first century.”694 
Which, of course, ignores the fact that Russian leadership of the USSR and the technological 
achievements of the twentieth century did little, if anything, to overcome “internal contradictions” 
the last time such a geopolitical exercise was undertaken. Again, Zyuganov sees religion rather than 
class interests as being the unifying force. 
 Zyuganov writes that, from a geopolitical point of view, Russia’s current weakness is the 
result of two main factors. The first of these is the loss of control or influence over the former Soviet 
republics and Eastern Europe (or the “territory of the continental Eurasian Heartland,” as he calls it) 
which he feels plays into the hands of Russia’s traditional enemies as this area is part of the ‘pivot’ 
geopolitical area and in this capacity can “hinder the expansion of the Atlantic bloc”. The second 
reason he gives is the same aspirations but in the other direction - those of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic and others to join “a military-political bloc directed against Russia” which would 
locate the “strategically important region of Eastern Europe” in the “zone of control” of that 
military-political bloc which would be a major step on the path to “American world hegemony”.695 
 Zyuganov complains that from the second half of the 1980s, the result of the “anti-national, 
anti-state policies” of the Gorbachev and then Yeltsin governments has been a colossal loss to 
Russia of territory in terms of the other states of the USSR and the former communist states of 
Eastern Europe as a sphere of influence.696 Zyuganov claims that all Russian geopolitical doctrines 
from ‘Moscow - the Third Rome’ to the doctrines of Stalin and Brezhnev have been focused on 
achieving self sufficiency for the state and creating a ‘large space’ around Russia of “strategic 
allies”.697 Whether or not these ‘strategic allies’ choose to fulfil that role, their agreement with 
Russian aims is always assumed. These ‘strategic allies’ are now, as they have been in the past, 
other nations, rather than the working classes of those nations. 
Zyuganov writes that the threat of loss to Russia of state sovereignty and national 
independence is more real now than ever before. He cites the “Yugoslav tragedy” as evidence that 
the West is determined to attack the East and claims that the “Imperialist powers” of the USA and 
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NATO will make Russia’s revival impossible. He writes that all responsible Russian politicians 
should jointly formulate a military and “geo-strategic” programme to guarantee Russia’s national 
safety by limiting America’s expansion towards world domination,698 in other words, limit NATO’s 
expansion eastwards into formerly communist states. Zyuganov writes that the banners of the 
demonstrators against the war in Yugoslavia which proclaimed that: “Clinton is the Hitler of today!” 
and “NATO = Fascism” were not emotional overstatements but in fact fully reflected the actions of 
the USA and NATO in the Balkans which mirrored the actions of Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy.699 Whilst he is obviously writing for the domestic, Slav, audience, his claims indicate a 
considerable lack of perspective and, in trying to further rally opposition to NATO, Zyuganov asks 
when Russia will follow Serbia and Iraq by being attacked for failing to follow a political path 
acceptable to the West.700 
 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE NEW COALITION AGAINST CAPITALISM 
 Zyuganov claims that international terrorism has become a fashionable term in recent times 
and that in the Soviet era, the USSR did not apply the term terrorism to national liberation 
movements but the West is now imposing its rules on the rest of the world which force Russia to 
fight against those powers that might potentially be its allies.701 He further claims that the USA is 
the main international terrorist in the modern world, having “perpetrated any number of acts of 
flagrant terrorism”.702 Whilst many anti-globalisation protesters as well as communists might 
sympathise with this view, it is a strange remark from a leader of a political party who would be 
president, made in a translation of one of his books aimed at the English-speaking world (so 
presumably America in particular) when he is also concerned by the Western influence on Russian 
media that results in regular criticism of him and his party. 
 Zyuganov links the increase in international terrorism to global, geopolitical, economic, 
legal, racial and religious causes but asserts that the main cause is the collapse of the USSR which 
led, he writes, to a fundamental destabilisation in world security, a power vacuum over the area 
formerly in Russia’s sphere of influence, and “dangerous illusions in the USA regarding the 
possibility of advancing rapidly towards achieving its goal of world hegemony.”703 On international 
terrorism, Zyuganov writes that it is a force within Imperialism, a form of ‘New Imperialism’ 
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against the ‘Old Imperialism’. He writes: “... terror against individuals and particular targets has 
become mass and indiscriminate terror, an instrument by which the exploiting classes can intimidate 
and demoralise the popular masses.” He sees all terrorism as state-sponsored terrorism, writing that 
“[t]he intelligence services acquire terrorist organisations both by means of penetrating them and by 
means of creating them. Terrorists are always acting in one way or another under the control of the 
intelligence services. There are no grounds to suppose this was not the case in respect of so 
immensely complex an operation as the air attack of 11th September, 2001.”704 He does not say 
which intelligence service he thinks orchestrated this event. 
 He writes that mankind needs to establish a common front against terrorism but that this can 
only be done on an anti-imperialist, anti-globalist basis or it will fail.705 Zyuganov writes that Russia 
does not have the power to prevent the expansion of NATO but does have the power to direct China 
and the Islamic world in their opposition to the West.706 Zyuganov writes that Russia should be 
answering the challenges of the modern world by providing a model of stable development and 
fighting for a multi-polar world.707 Zyuganov has moved away from focusing directly on purely 
Russian concerns towards a focus on wider modern concerns such as ecology and the supply of raw 
materials, although from a Russian, nationalist perspective. In globalisation, he has found a new 
cause that unites people across national boundaries: he writes that “[w]hat we need now is the 
creation of a broad alliance of anti-globalists, a kind of anti-globalist International.”708  
Another of Zyuganov’s favourite themes is the idea of the ‘Golden Billion’ of rich 
Westerners draining the East of raw materials and natural resources 709 and the moral, cultural and 
intellectual inferiority of the West as a whole, in comparison with Russia’s superiority in these 
areas. He writes: “[t]he methodological deficiency and amorality of the ideology of globalisation is 
most clearly evident in the concept of the Golden Billion, a new master race comprising the 
population of the leading capitalist countries irrespective, be it noted, of their moral, cultural or 
intellectual level.”710 Russia, in Zyuganov’s view is a superior civilisation that must lead the fight 
against globalisation and the greed of the West. 
 
 
                                                 
704
 op. cit., p.145. 
705
 op. cit., p.160. 
706
 Zyuganov, 2000, p.504. 
707
 op. cit., p.506. 
708
 op. cit., p.196. 
709
 Zyuganov, 2004, pp.67-68. 
710
 op. cit., p.55. 
 134
THE MEDIA, THE INTERNET AND RUSSIAN CULTURE 
Zyuganov writes that over the course of the last ten years, there has been a progressive 
collapse in the integrity of Russia as a subject of world history and culture, however, he continues 
by claiming that all great civilisations have faced such a catastrophe and the “enigmatic Russian 
soul” manages to preserve its individuality and that Russian civilisation is unique and has repeatedly 
survived and miraculously revived and will do so again.711 Zyuganov dates the beginning of this 
collapse to the late 1980s and Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’, which led in time to the possibility of 
questioning the Soviet past. He writes: “[b]efore the power of the Soviet state could be broken, 
social consciousness had to be destabilised and the traditional system of values wrecked. Television 
proved itself fully up to this woeful task. It became a force which undermined people’s ability to 
think rationally, spearheaded a devastating attack on moral standards, and acted as a tool for 
destroying the cultural kernel of our society. This was achieved by ‘exposing’, debunking, deriding 
and vilifying all the values, symbols and heroes of the Soviet era. The moral and psychological 
defences of Russian society were seriously compromised as a result.”712 
Zyuganov regrets the decline in broadcasting adaptations of Russian classical literature on 
television and their replacement with Western popular culture which, he claims, is aimed at creating 
a ‘universal culture’.713 He writes that, on returning to power, the CPRF will “revive ... respect for 
the Russian language and culture and for the languages and cultures of the peoples of Russia”714 and 
“ban the propaganda of violence and depravity from our television screens.” 715 These views were 
repeated by respondents in St Petersburg (see Chapter 5). Zyuganov also writes of a “malign 
feature” of the “neo-liberalism of the 1990s” being “[t]he replacement of natural, traditional 
language with neo-liberal ‘newspeak’, which completely distorts the meaning of key concepts and 
words.”716 Whilst this is probably a reference to the invasion of English words into the Russian 
vocabulary, ‘newspeak’ is not the only reference to 1984 that Zyuganov makes, as noted above. 
Zyuganov also writes of the “takeover of the main Soviet mass media by a pro-Western 
russophobic grouping”.717 “In today’s society, the mass media are beginning to play a role very 
different from their former, auxiliary role. They are becoming a geopolitical factor in their own 
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right, capable of exerting real influence on the historical destiny of a nation.”718 Whilst the Russian 
media are clearly strongly biased against the CPRF (a bitter complaint of many of the party 
members interviewed for Chapter 5), the heavily censored Soviet-era media did not play anything 
approaching an “auxiliary role” in Soviet society but conversely, was used as a tool of propaganda 
by the communist regime. Access to information and control over broadcasting are clearly 
dangerous only in the hands of non-communists in Zyuganov’s view. 
While he praises the approaching knowledge-based economy, Zyuganov fears voters’ access 
to knowledge. Television in Russia changed after the reduction in Soviet-era censorship and while 
using the internet to advance his own party’s cause, he fears access to Western- and specifically 
American-based sources of information and entertainment. He writes: “[t]he electronic mass media 
are a potent weapon for influencing mass thinking, a means of waging the most dangerous type of 
modern warfare: conceptual war. They must be rigorously controlled by society.”719 What Zyuganov 
does not explain is how he imagines “society” would arrive at a collective agreement as to how the 
internet should be controlled and whose views “society” would collectively decide to suppress 
through that control. 
While Zyuganov concludes that a knowledge-based economy could “overcome deficiencies 
in the present system”,720 he also raises concerns about the use of the internet, claiming many users 
become unable to distinguish fact from fiction and that the “dictatorship of the [American] mass 
media” is directed towards mental reprogramming of the outlook and sense of identity of whole 
peoples and continents, and thus a frightening new aspect of globalisation.721 He continues by noting 
that “[t]oday, owning information and directing its flows are prerequisites for establishing 
totalitarian control and achieving world domination.”722 Zyuganov does, however, see a positive 
outcome of internet use in the organisation of collective action against globalisation which results in 
mass demonstrations at meetings of the WTO, IMF and G8723 (or the G7, as he still insists on calling 
the organisation in 2002, despite the fact that Russia has participated fully in the group since 1998), 
organisations which Zyuganov blames for the adverse effects of globalisation. 
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ZYUGANOV’S PLANS FOR RETURNING THE CPRF TO POWER 
 It has been suggested that the CPRF has perhaps reached the limits of its electoral support724 
and the leadership of the party has recognised this possibility because, as a means of returning the 
CPRF to power, Zyuganov is now an advocate of coalition government. The CPRF is a member of 
the coalition bloc National Patriotic Union of Russia and it was as leader of this bloc that Zyuganov 
stood as a candidate in the 1996 presidential elections, instead of as leader of the CPRF. Zyuganov 
writes of “broadening the social base of the opposition” and of getting this broad coalition into 
power by means of winning elections.”725 He refers to this broad coalition he hopes to create as one 
of “national-patriotic powers” but “social base” implies other classes – not just the working class.  
Zyuganov devotes an entire section to coalition government in Russia in his pamphlet 
Oktyabr’ i sovremennost’, published in 1997. He advocates the unification of Russian political 
parties “according to interests” to deal with the difficult economic situation Russia faces to create 
the possibility of forming a coalition government.726 He notes that over the last decade, since the end 
of the “world system of socialism”, coalition governments have been a regular feature of East 
European politics and that around half of the countries of Europe had coalition governments at the 
time of writing and that successful coalition governments have existed and do exist in some Asian 
countries.727 However, he makes no mention of coalitions being brought down when they cease to 
agree on fundamental issues. 
Zyuganov noted in 2002 that it was Lenin who suggested the “excellent idea” of a union 
with non-communists, without which, Zyuganov argues, there can be no successful movement 
forward.728 One of the problems the party faces in its quest to return to power is that of a serious 
decline in membership. When questioned about the ageing membership of the CPRF in the light of 
Lenin’s assertion that the communists were the party of youth, Zyuganov replied that wisdom 
gained through experience and veterans who had defended the country were the “golden fund” of 
the party. Nevertheless, he maintained in 2002 that the “basic nucleus” of the party’s members were 
of an ‘active age’ and that in the near future a ‘worthy place’ would be held in the party by the 
young.729 By 2008, however, Zyuganov had admitted that only between 5 and 7 percent of the 
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party’s members were under 30.730 
Coalitions, however, would help the communists overcome the problem of a declining 
membership and insufficient support from voters. However, the CPRF has yet to find coalition 
partners that are able to return the party to power. According to Party Programme, potential allies in 
the “national-liberation battle of the Russian people” are “political parties of socialists, centrists and 
followers of the democratic spectrum, progressive and progressive patriotic movements ... [as well 
as] ... unions, workers’, peasants’, womens’, veterans’, youth, employers’, enlightened and creative 
organisations, and religious unions of all traditional confessions”.731 How democratic and religious 
organisations would fit into the distant future communist state once they had fulfilled their function 
of returning the communists to power, unsurprisingly, is not discussed. 
Zyuganov also praises the coalition format of government as a tool for dealing with crisis as 
in Great Britain during the Second World War with the participation of representatives of all leading 
parties. Zyuganov also refers to the experiences of France and Italy during the same period - cases 
where the governments included both conservatives and communists.732 As a method of dealing 
with national crises, he considers coalition government ideally suited to Russia’s current situation. 
The idea of co-operation between different parts of the ideological spectrum is continued in his 
thinking elsewhere. He refers to competing factions in Russia being ‘artificially polarised’ according 
to established ideology and argues that a realignment of the political spectrum is possible.733  
 Zyuganov writes that the party is ready to co-operate with “those representatives of power 
who show sincere care for the country and work on the principles of respect for the law, following 
the path of genuine democracy”734 rather than oppose them. The pamphlet that contains these 
remarks was published in 1996 in time for the presidential elections and this comment is designed to 
show that the party has no plans to cause disruption and also to emphasise their new-found support 
for democracy to a sceptical electorate. When questioned as to the CPRF’s actions on coming to 
power and whether this would entail reprisals against political opponents resulting in civil war, 
Zyuganov replied that the party is against civil war and repression and that multiparty politics and a 
democratic social structure are well established in Russia now – which suggests he would not seek 
to dismantle the multiparty system. “It is the people who will remain in power through democratic 
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elections” he claims.735 The Party Programme refers to power in the hands of the people, but again, 
this is not to be achieved through revolution but by “recognising constitutional power of the working 
majority, unified through Soviets and other forms of democratic self-government by the people”.736 
The party would return to power as part of a coalition and then form a government of national 
trust.737 
When asked what resources are available to the National Patriotic Union of Russia to enable 
it to carry out its programme, Zyuganov replied that its main resource was the working people who 
retain the wish to protect the spirit of collectivism.738 However, the CPRF does not have the close 
links to the workers’ movements that its predecessor had.739 Zyuganov speaks of the restoration of 
the Soviets and “other forms of popular power”740 and puts considerable emphasis on the wish to 
avoid civil war and revolution. He writes that “we consider that a modern political party can not be 
extremist, can not call the people to the barricades, when it is not ready for this and when any 
attempt to erect such barricades only leads to bloodshed.”741 This idea of a peaceful transfer of 
power is, of course, a long way from the revolutionary words of Marx and Lenin. He writes of 
‘national reconciliation’ as a means of overcoming the economic crisis “developing a national-state 
doctrine that takes into account the thousand-year experience of Russian statehood” and claims that 
this can only be achieved by returning to socialism. 742  
 Zyuganov deals with the obvious lack of unity in the communist movement in Russia since 
1991 by claiming that plurality of opinion and party organisation began within the communist 
movement itself before 1991. In Derzhava, he writes of the “four years’ experience of multi-party 
politics”743 writing that there are important differences of theory, strategy and tactics between the 
communist parties that have existed since 1991 but that such differences need not hinder co-
operation between the different communist parties. He refers to such co-operation taking place 
already in the regions and to the need for co-ordinating bodies in the regions to oversee the 
organisation of ‘joint action’.744 He writes that “such organs must exist … to bring joint use, not 
foist tactics on the party which are unacceptable to it”745 which suggests that Zyuganov sees these 
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potential co-ordinating bodies as a means of asserting CPRF control over other, smaller communist 
parties as he points out it must not hinder the CPRF but he makes no mention of the agreement of 
other parties. 
Zyuganov writes of the necessity of having plans both for action in the event of coming to 
power and in the event of remaining in opposition. In the event of remaining in opposition, 
Zyuganov writes that the party must have a real possibility of influencing the social and political 
situation.746 The potential threat of civil war and how such a war could be avoided (and maybe also 
the fear that the threat of such a war could turn the electorate against the CPRF) is something that 
Zyuganov pays considerable attention to. He writes that “civil war is not our choice”.747 Zyuganov 
seems to see this threat of civil war as being the consequence of the exhaustion of economic 
resources and of a “spontaneous anarchic riot” which would constitute a “war of all against all for 
the redistribution of the remaining social wealth”.748 He writes that in this case, if it is not possible 
to avoid such a war, then the party will try to organise and direct it for the benefit of the workers 
interests and for the “protection of the state and stabilisation of society”.749 How a civil war can be 
‘directed’ for the ‘stabilisation of society’ is, unsurprisingly, not explained. He emphasises that this 
is still a scenario that they wish to avoid as that there would be no winners but that the party is 
obliged to be prepared for such an outcome of the economic crisis. He claims, however, that it could 
be avoided by “the restoration and strengthening of civil peace” and a transfer to the socialist path of 
development and further, he argues, this alternative is in the interests of the vast majority of the 
people.750  
As well as arguing that this impending civil war can be avoided firstly by the transfer to 
socialism and secondly by forming a broad social and political coalition of left, centrist, patriotic 
and democratic powers, Zyuganov feels such action would be powerful enough to “neutralise and 
morally isolate the ‘party of civil war’”, by which he seems to mean the Yeltsin government. This 
coalition is to be brought to power by electoral success or “by other peaceful, non-violent means”751 
but what these non-violent means could be if not elections, again is not specified. He writes of 
avoiding violence and of respecting democratic norms but this precludes revolution. It seems he 
does not want to rule out the option of seizing power in the event of a total breakdown of central 
government control during an economic crisis. 
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Zyuganov’s policy choices (choosing to lead the party in legal, democratic and parliamentary 
means of gaining power instead of following the route of smaller communist groups of extra-
parliamentary activity, non-participation in elections and calls for revolution) can be credited with 
improving the fortunes of the CPRF as it went from being banned to being a sizeable faction in the 
first Duma.752 The financial advantages associated with being a Duma faction enabled the party to 
strengthen its regional network753 and distance itself from the extreme opposition which tended 
towards violent street demonstrations.754 The party continues to benefit from participation in 
democracy (in contradiction of its revolutionary roots) and even retains considerable, though much 
diminished, support despite competition from Unity and then United Russia in Duma elections and 
this party’s adoption of a strongly patriotic stance. 
An ageing membership and reduced support for the party raises the question of whether it 
can return to power, even as part of a coalition. Undeterred, Zyuganov insists that the party’s 
184,263 members verified by the Ministry of Justice “... do not include the hundreds of thousands of 
our supporters and activists who actively support the party but for various reasons do not form part 
of the membership”.755 He claims that in 2005 over 3 million people joined protests organised by the 
CPRF, including 3,000 pioneers at the 7th November celebrations, and 20,000 people joined the 
party a third of whom Zyuganov describes as ‘young’ and he dismisses accusations of the CPRF 
being a ‘party of pensioners’ as the “banal ideological weapons of the ‘party of power’ in battle 
against us.”756 Zyuganov also claims that 15 to 20 percent of electors are supporting the party in 
local elections including educated people as well as workers757 but this percentage only serves to 
confirm the party’s reduced political status. 
 In order to make the party more acceptable to some of those who focus on the negative 
aspects of the former regime, Zyuganov has realised he needs to reform elements of the party’s 
organisation. When asked about the privileges enjoyed by the old nomenklatura under the 
communist regime and whether such a privileged hierarchy could arise again under any future 
socialist government, Zyuganov replied that participation in his electoral bloc did not entail any 
material benefits and that those who were in the CPSU for such benefits are now mostly supporters 
or members of the anticommunist and anti-patriotic camp.758 However, since the accusation of 
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selling places on its list of candidates for the Duma elections for high prices to businessmen in order 
to fund its election campaigns, the CPRF’s intended return to power itself appears to be more 
important to the party than how they get there. 
Although one former member of the party claims that many members of the Russian 
intelligentsia have become active campaigners with the CPRF as a result of disappointment with 
Russia’s politics,759 the CPRF was reportedly slow to get its activists out on the streets in the 2008 
regional elections while United Russia had been busy for weeks. The CPRF only put in an 
appearance in the last few days of the campaign and, according to one commentator, was relying on 
the electorate still voting for the party out of tradition and nostalgia for the USSR. The same analyst 
reports that local and regional committees of the CPRF had not been holding meetings with electors 
and not sending activists door-to-door in the campaign.760 If the party is now losing its one previous 
advantage over United Russia that was not affected by the conditions of ‘managed democracy’ – the 
ability to get activists out to campaign at election time – then the party is indeed facing a difficult 
future. 
The Draft Programme of spring 2008 notes that the results of elections appear to be planned, 
which brings the main official document of the party up to date in terms of recognising changed 
political circumstances, even if it cannot prove this claim. However, it also states that the country is 
in the grip of a severe systemic crisis and that there is a deepening abyss between rich and poor, that 
people are losing their social-economic and civil rights and that the majority of the population is 
being proletarianised, that there is growing indignation towards and opposition to the ruling regime. 
Whilst an argument could be put forward about the erosion of civil liberties, the clearly deliberate 
blindness to the changing economic circumstances in Russia in recent years and the popularity of the 
Putin and Medvedev regimes, implies that the party is trying to convince itself of its continued 
relevance in very changed economic circumstances from those in which it began. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there has been a 
general shift towards the centre and an acceptance of democratic forms of government on the part of 
left-wing parties and the CPRF is no exception with Zyuganov defending the CPRF’s participation 
in parliament.761 Movement away from communism and towards social democracy has perhaps been 
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strained recently with the loss of some of the social democratic tendency in the party but 
Zyuganov’s underlying message hasn’t changed. What has changed in his later books, is not his 
argument but the evidence cited to reinforce his views such as appearance of new socialist regimes 
in South America and the anti-globalisation movements that have mobilised thousands against 
certain aspects of capitalism. The waning influence of the CPRF in Russia has led Zyuganov to 
concentrate in his latest work on the party’s links with foreign organisations in order to try to give 
the impression of continuing relevance but he frequently fails to deal with reality and persists in a 
view that government of Russia and beyond is the party’s ‘right’: he writes that “[t]he CPRF is the 
party of the future”762 and that “[w]e act in the interests of the majority.”763 However, the party is 
now in serious decline. 
Although it did effectively ‘win’ the 1995 and 1999 Duma elections, as Russia has a 
presidential system of government, any electoral success in the Duma is limited in its effect if the 
party cannot also win the presidency, something the CPRF has failed to do in every presidential 
election since the end of the Soviet era. However, through the merging of nationalist theories with 
communism, Zyuganov took the CPRF to a level of parliamentary representation that provided 
considerable influence. If it were not for Zyuganov and those in the party who share his views on 
participating in the democratic process, the CPRF would have had no representation in the Duma at 
all and would have been limited to extra-parliamentary political activity. While the move towards 
nationalism was needed to draw more support from voters, it is perhaps more a change in the scale 
of adherence to nationalism than a complete change of direction since the CPSU also relied on 
nationalism to rally support for various policies. However, the emphasising of nationalist policies by 
the communists has taken on a much greater prominence since Russia’s loss of superpower status 
and the success of other political parties that claim to be ‘patriotic’. 
After publishing several books throughout the 1990s that hardly mentioned Lenin, Zyuganov 
has made far more references to Lenin in his recent works. Other changes in later books include a 
focus on globalisation, terrorism and the benefits and evils of the internet and television. Whilst 
adapting much of what he writes to accommodate changes in the modern world, he fails to adapt to 
Putin’s election and the appearance of United Russia, the CPRF’s strongest competitor. His recent 
works, whilst still critical of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, make very little mention of Putin, which is 
perhaps understandable since the president and the party that supports him have adopted patriotism 
and calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union and these are hardly policies the CPRF can abandon 
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in search of a new place in the Russian political spectrum.  
Zyuganov continues the apocalyptic phraseology of communism in predicting “planetary 
catastrophe” in the same way as Marx and Lenin predicted revolution but the tone of his writing is 
perhaps one of the greatest similarities with the party’s former philosophy rather than its content. He 
still writes using Cold War era terminology and still sees Russia’s traditional opponents as enemies 
in the same way they were seen in Soviet times but now Zyuganov calls for an international 
coalition against globalisation instead of a proletarian revolution. Since these changes in ideology 
are quite considerable for a party that still calls itself ‘communist’, the following chapter asks to 
what extent the party has retained the support of the voters and whether it is possible to predict 
whether a voter will support the CPRF based on their political views. Since the party has moved 
away from calling for a proletarian revolution, do its supporters still consider themselves 
communists? 
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CHAPTER 4    THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE ELECTORATE: 
        CHANGE FROM 1999 TO 2007 
 
With Zyuganov’s change of direction for the party, have voters responded to the nationalist 
calls of the CPRF? Although the party achieved good results in the 1995 and 1999 elections with 
more seats than any other party, the decline in support for the party at the 2003 Duma election 
currently shows no sign of being reversed, with the number of seats won in the 2007 election 
representing only a slight improvement. This chapter looks at the electorate and the CPRF and its 
policies and assesses the competition the party faces for votes by considering the communist vote in 
1999, 2003 and 2007 based on survey research to judge the change in the level of support for the 
CPRF before Putin was elected President to that after his election (an event which has clearly had an 
impact on the communist vote) and that at the end of his tenure. The chapter examines which 
indicators of communist support have changed over the course of these elections. 
 Although it falls a long way behind United Russia in terms of representation in the Duma, 
and there are two other parties with not much lesser representation in the present Duma, the CPRF is 
still routinely described as Russia’s only real opposition party.764 Along with Yabloko and the 
LDPR, the CPRF is one of only three parties to contest every Duma election since 1993. Political 
parties in Russia are different from those in Western Europe because many parties have formed, 
merged, disappeared and reappeared under new names with great frequency in the early post-Soviet 
period, and are still doing so. The CPRF is one of a small number of exceptions and, unlike many 
other parties, has a clear and fairly consistent programme and does not exist purely for the interests 
of its leaders, as some of the smaller parties have appeared to do, being formed just before elections 
and disappearing soon afterwards. While the majority of Russian voters have no stable party or 
ideological identification765 CPRF voters, by contrast, have the strongest affiliation with their party 
of any group of voters, as will be seen from the surveys analysed in this chapter. 
 Parties have limited influence in Russia as a result of the presidential system adopted in the 
1993 constitution. While they may claim to act on behalf of social groups, parties have little power 
to effect changes on those groups’ behalf. Parties have limited ability to influence government 
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policy766 although the President is accountable in various ways such as to a party-based majority in 
the Duma. This limitation has resulted in voters often preferring to identify with political leaders 
rather than ideologies and party symbols.767 How then does an opposition party like the CPRF retain 
support? Previous studies, discussed below, have shown that age, economic status, occupational 
status and residence in smaller towns or rural areas are significant factors in voters deciding to vote 
for the CPRF.768 Bearing these studies and their findings in mind, the analysis below compares the 
communist vote in the 1999 Duma election with that in 2003 and 2007. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
There was very little public opinion survey research under the communist regime and what 
did take place in the 1960s was not of representative samples of the population as a whole and 
mainly concerned attitudes to work in order to find ways of increasing productivity. The only other 
surveys of note were conducted involving those who left the Soviet Union after the Second World 
War and during the 1970s.769 However, in recent years, there have been many studies of public 
opinion in Russia and many of those have included opinions of respondents on the former and 
present regimes, former communist party membership and attitudes to the present communist party 
as well as other political organisations and voting preferences. 
In order to consider the change in levels of support for the CPRF from 1999 to 2007, this 
chapter looks at factors affecting the three Duma elections during this time and the many previous 
studies of support for the communist party then, using the survey results of the New Russia 
Barometer VIII (NRB VIII), New Russia Barometer XII (NRB XII) and New Russia Barometer XVI 
(NRB XVI), looks at those indicators of support discussed in the previous literature to determine to 
what extent they can predict whether a vote will be cast for the CPRF. The NRB is a ‘barometer’ as 
many questions are repeated from one survey to the next in order to determine the direction of 
change in public opinion. The surveys included questions on employment, followed by sections 
asking respondents’ opinions on economic matters, politics, voting and parties, views of life, 
international relations and social issues. Interviews were conducted face-to-face with around 2,000 
participants chosen at random across the Russian Federation including smaller towns and rural areas 
as well the large cities. The first NRB was conducted in January 1992, the eighth just after the 1999 
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Duma election, the twelfth just after the 2003 Duma election and the sixteenth just after the 2007 
Duma election. The surveys relate to different populations of voters so changes in support are an 
indication of trends, rather than direct comparisons.  
 The New Russia Barometers VIII and XI were devised by the Centre for the Study of Public 
Policy at the University of Strathclyde and were conducted by the Russian Centre for Public 
Opinion Research (VTsIOM) in 2000 and VTsIOM-Analytica in 2003, now known as the Levada 
Centre. The Centre for the Study of Public Policy is now based at the University of Aberdeen and 
NRB XVI was conducted by the Levada Centre on behalf of the Department of Politics at the 
University of Glasgow. Field work for NRB VIII took place between 13th and 29th January, 2000 and 
for NRB XII between 12th and 22nd December, 2003. NRB XVI was conducted during January and 
February, 2008. The universe for the surveys was the adult population of Russia over 16 years for 
the 2000 survey and over 18 years for the 2003 and 2008 surveys excluding soldiers, convicts, the 
homeless and those temporarily away from home.770 
VTsIOM divided Russia into 10 regions for the first stage of the sample and, using 
population statistics, assigned a number of interviews to each region in proportion to its share of the 
total Russian population. For NRB VIII, 107 settlements were chosen in total, belonging to 38 
subjects of the Russian Federation, including 33 oblast centres, 43 cities and towns and 31 villages. 
Within these settlements, 195 primary sampling units were selected which resulted in an average of 
ten respondents per unit. Households were selected by a random route method in which the 
interviewer called at every nth house from a random starting point. Within each household, one 
individual was selected as a respondent on the basis of a gender by age by education grid based on 
official statistical data. In total, 4,326 addresses were visited and of these, 3,055 had an occupier 
who met the sampling requirements, of these, 2,003 agreed to be interviewed, with the total number 
of respondents being 1,940 after the exclusion of those under 18. The sample was then weighted 
according to gender, age and education in order to make it representative of the Russian population 
as a whole.771 
For NRB XII, the sample was distributed among seven federal regions and then among five 
types of settlement proportionate to the number of residents 18 years old and over. 100 urban and 
rural locations were chosen proportionate to the population (66 urban and 34 rural) in 39 of Russia’s 
89 subjects. Primary sampling units were then randomly selected from polling districts in urban 
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settlements and villages in rural districts which resulted in around ten respondents per sampling unit. 
The random route method was used, as described above, and 2,022 addresses were visited from 
which 1,601 people who met the sampling requirements completed the interviews. The results were 
then weighted to match the Russian population as a whole.772  
For NRB XVI, the sample was representative of the urban/rural division of the Russian 
population chosen firstly from seven territorial regions representing the regions of Russia and each 
region was represented in the sample proportionally according to its population size. Secondly, the 
sample was chosen from among six strata of population centres ranging in size from villages to 
cities of over one million inhabitants. Again, the random route method was used to identify 
households at which the interviewer would call but the ‘last birthday’ approach was employed for 
selecting respondents within a household. As with previous surveys, the results were then weighted 
to match the Russian population as a whole.773 
For further details of the method of conducting the surveys, see Russia Between Elections, 
pp.70-72, and New Russia Barometer XII, pp.44-46. Details of the method used for conducting the 
survey in 2008 were obtained from the technical report accompanying the survey. The coded data 
was provided for this chapter by the Department of Politics, University of Glasgow.774 The total 
number of voters for the CPRF in NRB VIII was 279, in NRB XI there were 179 and in 2007 there 
were 203 CPRF voters, this represents 14.4 percent, 11.2 percent and 10.2 percent respectively of 
the total samples. 
Initial analysis below, using crosstabulations, is then followed by logistic regression models 
for each survey, which enables the testing of the dichotomous outcome variable, in this case a vote 
for the CPRF against all other outcomes in each of the Duma elections. The outcome variable for 
each year was recoded with 1 representing a vote for the CPRF and 0 representing a vote for another 
party or for ‘against all’, an abstention or a refusal to answer the question. The predictor variables 
entered were also recoded to be dichotomous with responses coded 1 for the anticipated preference 
amongst communist voters and 0 for all other responses.  
 Why include those who did not vote in the variable ‘non-CPRF’? Those who do not vote 
often hold negative opinions of political parties generally and of certain parties in particular.775 In a 
study that compared voter preferences in the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections, orientation to party 
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was found to result from interest in politics and belief in the meaningfulness of elections.776 
Therefore, as CPRF voters have strong links to the party they support, as will be seen from the 
regression models below, this is anticipated to differentiate CPRF supporters from those who did not 
vote as well as those who voted for other parties. In 2005, it was found that in Russia, those who did 
not vote were only half as likely as voters to be a member of a political party777 and non-voters were 
also found to be younger.778 Those who voted ‘against all’, when this was an option, were also 
found, in 2008, to be younger and also more likely to live in urban areas and were more highly 
educated.779 As CPRF voters are anticipated from existing literature to be older, classifying non-
voters as non-CPRF is anticipated to make any differences of opinion between the two groups 
clearer. 
  
THE 1999, 2003 AND 2007 DUMA ELECTIONS 
Less than a year after its formation, the CPRF had gained third place in the 1993 Duma 
election behind Russia’s Choice and the LDPR, or fourth place if independents are counted as 146 
SMD seats, or 32.5 percent of the vote, went to candidates who stood as independents. In 1995, the 
CPRF gained the highest percentage of votes and 157 seats, just over one third of the total. This put 
the party ahead of independents, with 77 seats, Our Home is Russia, with 55 seats and the LDPR, 
with 51. Again in 1999, the CPRF effectively won the election with 113 seats, however, 
independents gained 114 but many of these deputies joined other parties between the election and 
the Duma’s first meeting. Unity came second with 73 seats and Fatherland third with 68. In 2001 
Unity and Fatherland had merged to form United Russia which resulted in a gain of 81 seats over 
their combined total for 1999, if votes for its two predecessors are combined. In 2003, the CPRF 
came a distant second, with 52 seats, behind United Russia with 222 seats and 49.3 percent of the 
vote. Motherland and the LDPR came third and fourth with 37 and 36 seats respectively. 
Independents won 68 seats (15.1 percent of the vote) but this number was reduced to 23 by the 
opening meeting of the new Duma as many independents had joined the United Russia faction. In 
2007, the CPRF was once again a distant second with 57 seats. 
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Table 1: CPRF Results for Duma Elections From 1993 to 2007. 
 
           Seats: Party List        Seats: SMD   Total Seats     Percentage of Seats 
 
1993 32 16 48 10.7 
     
1995 99 58 157 34.9 
     
1999 67 46 113 25.1 
     
2003 40 12 52 11.6 
     
2007 - - 57 12.7 
     
 
Source: adapted from www.RussiaVotes.org 
 
In 1993 and 1995 there was a strong correlation between the percentage of the vote for 
the CPRF (and other left wing parties) and voter turnout. This correlation was lower in 1999 and 
in 2003 the decline was greatest in regions where the CPRF had been strongest with the CPRF 
being the party most seriously affected by the drop in turnout.780 In 1999, turnout was 61.7 
percent and in 2003 it was 54.7 percent.781 Also, in 2003, 23 percent of those who voted for the 
CPRF in 1999 did not vote.782 One possibility is that the CPRF is losing votes as economic 
conditions in Russia improve and that the good result for the party in 1999 was partly due to the 
economic problems of 1998. If this is indeed the case, then the CPRF vote may be in permanent 
decline if the Russian economy continues to improve. 
The total percentage of the vote won by the CPRF increased from 1993 to 1999 but then 
fell noticeably in 2003. The combined party list and SMD percentage of the vote for the CPRF in 
each election from 1993 to 2003 was 7.4, 17.5, 18.9 and 11.7 percent. In 2007, when all seats 
were elected by proportional representation, the CPRF won 12.7 percent of the vote. Although 
the party increased both its share of the party list and SMD vote in 1999, it gained only one 
quarter of the seats in the Duma, instead of the one third share it gained in 1995. The party 
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gained 4.3 percent more of the vote in 2003 than it did in 1993 but received only four more 
Duma places than it had ten years earlier. In 2007, the party only increased the number of seats it 
won by 5 and this was largely as a result of changes in electoral law that increased the threshold 
for representation from 5 percent of the vote to 7 percent, so denying smaller parties seats. 
However, the greater problem for the party is the considerable loss of support it has encountered 
in recent years. 
This drop in support has been due in part to the appearance of other left wing parties 
aimed, with probable assistance from the Kremlin, at splitting the communist vote. In 1999 there 
were two parties aimed at splitting the left wing vote - the Socialist Party of Russia and the 
Russian Socialist Party,783 neither of which succeeded in gaining representation in the Duma. In 
2003 the Kremlin is thought to have assisted with the creation of Motherland, assisted the 
already existing Party of Pensioners and supported Gennady Seleznev’s Revival of Russia 
movement to reduce support for the CPRF.784 The party has also suffered from the lasting 
popularity of Unity and later United Russia. Whilst not at all similar to the CPRF in terms of 
ideology, United Russia has, however, adopted the CPRF’s patriotic stance with much success. 
The switch from the CPRF to other parties from 1999 to 2003 resulted in a total of 5.5 
million votes for Motherland (and also some switching to the LDPR). Some voters also switched 
to the Agrarian Party which received 2.2 million votes (but only two seats) and the Pensioners’ 
Party, which increased its support from 1.3 million votes in 1999 to 1.8 million in 2003 
(resulting in one seat in both elections).785 The CPRF lost around half its 1999 party-list vote and 
party-list votes for the left as a whole dropped from 1999 by 1.8 million votes with the CPRF 
losing 8.5 million votes.786 This led to greater co-operation on the left as the CPRF and 
Motherland agreed in August 2004 to co-ordinate their work to maintain a viable opposition to 
United Russia in the Duma.787 Glaziev, Motherland’s leader at that time, only received 4.1 
percent of the vote in the 2004 presidential election, and the successor party, Fair Russia, did not 
put forward a candidate in the 2008 Presidential election. 
Although its share of the vote has fallen, the CPRF does at least seem to be able to rely 
on a committed core of supporters. 68 percent of the CPRF vote was constant from 1993 to 1995 
and the party had doubled its vote. Although the party also lost 32 percent of those who had 
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voted for the party two years earlier, the proportion that it had retained was considerably higher 
than that for other parties that contested both elections.788 In studies conducted after the 1995 
Duma elections 71 percent of those who voted in the 1995 Duma election, and could remember 
how they had voted in 1993, had voted for a different party the second time while this figure 
would most likely be between 15 and 25 percent in an established democracy.789 While voters 
for other parties were far more likely to have voted for a different party in 1995 from the one 
they voted for in 1993, almost three quarters of CPRF voters supported the party in both 
elections. 60 percent of voters had changed not just party but partisan family and three quarters 
of those who changed did so from government and centrist parties but only one quarter from the 
socialist parties.790 
According to NRB VIII, conducted less than a month after Putin had become acting 
President, those who had voted for the CPRF were less united in their support for the party 
leader than Unity supporters were for Putin (Unity had declared support for Putin although he 
was not a member of the party). When asked whether they would vote for Putin or Zyuganov in a 
second round runoff for President, 75 percent of CPRF voters responded that they would vote for 
Zyuganov and 23 percent that they would vote for Putin. Of those who had voted for Unity, 92 
percent declared their intention to vote for Putin in an anticipated second round and only two 
percent for Zyuganov. A total of 57 percent of all those questioned indicated that they would 
vote for Putin and only 20 percent for Zyuganov. The group that was the second most likely to 
support Zyuganov was not voters for any of the other parties but those who had not voted in the 
Duma elections, with 14 percent reporting that they would vote for the CPRF leader.791 The 
CPRF clearly faces a problem in motivating some of its potential supporters to actually vote.  
Another factor in the CPRF’s loss of support could be related to the party’s choice of 
candidates. As the party that claims to represent the working class, the CPRF has taken a risk in 
giving places to businessmen on the SMD ballot. Of the candidates selected for the SMD seats, 
only seven of the top 18 positions on the CPRF list for the 2003 election were CPRF members792 
while the party allocated some of the most winnable seats to businessmen. Accepting financial 
support from some businessmen alienated some of the CPRF’s core supporters and gave the 
party’s opponents ammunition to use against it in the election.793 It has also been reported that 
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the party sold these places on its party list,794 as other parties have, and continue to do. Yukos is 
reported to have paid the CPRF 30 million dollars for places and individual businessmen are 
reported to have paid between one and three million dollars each.795 According to Volokhov, a 
former member of the party and the author of a book that is very critical of Zyuganov, the costs 
of places on the party list for the CPRF for the 1999 Duma election were 1.5 million dollars per 
place for positions 5 to 12, and 1 million dollars per place for positions 13 to 25.796 
In 1995, the CPRF had treated the Duma election as a presidential primary but knowing 
that Zyuganov could not win the 2000 presidential election, the CPRF treated the 1999 election 
as an opportunity to consolidate its dominant place on the left and as an opportunity to be a 
major force in the next Duma.797 In the 1996 presidential election, the vote was against 
Zyuganov but in the 2000 presidential election, the vote was for Putin.798 Zyuganov made a 
tactical error in the 2000 presidential campaign in maintaining an anti-Yeltsin position, opposing 
the consequences of Yeltsin’s rule instead of re-positioning the party’s policies to oppose 
Putin799 and with 12 percent of CPRF voters in 1999 choosing to vote for Putin in 2000,800 this 
would indicate that there has been a considerable shift in public opinion in Russia away from the 
communist party and its leader. Putin won almost a quarter of the votes in 2000 from those who 
saw themselves as communists801 and 19 percent of the CPRF vote in 1999 went to United 
Russia in 2003.802  
The fact that Russia still has a developing party system and a short history of a civil 
society with alternatives to the CPSU is probably a factor in voter preferences largely being 
decided as a result of approval or disapproval of party leaders.803 Support for the CPRF was 
decided largely before the campaign began in 1999, in contrast with other parties, and the low 
level of wavering in support for the CPRF during the campaign indicates that the campaign itself 
had little effect on the party’s popularity and also, in comparison with other parties, it failed to 
attract more than ten percent of undecided voters during the campaign.804 Communist party 
voters had made their decision to vote for the CPRF generally very much earlier, before the 
campaign began in 2003. By contrast, Unity’s/United Russia’s lack of an ideology has appealed 
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to voters of all political beliefs, including those who describe themselves as communists. The 
approval of communists is partly what helped Unity to victory in 1999 and Putin to victory in 
2000, providing him with a majority in the first round of the presidential election.805  
Interestingly, 14 percent of those questioned in NRB XII who did not vote in the 2003 
Duma election reported that they would support Zyuganov in a Putin/Zyuganov second round 
run-off for the presidential election, which would suggest that the link between support for 
communism and making the effort to vote may be weakening. By 2007, at the end of Putin’s 
second term, the picture had changed considerably. Only 53 percent of those who had voted for 
the CPRF in the Duma election reported that they would vote for Zyuganov in the following 
Presidential election. 19 percent reported that they would vote for Medvedev and 15 percent that 
they didn’t know how they would vote. Again, the second most likely group to vote for 
Zyuganov was those who had not voted in the Duma election but, in 2007, this was only 4 
percent. Of United Russia voters, 81 percent reported that they would vote for Medvedev and 
only 1 percent for Zyuganov. 14 percent did not know how they would vote. Of those who 
claimed not to remember how they had voted, 59 percent reported that they would vote for 
Medvedev. 
In 2007, the CPRF came second with 57 seats and 12.7 percent of the vote - almost 50 
percent less than United Russia, which gained 315 seats.  The only other parties to enter the 
Duma were the LDPR, with 40 seats and Fair Russia, with 38 seats.806 Again, there were 
accusations that voting had not been entirely free and fair. Although the Russian Central 
Electoral Commission invited the OSCE and other organisations to send observers to monitor the 
election, no delegation was sent as many observers had been denied visas.807 The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) did send a mission which praised various technical 
improvements but criticised several issues, including the bias of state-run television towards 
United Russia and the harassment of opposition parties.808 
 
THE COMMUNIST VOTER AND THE CPRF 
Conclusions drawn from the first New Russia Barometer in 1992 indicated that former 
members of the CPSU were more politically active, were more likely to be male, were more 
affluent than those who had not been members of the party and better provided with consumer 
goods.809 However, these material advantages have largely changed and CPRF members have 
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since generally been found to be less affluent than other sections of Russian society. As early as 
1992, it was found that older people were more likely to still consider themselves members of 
the party with younger people and religious believers more likely to have left. Further, those 
older people who still considered themselves members, were more likely to have negative 
feelings towards economic reform. Although noticeable, the differences between former 
members and non-CPSU members, at this stage, were not found to be substantial.810 
In a study that compared the 1993 and 1995 Duma election results, the CPRF was by far 
the most distinctive party in Russia and despite the CPRF doubling its vote from 1993 to 1995, a 
development that might have been expected to lead to a less clear electoral profile, the CPRF’s 
voters continued to share common political beliefs in terms of attitudes to the past and present.811 
CPRF voters in 1993 and 1995 were also more likely to have been members of the CPSU than 
voters for other parties. The former CPSU voters who then voted for the CPRF were found to 
agree largely with what the CPSU represented but those who were CPSU members but later 
voted for other parties did not.812  
The question ‘were you a member of the CPSU or was another in your family a member 
of the CPSU?’ has been asked throughout the NRB, since 1992. The percentage of respondents 
who are former members of the CPSU and who vote for the CPRF had almost doubled over the 
course of these three surveys while the number of respondents reporting that they voted for the 
party has decreased noticeably. This may be an indication of an ageing group of supporters and 
more committed believers still voting for the party while those who are less convinced of the 
benefits of communism have left to support other causes. While inclusion in exploratory models 
for the logistic regression did not yield statistically significant results for 1999 and 2003, by 
2007, former membership of the CPSU was a significant indicator of support for the CPRF. 
Whilst many CPRF members are former CPSU members, former CPSU membership 
does not predict present membership or even support for the CPRF as many people joined the 
CPSU to gain the material and educational and career advantages that the party could confer on 
members, as well as those who joined out of ideological conviction. Having been a member of 
the CPSU is not a good indication of political views as many former CPSU members are now 
members of the new regime and political parties other than the CPRF.813 The logistic regression 
models below for 1999 and 2003 do not include former CPSU membership as CPSU 
membership was found in initial, exploratory versions of the regressions to be far greater for 
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non-CPRF voters than for those who had voted for the party and therefore had a considerable 
negative impact on the explanation of the CPRF vote. 
 
 156
Table 2: Former CPSU Membership by Percentage in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
1999      2003      2007 
 
 Member Another No One Member Another No One Member Another No One 
  in Family   in Family   in Family  
          
CPRF 
Voters 
18.8 24.5 56.7 28.5 21.8 48.6 34.0 24.1 40.4 
          
All Others 9.5 27.9 62.0 8.6 18.8 66.0 7.7 16.9 64.8 
 
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI.  
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The change in the levels of academic attainment of CPRF voters over the eight years 
between elections to the Duma might perhaps reflect the dwindling core of supporters the party 
has being those who benefited most in educational terms from their involvement with the party 
under the Soviet regime. Respondents for Chapter 5 were keen to emphasise the opportunities 
available in Soviet times (although these were claimed to have been available to all citizens, 
equally). While there had been over a third fewer CPRF voters with higher education than non-
CPRF voters in 1999, numbers were almost equal in the later survey. Consequently, higher 
education was omitted from the regression calculations as it was found in exploratory work to 
reduce the accuracy of the regression models in predicting whether a respondent in the surveys 
voted for the CPRF. 
From 1999 to 2007, there is a considerable variation in terms of educational attainment 
among CPRF voters. Respondents who voted for the CPRF were twice as likely to have higher 
education by the time of the third survey as those asked in the first while amongst others there 
was an increase of slightly under 3 percent. As these are different samples, it is not possible to 
draw firm conclusions from the changes over the years in the academic attainments of CPRF 
voters. Although the change is notable, education does not form part of the regression model as it 
did not produce statistically significant results for any of the models. 
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Table 3: Support for the CPRF by Level of Education by Percentage in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
  1999   2003   2007  
 Up to 
Completed 
Secondary 
Secondary 
plus 
Vocational 
Higher 
Education 
Up to 
Completed 
Secondary 
Secondary 
plus 
Vocational 
Higher 
Education 
Up to 
Completed 
Secondary 
Secondary 
plus 
Vocational 
Higher 
Education 
          
CPRF 
Voters 
62.7 28.3 9.0 42.9 42.3 14.7 51.2 31.0 17.7 
          
All Others 53.9 30.4 15.7 36.0 48.0 16.3 40.0 40.6 19.4 
          
          
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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IDEOLOGY  
Unsurprisingly, when asked about their political views in 1992, those who had been 
members of the CPSU were much more positive about socialism and Marxism-Leninism than 
those who had never joined the party.814 Socialist values have frequently been found to be 
correlated with class, age and also negatively correlated with education.815 However, one study 
also found that it was liberal values rather than the expected authoritarian values that indicated 
support for the CPRF816 and after accounting for these liberal values, the influence of 
nationalism, economic pessimism, age and education proved to be of much lesser influence.817 
Findings from a series of interviews conducted in 2001 in Moscow and Russia’s ‘red belt’, 
where voters tended to favour communist and nationalist candidates, indicated that those who 
favoured non-democratic alternatives to democracy generally had minimal education and were 
the respondents most likely to be living in the most difficult economic circumstances. Those in 
favour of reducing freedoms were still in favour of personal freedoms but failed to see that some 
institutional reforms would be unlikely to protect those freedoms and were unaware of the fact 
that their choices were contradictory.818 ‘Restoration of the USSR’ and ‘return to the economic 
system of the past’ are two variables used in the regression models below to test whether 
authoritarian values do or do not differentiate the communist voter from the rest of the electorate. 
With a clearly defined ideology, in comparison with most other parties, supporters of the 
CPRF know what they are voting for, unlike supporters of Unity/United Russia, a party which 
has made a point of declaring that it has no ideology and whose voters do not hold any set of 
political opinions that define them as a group apart from supporters of other political parties but 
rather reflect the political views of Russians as a whole.819 Several studies have argued that the 
Duma elections indicate that Russian political parties do have distinct social bases of support 
determined by age, education, residence, gender, economic conditions and voters’ ability to 
adapt to socio-economic changes and that these social bases of party support have been clear 
since the first post-Soviet elections and have grown and also become more varied over time.820  
 From a survey conducted in 1996, it has been found that committed communists had 
quite different political beliefs from the rest of the electorate and 44% of the electorate claimed 
never to have believed in communism or to have been a party member, 28% claimed to have 
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believed in communism in the past but not been a party member and one third of those 
questioned who had been party members claimed never to have believed in communism anyway. 
It has also been found that belief in communism does influence voting and that the effect of 
communist ideology on voting is considerable.821 Another survey found that nearly a third of 
those who were never members of the CPSU and do not believe in communism normally abstain 
(whereas those who had been members of the CPSU and abstained from voting tended not to 
have believed in communism) but current believers and members of the CPRF were three times 
less likely to abstain.822  
 From the table below it can be seen that in 1999, when asked how they would define the 
ideology they supported, 91 percent of CPRF voters replied ‘communist’. The second largest 
category of CPRF supporters replied ‘none’ - 4.7 percent and only 1.4 percent replied ‘social 
democratic’. Among non-CPRF respondents, the largest category was those who replied that 
they had no political outlook - 40 percent. The second largest group at 20.7 percent was those 
who replied ‘right wing’ and the third, at 12.6 percent of the sample, was the group of non-CPRF 
voters who replied ‘communist’. 
How did those who had not voted CPRF vote who said ‘communist’? And what about the 
40 percent who said ‘none’? Did they vote for Unity? Further analysis of the vote shows that of 
those who identified themselves as communists, 253 voted for the CPRF, 17 for Unity, 18 for 
Fatherland - All Russia, 13 for Communists, Workers of Russia, For the Soviet Union and 
smaller numbers for other parties. In total 335 respondents identified themselves as communists 
of which 253 constitutes 75.5 percent so one quarter of those who claimed to be communists felt 
that the CPRF did not sufficiently represent their views at the time of the 1999 Duma election. 
Of those who voted for the CPRF but did not identify themselves as communist, 13 reported 
having no ideology and four replied that they were social democrats. Smaller numbers of 
respondents identified themselves with other ideologies. Of those who voted for Unity, as well as 
the 17 who identified themselves as communists, 95 said they identified with a right wing 
ideology, and 79 replied that they had none. 
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Table 4: Table showing the relationship between ideology and voting in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
 1999   2003   2007  
 CPRF Voters All Others  CPRF Voters All Others  CPRF Voters All Others 
Communist 91.0 12.6 To the Left 46.4 6.3 To the Left 30.5 6.0 
         
Soc. Democrat 1.4 8.5 To the Centre 5.0 19.0 To the Centre 4.4 10.4 
         
Right wing 0.7 20.7 To the Right 4.5 9.8 To the Right 5.9 10.4 
         
Other 
 
2.2 18.2 Unknown / No 
answer   
28.5 31.0 Unknown / No 
answer   
36.0 31.5 
         
None 4.7 40.0 No interest 15.6 33.8 No interest 23.2 41.79 
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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 For NRB XII, the equivalent question asked respondents about their political orientation 
with the possible responses: ‘to the left’; ‘to the centrist party’; to the right’; ‘not interested in 
politics’ and ‘don’t know’. The nearest equivalent to ‘communist’ was ‘to the left’ and 46.6 
percent of CPRF-voting respondents chose this category - slightly less than half of all those who 
voted for the CPRF. The second largest category, at 26.8 percent, was those who replied that 
they did not know what their political outlook was and the third category, 15.6 percent of CPRF 
voters, replied that they had ‘No interest in politics’. CPRF voters who chose ‘to the left’ in 2003 
were outnumbered by those who chose other categories, unlike in 1999 when CPRF voters were 
almost unanimous that they were ‘communists’. For non-CPRF voters, support for right wing 
ideologies had declined by half. The combined percentage of those who did not know what their 
political outlook was or had no interest in politics was 62.1 percent - an increase of 22.1 percent 
from those who replied ‘none’ in 1999.  
 There were 198 respondents who claimed to hold a political orientation to the left and 
179 respondents claimed to have voted for the CPRF in 2003 but the overlap between ‘to the 
left’ political orientation and ‘voted for the CPRF’ was less than half. Of those who reported 
having a left wing political orientation, only 83 (42 percent) voted for the CPRF, 33 voted for 
Motherland, 27 did not vote, 25 voted for United Russia and 18 for the LDPR. Of those who 
voted for the CPRF, as well as the 83 who replied that their political orientation was ‘to the left’, 
48 of the CPRF’s voters did not know what their political orientation was, 28 replied that they 
were not interested in politics, nine reported a centrist orientation and eight replied that their 
political orientation was ‘to the right’. Of those who voted for United Russia in 2003, 198 
reported a centrist orientation, 182 replied that they did not know what their political orientation 
was, 182 replied that they were not interested in politics and 61 that their political orientation 
was ‘to the right’. United Russia changed from being mostly identified with the right (as Unity) 
to being mostly identified with the centre ground of Russian politics, if anything at all. 
The results for 2007 show that there has been a decline by one third in those responding 
that they identify with the expected category - ‘to the left’ with only 31 percent choosing this 
answer and those responding ‘no interest’ has increased by nearly five times. Responses for 
‘unknown’ or ‘no answer’ are now notably greater than for ‘to the left’. Of all possible answers, 
‘to the left’ received the fewest responses in the survey as a whole. The option ‘to the left’ was 
the choice of 6.7 percent of those who voted for United Russia but with a 32.3 percent saying 
‘don’t know’, lower than the 34 percent for the CPRF. While 23 percent of those who voted for 
the CPRF said they had no interest in politics, 30 percent of United Russia voters fell in this 
category. Further analysis of voting preferences reveals that 70 percent of all those surveyed 
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responded that they either had no interest in politics or they did not know what their political 
orientation was. 
So why, when the CPRF is one of the most ideologically coherent parties, did some 
CPRF voters reply ‘not interested in politics’ or ‘don’t know’? There is some confusion as to 
what constitutes left and what constitutes right in Russia, partly because the communists became 
the conservatives overnight when the Soviet Union collapsed. The CPRF has appealed to 
nationalists in its aim to strengthen Russia’s standing internationally, which may have further 
added to any existing confusion, as well as calling for increased levels of employment and better 
health and education,823 more traditionally left-wing concerns. Left-wing politics are clearly not 
necessarily associated with the CPRF but of all ideologies or political outlooks, the CPRF has by 
far the closest linkage of any party with an ideology, in the minds of the electorate. 
Does support for the CPRF translate into support for a return to the communist system? 
From the table below it can be seen that there is limited support even among those who vote 
communist for a return to the past political and economic system and between 1999 and 2007, 
those who did not vote communist have become much clearer that they would not restore the 
former economic regime while the CPRF voters are now slightly more divided but the number 
that would definitely not restore the communist regime has almost trebled. With only 47.7 
percent in 1999, 40.2 percent in 2003 and 40.4 percent in 2007 convinced that they would restore 
the former economic and political system, the CPRF has not even been able to convince a 
majority of its voters that the party represents an economic and political system that should be 
implemented again. 
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Table 5: Table showing the relationship between support for a return to the past economic system and voting in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
     1999      2003      2007 
 
Entirely Generally Generally Entirely Entirely Generally Generally Entirely Entirely Generally Generally Entirely 
 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
             
CPRF Voters 47.7 35.1 11.5 5.0 40.2 35.8 14.0 6.7 40.4 29.6 13.3 13.3 
             
All Others 12.9 19.8 31.9 33.2 10.2 14.4 23.1 45.8 6.7 13.0 22.8 48.1 
             
             
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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The CPRF, despite Zyuganov’s insistence that the party would move forward to 
socialism and not backward, is now having to deal with appealing to voters, 70.9 percent of non-
CPRF supporters and 26.6 percent of its own supporters, who would not want the economic 
system that the party represents restored. It has frequently been noted that when Russians speak 
approvingly of the past, this does not translate into a wish to return to Leninist rule824 but what is 
often meant is a return to a time of greater economic security and, in the minds of communists, a 
Russian national tradition that should be preserved.825 In a study that covered the communist 
successor parties of Ukraine and the Czech Republic as well as the CPRF, it was the economic 
and social aspects of the transition, in particular rising unemployment, inflation and perceived 
social insecurity along with socialist values (such as support for state welfare and collectivism) 
that were found to lead to a return to support for left-wing parties,826 rather than a wish to return 
to the communist system in its entirety. 
 
 
GEOGRAPHY 
There are several geographical factors that affect the communist vote. Communist parties 
in Eastern Europe have generally been strongest where those countries have a ‘red belt’ of 
industrial or agricultural regions where they have been able to benefit from protest votes against 
democratic and market reforms.827 Much research has focused on the support for the CPRF south 
of the 55th parallel where it is generally found to be strongest. However, the idea that the 55th 
parallel represents a political division in Russia – north tends to be pro-reform and the south, 
anti-reform – has been found to be too simplistic for finding underlying factors that affect the 
communist vote as the composition of this ‘red belt’ changes from one election to the next.828 
These factors include the impact of urbanisation levels and the concentration of resources 
(Moscow and St Petersburg being north of the 55th parallel).829 
The CPRF vote has been strongly correlated with the rural electorate830 but some 
researchers have found that this link is eroding. While the CPRF expanded its appeal beyond the 
‘red belt’ south of the 55th parallel from the 1995 election to the 1999 election,831 seventeen of 
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the ‘red belt’ regions accounted for just over 4 million of the 8.5 million votes that the CPRF lost 
in 2003. Part of this loss is attributable to the erosion of support for the CPRF in rural areas to 
other parties.832 Like the communists, Agrarian voters were also found to be on lower incomes 
and were less educated than the average voter and while the CPRF continued to attract votes 
from older people, those on lower incomes and agricultural workers, the correlations were lower 
in 2003 than in 1999.833 Of the 15 regions in which Motherland took over ten percent of the vote 
in 2003, in 11 of those, the CPRF lost over ten percent of the vote.834 In Moscow and Moscow 
Oblast, Motherland received 1 million votes and the CPRF lost 600,000.835 In the North 
Caucasus, the CPRF lost over a million votes from 1999 to 2003 and Motherland gained almost 
half a million.836  
There is a relatively higher share of the working-age population in urban areas than in 
rural areas as these regions are home to more of the young and the retired and it has been found 
that there is a strong correlation between regions that vote communist and regions with an older, 
more rural, more agrarian and less educated population.837 Russia’s ageing population has 
implications for future elections as a result of the strong correlations between older voters and 
more agrarian or rural populations which are reinforcing the existence of the ‘red belt’838 which 
may in turn reinforce communist support. Whilst geographical factors are clearly significant in 
determining support for parties of the left, town size was not included in the regression models 
below as results for the individual surveys indicated that town size was not significant in 
indicating the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF in these two surveys when included 
in exploratory regression models and the size of the two samples are too small for any results to 
be reliable. 
 
INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA 
Issues in the 2003 election included the increasing state domination of the national 
media, especially with the state takeover of TVS, the last of the formerly non-state national 
television stations.839 Russia has a pluralist, but not an independent, press in so far as a broad 
range of political opinions and interests are represented but this pluralism is the result of 
different groups owning newspapers (and formerly, television stations) as money in Russia is 
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made through connections in government.840 This pluralism, however, disappears when those 
groups feel threatened, as in the 1996 presidential elections.841 One researcher notes that: “[a] 
necessary precondition for the media to function autonomously is their guaranteed access to 
(political and economic) information and transparency of governance. Worldwide, a correlation 
can be seen between press freedom and transparency, and between transparency and 
democracy.”842 Access to that information is limited in Russia to those media outlets in favour 
with the government, despite the fact that the right to information is included in Article 29 of the 
1993 Constitution.843 Communists interviewed for the following chapter complained of 
difficulties in getting the party’s policies represented accurately in the media and as long as the 
media are not independent, the problem is likely to result in a further decline in the communist 
vote. 
Those who decided how to vote from watching state television were more likely to 
support Unity in 1999 and United Russia from 2003 and less likely to vote communist.844 In 
1999, except for age, socio-economic status had little impact on voting. Older voters were more 
likely to vote for the CPRF or Fatherland - All Russia while younger voters preferred Unity or 
the Zhirinovsky Bloc.845 Economic attitudes also influenced the vote, especially for the 
communists but the greatest influence was the media: state-controlled television on the vote for 
Unity and Fatherland-All Russia; and commercial television on the vote for Yabloko.846 State 
television’s promotion of pro-Kremlin parties in the 2003 election had a serious detrimental 
effect on opposition parties847 and the communists were “ignored or vilified” by the media.848  
Although television coverage of the election clearly had an impact on the communist 
vote, the attack on the CPRF in the broadcast media was combined with other forms of 
advertising. A survey of media coverage, party platforms, and political advertising showed that 
several parties (particularly Motherland and the LDPR) campaigned to win the votes of former 
communist party supporters through claims of the CPRF having acquiesced to business interests 
and claims by those parties they better represented the interests of workers, pensioners and those 
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living outside the big cities.849 When asked about the media in the NRB surveys considered here, 
however, communist voters were not remarkably different in their views from the rest of the 
electorate.  
In 1999, Unity’s greatest increase in support came after Putin’s endorsement of the party 
which attracted 53 percent of Unity’s support as these voters had been undecided before this 
endorsement.850 In 2003, United Russia’s influence over the media was considered so substantial 
(along with other complaints about irregularities in the counting of votes) that Yabloko and the 
CPRF co-operated to try to get the results overturned.851 The variable, ‘television coverage’, is 
included in the regression models below, as media coverage of elections and the CPRF in 
general was an issue raised by many respondents in the following chapter. 
 The questions asked varied from one survey to the next. In 1999, respondents were asked 
whether they considered coverage of the Duma election to have been biased and in 2003, the 
question related to whether the media could be trusted to represent the respondents’ views. 
Contrary to expectation, the CPRF’s voters did not perceive television coverage of the 1999 
Duma election to have been biased as much as those who did not vote for the party.  In 2003, 
surprisingly, CPRF voters were twice as trusting of television to represent their interests as non-
CPRF voters, although the total percentages for both groups were low in comparison with those 
who did not trust the media. In 2007, the most similar question asked whether television 
coverage of the election had been fair. The most comparable results are those for 1999 and 2007 
as the questions were the most similar and results for the CPRF  had hardly changed in terms of 
considering television coverage of the election to be biased. The most sizeable difference 
between CPRF voters and others was in 2007 with 41.9 percent of CPRF voters considering 
television coverage to be unfair and 60.9 percent of non-CPRF voters. This was the reverse of 
the anticipated outcome and did not produce statistically significant results in trial versions of the 
logistic regression. Instead a question on the fairness of the vote was included which better 
differentiated CPRF voters from others. 
                                                 
849
 ibid. 
850
 Brudny, 2001, p.163. 
851
 Riggs and Schraeder, 2005, p.147. 
 169
 
Table 6: Perceptions of CPRF and Non-CPRF Voters of Bias in Television Coverage of the Duma Elections by Percentage in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
1999               2003      2007  
 Biased Not (Very) Biased Does Not Trust Trusts Unfair TV 
Coverage 
Fair TV Coverage 
       
CPRF Voters 41.4 58.6 84.9 15.1 42.9 41.9 
       
All Others 38.1 62.0 92.3 7.7 26.0 60.9 
       
       
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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AGE AS AN INFLUENCE ON VOTING 
 Younger communists interviewed for the following chapter rejected assertions in the 
media and accusations from other parties that the CPRF was a party of pensioners. However, the 
average age of members in 2003, was 55, according to the party852 and three years later, two 
thirds of CPRF voters were found to be over this age.853 The party increased its share of the vote 
among voters under 30 and the better educated from 1993 to 1995854 but appears to have lost 
support among younger voters in subsequent elections. Older voters were more likely to support 
the CPRF in all three surveys and younger voters were more likely to support Unity in 1999 and 
United Russia in 2003, the Union of Right Forces and the LDPR855 so there are clearly 
generational differences in party support. In 2008, Zyuganov admitted to the party’s Central 
Committee that 85 percent of the membership were either pensioners or approaching retirement 
and only5 to 7 percent of the membership were under thirty.856 
The crosstabulation for CPRF vote by age, below, shows how the CPRF vote has altered 
in the eight years between the three surveys. Although the CPRF voters declined from 14.4 
percent of the sample in 1999 to 11.2 percent of the sample in 2003, of this decline, the greatest 
loss was in the age group 18 to 39 (a six percent loss) with a loss of less than one percent in the 
40 to 59 age group and an increase in the percentage of CPRF voters in the 60 to 95 age range of 
just over seven percent. Although the number of voters for the party was considerably lower in 
the second sample, the percentage in the middle age range has hardly declined. The party is 
noticeably less popular with the young and the proportion of the vote it receives from pensioners 
has increased from just over twice the percentage that voted for other parties (or did not vote) in 
1999 to over two and a half times as many in 2003. 
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Table 7: Breakdown of Support for the CPRF by Age Group by Percentage in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
        1999                2003      2007 
 
18-39 40-59 60-95 18-39 40-59 60-95 18-39 40-59 60-95 
          
CPRF 
Voters 
17.3 39.2 43.2 11.2 38.5 50.3 10.4 36.6 52.8 
          
All Others 48.9 30.6 20.5 43.7 36.6 19.7 46.4 36.7 16.9 
          
          
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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The share of pensioners in the population as a whole (or those classified as ‘older than 
working age’) has decreased from a high of 30.1 million in 1995 to 29.1 million in 2005, back to 
close to the percentage of the population that were classed as over the working age in 1992.857 
However, this percentage is forecast to increase again over the next few decades. This increasing 
number of pensioners (as a proportion of the population as a whole) may mean a maintenance of 
the CPRF’s levels of support as voters’ concerns change as they age. Kiewiet and Myagkov 
found that voters approaching retirement age during the 1990s were more supportive of the 
communists than those who were already pensioners. They consider this to result from extra loss 
during the transition as both groups lost their savings to inflation but those not yet retired also 
lost their jobs in many cases.858 They also note that Zyuganov received almost exactly the same 
level of support from pensioners in the 2000 presidential elections as in 1996 despite the 
considerable replacement of individual pensioners who had reached retirement age over the 
course of the four years between the elections.859  
While Kiewiet and Myagkov found that the persistence of the correlation between old 
age and communist support could be attributed to voters approaching retirement over the last ten 
years becoming more supportive of the CPRF than the previous cohort of pensioners,860 this 
finding is not confirmed by the results of the NRB studies considered here and this trend would 
be unlikely to continue if economic conditions improve further. Generational differences in 
voting have been noted by various authors with particular reference to political socialisation 
having been different for younger citizens than that for older citizens.861 An earlier study aimed 
to determine whether any generational differences in former communist societies could be 
explained by national, educational or life-cycle causes, and also found that approval of the 
communist regime varied by generation with higher approval in older generations (the older the 
voter, the more likely they were to approve).862 If the pattern Kiewiet and Myagkov found is one 
that does continue, then the CPRF should have a steady replacement of older supporters over the 
next few years, however, this does not, at present, appear to be a likely scenario. 
By 2007, there had been an increase of 9.6 percent in voters for the CPRF being over 60. 
The numbers across the three surveys in the 40-59 age range grew by 6 percent from 1999 to 
2003 and then stayed fairly stable. However, there was a decline of nearly 7 percent amongst the 
youngest group, with the greatest change in this group occurring between 1999 and 2003. 
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Although the decline in younger supporters seems to have slowed down, it has still dropped over 
the eight years by almost 7 percent. According to these surveys, there has been no replacement 
of the same numbers in the 40-59 age group and there has been an increase of 9.6 percent in 
CPRF voters of 60 and over 
 
ECONOMIC STATUS  
One study of communists in the early post-Soviet era found that those who still 
considered themselves to be CPSU members were most likely to oppose reform863 and another 
found that despite the CPRF being a very different party from the CPSU, its supporters, and even 
more so its members, tended to be those with a positive attitude towards the former regime. 
Before 1999, voters for the CPRF in the 1995 Duma election mostly described their economic 
situation as having worsened and/or felt that the economic outlook was poor.864 As it became 
increasingly clear with the passage of time that there would be no return to the former regime, 
Zyuganov focused on the consequences of the economic transition to attract votes from those 
who had been disadvantaged by the transition, in particular those who suffered from rising 
inflation, unemployment and diminished social services.865 However, he failed to address the 
change in support for the regime since Putin’s election, probably resulting in the CPRF’s poor 
results in the 2003 Duma election.866 
The social composition of the party has changed considerably over the years. In 1982, the 
CPSU claimed that 43.7 percent of its members were working class867 but by 1990, the party was 
only claiming 27.6 percent of the membership to be working class and 40.5 percent were 
described as white-collar workers.868 12 percent of the CPRF membership were described as 
workers in 2003, 12 percent as peasants, 20 percent students, 46 percent ‘white-collar workers, et 
cetera’ and 10 percent ‘others’.869 With such a low percentage of workers in the party, the CPRF 
can hardly claim to be the party of the working class. 
The percentage of the population as a whole engaged in industrial work, and therefore the 
party’s assumed natural constituency, has fallen considerably in recent years from 29.6 percent 
of the population in 1992870 to 17.3 percent in 2005.871 However, it is not just personal economic 
circumstances that affect support for the party as one study found that the relationship between 
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economic development and voting was very clear as richer regions registered more votes for 
Yabloko and poorer regions registered more for the CPRF.872 An article published in 1997 also 
noted that the communist vote depended heavily on the state of the economy rather than any 
ideological commitment to communism.873 This could explain the much higher vote for the 
CPRF in 1999 than in 2003 as the state of the economy changed considerably between the two 
Duma elections. 
The association between class and voting preferences between 1993 and 1996 was found 
to have changed significantly between 1993 and 1996, increasingly indicating a strong class-vote 
alignment and some signs of class realignment. Class position and a voting preference for 
Yeltsin or Zyuganov increased markedly.874 In 1993, the only distinction that was significant in 
terms of voting preference was entrepreneurs but by 1996, there was a clear left/right division 
between manual workers/peasants and entrepreneurs/intelligentsia/managers875 as a joint effect 
of the electorate becoming more economically differentiated and politically sophisticated that 
influenced the relationship between class and voting preference.876 The CPRF will now need to 
convince manual workers and peasants that it does indeed represent their interests. As will be 
seen below, not all those who identified themselves as communists in 2003 were convinced that 
the CPRF best represented their views. 
 In a survey of 800 rural households, Wegren found that the CPRF’s support is not as 
strong as has frequently been argued on the basis of these voters having a lower income: 
“[c]ommunist support does not appear to be economically motivated, nor a result of 
alienation”.877 However, this contradicts most previous and subsequent studies as well as the 
views of activists in St. Petersburg interviewed for the following chapter. Wegren found that 
communist supporters were, on average, seven years older than non-communist rural dwellers, 
with the communists having a mean age of 57, tending to be less well educated by 1.4 years 
fewer of education than their non-communist counterparts and, surprisingly, that communist 
supporters were not significantly disadvantaged economically, which contradicts not only 
previous research but also some of the data that Wegren presents.  
 Wegren found that differences in income were explained by communists being older and 
that younger, non-communists were more able to take advantage of new business opportunities. 
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However, Wegren also found that the average income for communist supporters was lower than 
that for non-communists because 64 percent of the communists were pensioners or unemployed 
and that the retired were more likely to support the communists than any other party.878 Wegren 
then compares just the employed communists in the sample with the employed, unemployed and 
retired non-communists and concludes that the communists have a higher average monthly 
income than non-communists. However, as the unemployed and retired constitute 64 percent of 
the communist supporters in this sample, both this comparison and conclusion are problematic. 
A more valid comparison would be of the income of employed communists and employed non-
communists. Also Wegren notes that the difference in monthly income between communists and 
non-communists “is around ten dollars, hardly a huge difference.” However, when that is the 
difference between 59 dollars per month (for Unity supporters) and 49.75 dollars per month,879 
that difference is in fact considerable. Wegren also notes that older voters depend more heavily 
on state benefits but if this is the case, with 64 percent of communists retired and unemployed 
and an average age of 57, how can communist voters not be “significantly disadvantaged 
economically”?880 However, the survey data from 2001 that Wegren presents do show that those 
on the very lowest incomes were more likely to vote for Unity than for the CPRF.881 
 By 2007, the composition of the vote for the CPRF has changed very little over the eight 
years between the first and last surveys considered here. The differences were more noticeable in 
the ‘others’ categories with a decline of 58 percent among pensioners and an increase of almost 9 
percent in the employed category.  The CPRF was found in one survey to have increased its 
support between 1993 and 1995 amongst most groups in Russian society and went from being 
‘the party of ‘losers’ of the transition’ to representing those who were comparatively deprived - 
those who felt they had lost status since the end of the Soviet era such as managers, the military-
industrial complex, educational and white-collar workers.882 However, these voters were the 
most marginalised being on lower incomes than other voters, being residents of rural areas and 
less educated and living in the ‘red belt’ south of the 55th parallel.883  
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Table 8: Employment Status of CPRF Voters by Percentage in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
 
              1999       2003      2007 
 Employed Outside 
Workforce 
Pensioners Employed Outside 
Workforce 
Pensioners Employed Outside 
Workforce 
Pensioners 
          
CPRF Voters 32.0 8.6 59.4 29.1 11.8 59.2 31.5 10.0 58.6 
          
All Others 50.2 20.8 29.0 54.3 17.6 28.2 59.1 17.7 23.2 
          
          
          
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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From 1999 to 2003, the increase in support from the unemployed, as seen in the table 
above, would indicate that it is again those most disadvantaged economically who are now 
supporting the CPRF, however, as will be seen below, the regression models do not fully 
confirm this assumption. However, from 2003 to 2007, there was a slight decline in this 
category. Overall, by 2007 there had been little change in the distribution of employment status 
among CPRF voters but among non-CPRF voters, there were 9 percent more employed and 6 
percent fewer pensioners. Kiewiet and Myagkov note that as Russian pensions are indexed to 
inflation, although pensions are low, they are not in fact much lower in real terms than they were 
before reforms began884 so it is difficult to determine whether the CPRF is representing the 
deprived or the relatively deprived. The logistic regression models below indicate the latter. 
 
GENDER 
Women were outnumbered by men in the CPSU by slightly more than two to one885 and 
the first NRB survey in 1992 found that ordinary members of the recently disbanded party were 
more likely to be male but in 1996, another study found that activists were almost as likely to be 
female as male.886 Ten years later, the tendency for supporters of communism to be male 
continued with one study finding that male voters were more likely to support the CPRF and 
female voters to support United Russia.887 While women in Russia were found to generally 
support left of centre views on economic policies in the late 1990s, they were not found to 
support nationalist or statist policies to the same degree.888 Is the CPRF, therefore, not so 
appealing to women if the focus of their campaigning is on so-called patriotic issues? Is the party 
missing the votes of women that it might otherwise gain if it changed the focus of its 
campaigning? 
There were clear differences in support for the CPRF in terms of gender of voters in 1999 
and 2003. A greater percentage of women voted for the party than men in 1999 but in 2003, the 
percentage of men and women voting for the CPRF was roughly equal. As the surveys 
questioned different voters, it is not possible to tell if those who voted for the CPRF in 1999 have 
switched to one particular party in 2003 or to various parties but it is possible to say that there 
has been a noticeable change in support for the party from 1999 to 2003 in voting by gender. 
Interestingly, crosstabulations of gender and party support for 1999 and 2003 contradict existing 
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research that considered support for the CPRF by gender, showing that in 1999, 44.1 percent of 
the sample that voted for the CPRF was male and 55.9 percent female while in 2003, 51.1 
percent of the sample that voted for the CPRF was male and 48.9 percent female. By 2007, 51.7 
percent of those who voted for the CPRF were female and 48.3 percent were male. Of those who 
did not vote for the CPRF, 54.7 percent were female and 45.2 percent were male. There has been 
a slight decline in support for the CPRF from women over the eight years covered here but the 
difference between support from women for the CPRF and for other parties in 2007 was only 3 
percent and so gender was found not to be statistically significant in trial versions of the logistic 
regression models below. 
 
RESTORATION OF THE USSR 
While the USSR as a concept has remained popular among Russians generally 
throughout the post-Soviet era,889 a study in 2001 found that those who regret the passing of the 
USSR are more likely to hold illiberal views in general890 but, as was seen above, the holding of 
such views does not necessarily indicate support for the CPRF as communists have also been 
found to hold liberal political opinions. The first study mentioned above also found that voters 
who did not regret the passing of the USSR were more likely to hold pro-Western and pro-
market views in the first half of the 1990s so it is anticipated that communist voters, who are less 
likely to hold pro-market views, also regret the end of the Soviet Union.891 The questions on this 
issue in NRB VIII and NRB XII were different and it should be noted that the question in 1999 
asked about the unification of all the states of the CIS into one unitary state while the 2003 
survey asked about the desirability of restoring the Union. The matter of restoring the USSR was 
not raised in the earlier survey. These questions are included here as restoration of the USSR is 
an important issue for communists and one mentioned by respondents for the following chapter.  
There was an increase from 1999 to 2003 of just over seven and a half percent in CPRF 
voters who would definitely restore the USSR and a decline of 12 percent in voters for other 
parties and non-voters who were less convinced the Union should be restored or were opposed to 
such a move. Although the number of people voting for the CPRF declined considerably from 
one survey to the next, the CPRF voters were more united by 2003 in their conviction that the 
Union should be restored. This may perhaps be a result of support for the party being reduced to 
a smaller core of committed communist believers. Conversely, amongst non-CPRF voters there 
has been a decline of 12 percent in those who would definitely like to see the USSR restored. 
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This is a little surprising as many politicians, including President Putin, who has been very 
popular with the electorate, have expressed regret at the disintegration of the USSR and also 
because the Union is associated with a time when Russia was more influential internationally 
which appeals to many voters who regret Russia’s loss of status since the end of the Cold War. 
However, as will be seen from the logistic regression models below, regret at the passing of the 
USSR is not associated clearly with support for the CPRF as this variable did not produce a 
statistically significant result. 
 In 2007 the question was “do you agree ‘it is a disaster that the Soviet Union no longer 
exists’?” and the number of those in agreement took the CPRF result almost back to where it was 
in 1999. It should be noted that the questions were all worded differently and therefore the 
answers are not directly comparable but there is, however, a clear difference between CPRF 
voters and those who voted for other parties. ‘Don’t knows’, not counted above, were 11 percent 
for non-CPRF voters in 2007 but only 1.5 percent for CPRF voters. For supporters of other 
parties and none, there was a steady and considerable decrease in support for restoration. Is this a 
result of greater nationalism among CPRF supporters? One aspect in the declining support 
among other groups for the restoration of the USSR may be the cost as Russia’s economy is 
growing while the economies of some of the smaller nations that had been members of the Union 
are not. 
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Table 9: Table showing the relationship between support for the unification of the CIS (1999) / the restoration of the USSR (2003) and voting by 
percentage. 
 
    1999         2003      2007 
 Agree Completely All Other 
Responses 
Agree Completely All Other 
Responses 
Agree Completely All Other 
Responses 
       
CPRF Voters 63.3 36.7 70.9 29.1 65.5 33.0 
       
All Others 46.3 53.7 34.3 65.7 24.9 63.28 
       
 
Sources: NRB VIII, NRB XII and NRB XVI. 
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LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The above-mentioned studies, combined with the crosstabulations above and research for the 
subsequent chapter identify the choice of predictors for the logistic regression analysis. Logistic 
regression is used in order to compare the vote for the CPRF with that for other parties and with 
non-voters using several possible indicators of support for the party. One logistic regression model 
is presented below for each survey to compare changing indicators of support for the CPRF over 
eight years. 
Age, perhaps the most universally agreed influence on the CPRF vote in the existing 
literature on the party, is included in all three models. ‘Age 60 to 95’ was included as not only does 
the majority of the literature cited above indicate that CPRF voters tend to be older members of 
Russian society but interviewees and several email respondents questioned for the following chapter 
noted that the majority of the party’s support came from pensioners. This variable was retained in all 
the final regression models. 
Based on research conducted in St. Petersburg for the following chapter, ‘age 40 to 59’ was 
included in exploratory models to test the assertion of one respondent that people in their forties and 
fifties were joining the party in greater numbers in more recent times and also the work of Kiewiet 
and Myagkov (published in 2002 and covering voting in the 1991, 1996 and 2000 presidential 
elections). This variable has been retained for the regression model presented here for 1999 but is 
not included in the 2003 or 2007 models due to reducing the probability of a respondent having 
voted for the CPRF in earlier, exploratory work. 
‘How honest do you consider television coverage of the election?’ was included as media 
coverage of the elections was found to be the greatest influence on the vote in 1999. In 1999 the 
question asked was: ‘would you say that the Duma election was fair in: ... b) television reporting of 
the campaign? Answers were coded 1 for ‘not at all’ and 0 for all other responses. State-owned 
television was also found to have had a very detrimental effect on support for opposition parties in 
2003 and so is included in the second regression model. CPRF voters are thus anticipated to trust the 
media less than others as the media ignored or criticised the party during the course of both 
elections. In 2003, the question was: ‘to what extent do you trust each of the following institutions to 
look after your interests: ... h) national television?’ Answers were coded 1 for ‘does not trust’ and 0 
for ‘trusts’ and ‘neutral’. In 2007, this variable did not produce statistically significant results for the 
CPRF and so was not included in the final model. 
‘Earn enough’ in 1999 and ‘income’ for 2003 have been included in the regression models as 
economic status, the state of the economy and impoverishment have all variously been found to 
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affect support for the CPRF. ‘Earn enough’ in 1999 and ‘income’ in 2003 were included in the 
regression models as not only does the existing literature note the importance of economic 
disadvantage but interviewees cited insufficient income as an issue on behalf of the impoverished 
members of Russian society who had lost out under the transition. For NRB VIII, the question was 
worded ‘do you earn enough from your main job to buy all you really need?’ Responses were coded 
1 for ‘definitely not enough’ and ‘not enough’ and 0 for ‘just enough’ and ‘definitely enough’. For 
NRB XII, the question was ‘to which group would you say you belong?’ and answers were coded 1 
for ‘we barely make ends meet; not enough money for food’ and ‘enough money for food, but 
buying clothes difficult’ and 0 for ‘enough money for food and clothes, but durables such as TV a 
problem’, ‘can easily buy durables, but not very expensive things’ and ‘we can even afford to buy 
expensive things such as a flat’. There were no positive responses at all from any group of voters for 
this last category. Income did not produce statistically significant results for the 2007 survey. 
Instead, a question where respondents were asked ‘how satisfied are you with your life?’ is entered 
into the model. The variable was recoded 1 for ‘totally unsatisfied’ and ‘mostly unsatisfied’ and 0 
for all other responses.  
The variable ‘blame transition’ is entered in the 1999 model, however, there was no 
equivalent variable in the 2003 survey. In 1999, ‘blame transition’ has a positive effect on predicting 
a communist vote but is not statistically significant. The question asked ‘who is to be blamed for our 
economic problems and to what extent? ... h) transformation from socialist to market economy.’ 
Answers were coded 1 for ‘mainly’ and 0 for ‘to some extent’, ‘not much’ and ‘not at all’. In 2007, 
respondents were asked ‘how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the country?’ The 
variable ‘country satisfaction’ was coded 1 for ‘totally unsatisfied’ and ‘mostly unsatisfied’ and 0 
for all other responses. 
One particular concern of the party members interviewed for the following chapter was the 
loss of ‘equality’ since the end of CPSU rule. A variable that could be equated with a sense of loss 
of equality between citizens since the end of the communist era was sought in both surveys as this 
loss was frequently cited by interviewees as a grievance. The closest question in NRB VIII was 
‘Compared to the old regime before perestroika, would you say today that: ... f) the government 
treats everybody equally and fairly?’ Those who responded ‘much worse than before’ were coded 1 
and other responses - ‘a little worse’, ‘better than before’ and ‘much better than before’ were coded 
0. For NRB XII the question that most closely enquired about equality was: ‘do you think state 
officials treat every citizen equally?’ Responses were coded 1 for ‘usually not’ and 0 for ‘not very 
often’, ‘fairly often’ and ‘almost always’. In 2007, there was no variable measuring a sense of 
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equality other than the question which asked for a sense of to what extent the Duma vote had been 
fair. The question asked ‘to what extent do you consider the Duma election to have been conducted 
fairly?’ Answers were coded 1 for ‘not very fair’ and ‘not fair at all’ and 0 for all other responses. 
Ideology is also considered to be an important indicator of support for the CPRF as the party 
has a coherent and stable set of policies that are easily identifiable by the electorate in comparison 
with those of many other parties. CPRF supporters have also been found to hold different political 
beliefs from the rest of the electorate so ideology should be a good indicator of support for the party. 
‘ideology’ in NRB VIII and ‘Ideology’ in NRB XII reflect the strength of conviction of respondents 
in St Petersburg that communism should be the future and not just the past. In 1999, the question 
was ‘what broad political outlook are you most inclined to favour?’ Possible answers were coded 1 
for ‘communist’ and 0 for ‘right wing’, ‘social democratic’, ‘great power patriot’, 
‘environmentalist’, ‘other’ and ‘none’. In 2003, the survey asked ‘which party or political force do 
you most sympathise with?’ Responses were coded 1 for ‘to the left’ and 0 for ‘to the centre’, ‘to the 
right’, ‘no interest in politics’, ‘don’t know’, and ‘refused to answer’. In 2007, the question was 
identical to that in 2003 and was recoded in the same way. 
Political convictions are also represented in the inclusion of variables ‘identify with party’ 
for 1999 and ‘party usually support’ for 2003 as the CPRF is one of the longest-standing political 
parties of the post-Soviet era and respondents in St Petersburg generally indicated a long-standing 
and strong association with the party and party identification has been found to be strongest amongst 
communist supporters.892 In 1999, the question asked ‘do you identify with any political party?’ 
Answers were coded 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’. In 2003, NRB XII asked ‘do you support any political 
party?’ and responses were coded 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’. For the 2007 survey, equivalent 
questions did not produce statistically significant results for the CPRF, possibly as a result of voters’ 
strengthening identification with United Russia. 
Restoration of the USSR was cited by various email respondents for the following chapter as 
a desirable event. This variable was included in the 2003 model, however, this question was not 
asked in NRB VIII, discussion of the restoration of the Union has only become more widespread 
comparatively recently. The closest equivalent in the 1999 survey enquired whether respondents felt 
that living standards would be higher if all the countries of the CIS were joined together in a single 
unified state. The question was: ‘some people say that the living standards of this country would be 
better if all the territories were joined together in a single unified state. But others say that this 
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would cause political trouble or be bad for our economic conditions. What do you think?’ Responses 
were coded 1 for ‘much better off in a single state’ and 0 for ‘somewhat better off in a single state’, 
‘wouldn’t make any difference’, ‘somewhat worse off in a single state’ and ‘much worse off in a 
single state’.  
Whilst this question does not reflect the sense of nationalist pride that tends to be associated 
with a wish to restore the USSR, it does, however, suggest to the respondent the idea of a unitary 
state which would cover much, but not all, of the same territory as the USSR, and therefore should 
appeal, in theory, to the communist voter as CPRF politicians have spoken for longer than many 
others of the desirability of restoring the USSR. This variable is therefore included for comparison 
with the ‘restore USSR’ variable in the 2003 model. The 2003 question asked ‘what form of 
relations between republics of the former Soviet Union would you prefer?’ Answers were coded 1 
for ‘restore USSR’ and 0 for ‘keep CIS in its current form’, ‘unite willing republics more closely’, 
‘closer ties with all former republics as in the European Union’, ‘independence for all republics’ and 
‘don’t know’. In 2007, respondents were asked ‘do you agree that it is a disaster that the Soviet 
Union no longer exists?’ The variable ‘disaster Soviet Union no longer exists’ was recoded 1 for 
‘entirely agree’ and 0 for all other responses. 
In 1999 respondents were asked: ‘there are different opinions about the nature of the state. 
To what extent do you think: a) it would be better to restore the communist system?’ Answers were 
coded 1 for ‘completely agree’ and 0 for ‘generally agree’, ‘somewhat disagree’ and ‘generally 
disagree’. In 2003, the most comparable question was worded: ‘which historical path should Russia 
follow?’ and the possible replies were coded 1 for ‘return to the path of the Soviet Union’ and 0 for 
‘generally the path of European civilisation in the modern world’, ‘follow its own special path’ and 
‘difficult to say’. In 2007, respondents were asked ‘what do you think the most acceptable political 
system is for Russia?’ and the variable ‘restore communist system’ was entered in the regression 
model. The variable was coded 1 for ‘the Soviet system as it existed in our country before 
perestroika’ and ‘ the Soviet system in a more democratic form’ and 0 for ‘the political system 
which exists today’, ‘democracy as in the West’, ‘don’t know’ and refusals to answer. 
Two other variables that contributed to the correct prediction of a communist vote were also 
included in the 2003 model. ‘Outside workforce’ was included as there has been an increase in 
support for the CPRF from the unemployed. The responses were coded 1 for all those not employed 
or categorised as pensioners and 0 for employed respondents and pensioners. ‘Putin approval’ was 
also included for 2003 to judge what CPRF voters think of the President whom members of the 
CPRF in St Petersburg accused of stealing their party’s policies. Putin’s appropriation of 
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‘patriotism’ and the policies associated with this stance in Russia, was a major cause of complaint of 
the communists in St Petersburg, interviewed for the following chapter. The question was ‘do you 
approve of the performance of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia?’ Answers were coded 1 for 
‘no’ and 0 for ‘yes’ and ‘no reply’. This variable was also included in 2007. 
Besides age, the other characteristic universally agreed to define the majority of CPRF 
members is pensioner status. This variable was not included in any regression model below due to 
problems with multicollinearity with the age variable ‘age 60 to 95’, and for the 1999 model ‘age 40 
to 59’ as many Russians retire in their late fifties. This assumption was confirmed by an early 
exploratory regression model. When the ‘pensioner’ variable was entered into another exploratory 
model instead of the age variables, less of the variance in the vote was explained for both years than 
when including age variables instead of the ‘pensioner’ variable.893  
 
Table 10: Logistic Regression estimates for 1999 showing parameter estimates (and standard errors). 
 
Variable B Standard Error 
Age 60 to 95  0.698** 0.262 
Age 40 to 59  0.626** 0.235 
CIS Unification -0.151 0.189 
Equality -0.093 0.183 
Earn Enough  0.364 0.212 
Blame Transition  0.081 0.203 
TV Coverage of Election  0.079 0.183 
Ideology  3.808* 0.242 
Identification with Political Party  0.994* 0.200 
Restoration of Communist System  0.485** 0.190 
Constant -5.190 0.334 
Pseudo R2 (Cox and Snell)  0.320  
   
Source: NRB VIII.   *Statistically significant at p<0.001, ** statistically significant at p<0.05, one-tailed. 
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Table 11: Logistic Regression estimates for 2003 showing parameter estimates (and standard errors). 
 
Variable B Standard Error 
Age 60 to 95  0.747** 0.240 
Outside Workforce  0.778** 0.369 
Restore USSR -0.019 0.247 
Equality  0.177 0.262 
Income  0.111 0.227 
Restore Communist System  0.375 0.256 
Ideology  1.053* 0.245 
Party Usually Support  4.810* 0.397 
Approval of Putin -0.664* 0.296 
Does Not Trust TV  0.295 0.355 
Constant -5.388 0.474 
Pseudo R2 (Cox and Snell)  0.291  
   
Source: NRB XII.   *Statistically significant at p<0.001, ** statistically significant at p<0.05, one-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 187
Table 12: Logistic Regression estimates for 2007 showing parameter estimates (and standard errors). 
 
Variable B Standard Error 
Age 60 to 95  1.191* 0.186 
Disaster Soviet Union No Longer Exists  0.839* 0.188 
Disapproval of Putin  0.862* 0.222 
Restore Communist System  1.326* 0.209 
Member of CPSU  1.139* 0.211 
Ideology  1.083* 0.232 
Timing of Electoral Decision-Making  0.076* 0.182 
Fair Vote  0.389** 0.189 
Life Satisfaction  0.183 0.203 
Country Satisfaction  0.272 0.207 
Constant -4.397 0.206 
Pseudo R2 (Cox and Snell)  0.185  
   
Source: NRB XVI.   *Statistically significant at p<0.001, ** statistically significant at p<0.05, one-tailed. 
 
For 1999, 32 percent of the variance is explained, for 2003, 29 percent of the variance is 
explained and for 2007, 18.5 percent of the variance is explained. For 1999, the classification of 
cases was 85.7 percent correct before the inclusion of predictor variables and 90.6 percent correct 
after predictor variables had been added to the model. For 2003, the classification of cases was 91.1 
percent correct before the inclusion of predictor variables and 93.6 percent correct after their 
inclusion. For the 2007 study, the classification of cases was 89.9 percent correct before the 
inclusion of predictor variables and 92.1 percent correct after their inclusion. This represents an 
improvement in prediction of 4.9 percent for 1999, 2.5 percent for 2003 and 2.2 percent for 2007.  
Not all the predictor variables are significant in the model, however, they do improve the 
prediction of a vote being cast for the CPRF.894 Nevertheless, in keeping with the principles of 
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logistic regression, there are still a small number of predictors.895 Where B values are positive, they 
indicate an increase in the likelihood of a ‘yes’ answer and when they are negative, they indicate a 
decrease in the likelihood of a ‘yes’ answer when respondents were asked if they had voted for the 
CPRF in the most recent Duma election preceding the survey.896 The model for 1999 misclassified 
35 cases, the 2003 model misclassified nine cases and the model for 2007 misclassified 65 cases. 
The model for 1999 indicates that ‘ideology’ and ‘identify with party’ are the two most 
statistically significant predictor variables - a result that is mirrored by the model for 2003, in which 
the variables ‘ideology’ and ‘party usually support’ were the most statistically significant. In both 
models the next most significant predictor variables were the age categories: ‘age 60 to 95’ and ‘age 
40 to 59’ for 1999 and ‘age 60 to 95’ for 2003, showing that the CPRF is clearly losing support 
among younger voters, a point seen very clearly in the crosstabulation, above. The model for 2007 
had eight statistically significant variables. The seven most significant were ‘age 60 to 95’, ‘disaster 
Soviet Union no longer exists’, ‘disapproval of Putin’, ‘restore communist system’, ‘member of 
CPSU’, ‘ideology’ and ‘when chose party voted for’. 
 Restoration of the communist economic and political system, unsurprisingly, had a positive 
impact on the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF in all three years. This variable 
measured the probablity of a vote for the CPRF coming from those who were convinced that 
restoring the communist system was the right way forward against those who were not convinced 
and those who were opposed to this course of action. In 1999 this variable was statistically 
significant but in 2003, the significance had decreased noticeably. However, in 2007 this variable 
was statistically more significant than in 1999. The most likely reason for the increase in those who 
voted CPRF who were absolutely convinced that the former system should be restored is that there 
is now a smaller core of committed supporters voting for the party than there was in 1999 when the 
party attracted wider support. 
‘Unification of the CIS’ was not significant in improving the prediction of a CPRF vote in 
1999 and actually had a negative impact on the probability that a voter supporting this policy would 
vote for the CPRF. ‘Restoration of the USSR’ in 2003 also had a negative impact on the prediction 
of votes for the CPRF and was, in fact, statistically the least significant variable in 2003. The idea of 
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restoring the former Soviet Union is popular among non-communists as well as communists due to 
the nationalist importance attached to Russia’s status as a super-power during the Soviet era and the 
loss of large territories when that era came to an end. This much wider support from the population 
as a whole is the most likely explanation of these variables’ negative impact on the prediction of a 
communist vote. 
‘Earn enough’ in 1999 and ‘Income’ in 2003 were included as CPRF members in St. 
Petersburg spoke of the poorest people not earning enough to live on in the context of the need for a 
communist government to solve this problem. Whilst both had a positive effect on prediction of a 
CPRF vote, neither of these variables were statistically significant, with the significance declining 
noticeably in 2003 from a level in the previous survey that was fairly close to being statistically 
significant. Sufficient income therefore appears to be a far less reliable indicator of communist 
support than it has been in the past. ‘Life statisfaction’ helped to predict the CPRF vote in 2007 but 
was not statistically significant. 
The ‘equality’ variables, whilst not directly comparable, as the questions were different in 
the separate surveys, surprisingly have a negative impact on the prediction of a CPRF vote in 1999 
but a positive impact in 2003 and a positive and statistically significant impact in 2007, which would 
indicate that concerns about equality are widespread in Russian society and not an issue that the 
CPRF has been able to capitalise on to the degree that the party might have expected since it is 
characterised as representing the ‘losers’ in the economic transition. However, the increasing 
statistical significance of this variable indicates that CPRF voters feel more disadvantaged in 2007 
than the average voter in 1999. 
 A perception that television coverage of the 1999 and 2003 elections was biased also has a 
positive effect on the prediction of a communist vote but again, neither the 1999 nor the 2003 
variable were statistically significant, suggesting that the perception of bias in the broadcast media is 
widespread and not limited to CPRF supporters. Television viewers in Russia are clearly aware of 
bias in media coverage of elections, whatever their political affiliation. This variable was not 
included in the 2007 model as it reduced the percentage of the communist vote that was correctly 
predicted by the model. 
 In 2003, there were two other significant variables. The first, ‘outside workforce’ has a 
positive effect on the prediction of a communist vote and is statistically significant (whereas it had 
not been so in 1999 when included in exploratory models). The second, ‘Putin approval’ has a 
substantially negative effect on the prediction of a communist vote but this result is also statistically 
significant indicating that CPRF voters approve of Putin despite accusing him of stealing some of 
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their party’s policies. By 2007, however, disapproval of Putin had a positive effect on the prediction 
of a communist vote and was also statistically significant indicating a decline in CPRF voters’ good 
opinion of the President. 
In 2003 NRB XII respondents were asked ‘when did you choose the party you voted for?’ 
When added to trial regression models, to test whether the time when voters made their decision 
differentiated communists from other voters, this variable was statistically significant and increased 
the variance explained by the model. However, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test was 
not statistically significant with this variable entered in the model and problems of multicollinearity 
arose with the variable ‘party usually support’, which better predicted the probability of a vote being 
cast for the CPRF. This factor has been found to distinguish CPRF voters from supporters of other 
parties but the variable “party usually support” had a B of 5.20 and “when chose party” had a B of 
3.29 when both were included in a preliminary regression model so “party usually support” was 
retained in the version reported here as it resulted in a higher B score and a statistically significant 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. However, in NRB XVI, ‘how long before the election 
did you decide which party you would vote for?’ gave the anticipated result and is included in the 
logistic regression model for this year. 
 In 2007, the high number of statistically significant variables would indicate that those who 
vote for the CPRF are a fairly homogenous group holding similar views. However, the large number 
of misclassified cases indicates otherwise. Former membership of the CPSU and the timing of 
electoral decision-making were the two new variables in this model that had not been retained in 
either of the previous final models but did not just help explain the CPRF vote in 2007 but were also 
statistically significant. Of those survey participants correctly classified, the views held by these 
CPRF voters indicate a longing for a return to the economic stability of the past. 
It is likely that the models could be generalised to the population as a whole as firstly, there 
is considerable continuity from 1999 to 2007 in terms of the same variables correctly predicting a 
communist vote and some continuity with the same variables being statistically significant which 
would indicate that the models are probably an accurate reflection of the populations surveyed and, 
secondly, the 2007 model reflects the loss of support for the CPRF as more traditional communist 
views, in particular restoration of the communist system, predict more accurately the difference 
between those who voted for the CPRF and those who did not as these views are held by a smaller 
core of consistent supporters who have not deserted the party. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the logistic regression models above, a CPRF supporter could be predicted to be 
older and with more strongly held political views than the average Russian citizen. As many 
previous studies have found, age is clearly one of the most significant factors in predicting support 
for the CPRF but this factor was outweighed in the first and second surveys by party identification 
and ideological conviction. If a voter identifies with a political party and an ideology, there was a 
greater probability that that voter will support the CPRF than any other political party. By 2007, 
however, age 60-95 was one of the seven most statistically significant factors in determining 
whether a voter was most likely to be cast for the CPRF. 
In 1999, the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF was most clearly influenced by a 
voter’s ideology and identification with a political party. Of secondary, but still significant, 
importance was their age, with those 60 and over only slightly more likely to be CPRF voters than 
those from 40 to 59. Of least concern to a CPRF voter in 1999 was blaming the economic transition 
for Russia’s problems, fair treatment of all citizens from the government as a measure of equality 
and that television coverage of the 1999 Duma election was biased. Whilst ‘equality’ had a negative 
effect on the prediction of a vote being cast for the CPRF, ‘blame transition’ and ‘television 
coverage’ had positive effects on the prediction of a CPRF vote but none of these variables were 
statistically significant. 
In 2003, again it was ideology and the strength of identification with a political party that 
most readily indicated the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF. Age 60 and over was the 
next most reliable indicator of communist support followed by strong disapproval of President Putin 
and then lack of employment (excluding pensioner status). Of least concern to a CPRF voter in 2003 
(in comparison with other variables) was the absolute necessity of restoring the USSR, which had a 
very low statistical significance, followed by being on an extremely low income. Concerns about 
equality and the fairness of television coverage of the 2003 Duma election also failed to noticeably 
differentiate CPRF voters from supporters of other parties and non-voters. 
In 2007, age was of considerably greater statistical significance. Ideology and disapproval of 
President Putin continued to be statistically significant with the addition of a wish for the Soviet 
Union to be restored along with the communist economic system, former membership of the CPSU 
and how long ago voters made their electoral decisions. The fairness of the vote in the 2007 Duma 
election was also statistically significant, but to a lesser degree. The only two variables which helped 
explain the vote but were not statistically significant were satisfaction with the way direction in 
which the country was being led and voters satisfaction with their own lives. 
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The above analysis indicates agreement with the findings of the study by Kiewiet and 
Myagkov that pensioner support for the CPRF is holding up from one election to the next despite the 
replacement of individual pensioners over the four years between elections so there are new 
pensioners choosing to vote for the CPRF as voters’ concerns change as they age. However, the 
surveys analysed here do not confirm Kiewiet and Myagkov’s finding that voters in their forties and 
fifties are turning to the CPRF, they in fact indicate the reverse and therefore also contradict the 
assertion of an interviewee in the following chapter that voters in this age range are joining the party 
in greater numbers than before. More generally, the above analysis confirmed the findings of White 
and McAllister (2006) that older voters are more likely to support the CPRF. The findings from NRB 
VIII and NRB XII also indicate that it is not the most disadvantaged economically that are the 
CPRF’s supporters but the comparatively disadvantaged. The results of the survey discussed above 
also indicate agreement with Rose and Munro (2003) that CPRF voters tended to be those with a 
positive attitude towards the former regime. However, the analysis above also shows that whilst 
CPRF voters might have strong ideological convictions, they were not by any means convinced that 
they wish to see a return to the former regime. 
As has been shown, there is no majority in favour of a return to the past economic and 
political system which raises a problem for the party in that its name and policies are associated in 
the minds of the electorate with a system that the majority do not wish to see restored. The argument 
that it has been ‘ideological extremism’ that has fuelled the growth of the CPRF since 1993 and that 
Zyuganov cannot now discard this ideology without alienating many activists and supporters897 is 
probably true but equally, while ‘patriotism’ as an idea is popular with the electorate, the CPRF’s 
patriotism has not been enough for the party to retain, never mind extend, its support. Davidheiser 
argued in 1998 that if the CPRF continues to work with nationalists and the ideology moves towards 
national socialism then the party will remain in permanent opposition and may not survive but that if 
the party joins forces with moderates and moves towards social democracy, it might gain sufficient 
support to govern.898 However, the general antipathy towards social democracy in Russia, and 
hostility to social democracy among communists, is well documented and it is unlikely that such a 
move would be successful for the party. The argument that since the 2003 election the CPRF cannot 
continue with the same leader and programme if it is to regain support899 appears well-founded, 
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particularly in light of the party’s depleted membership. The party’s continued failure to reverse this 
trend is further evidence that a new leader is needed after 15 years. 
This raises the question of which direction the CPRF should move in, if indeed the party has 
any room for ideological manoeuvre. As will be seen in Chapter 5, there is a lack of support for 
social democracy among members of the CPRF in St Petersburg and the more extreme left wing 
political positions are already well covered by smaller parties which have consistently failed to 
attract sufficient votes at elections to gain representation in the Duma. As Russia has a presidential 
system and the Duma wields little power, a majority in the Duma would still not be sufficient to 
move Russia towards communism as the CPRF would need to win the presidency as well. Although 
the results show that there is considerable support for traditionally communist ideas among CPRF 
voters, they also reflect the unwillingness of the majority of the population to elect Zyuganov or his 
party as already seen in the Duma and presidential elections which preceded these surveys.  
Although the CPRF’s web-site claimed that in 2001, around 20,000 people joined the 
party,900 the party only claimed to have 184,000 members in 2006,901 a considerable fall from the 
500,000 members the party claimed to have in 2003. The party is particularly unable to appeal to 
large enough numbers of young people to replace its older supporters in sufficient numbers as they 
die. Ultimately, as party identification and the strength of that identification have been shown to 
increase with age, it may be difficult to attract the support of the young anyway. However, with a 
leader who is unpopular in comparison with the recent and current Presidents and very unpopular 
with the young, it is difficult to see how the CPRF can attract new support while Zyuganov remains.  
With almost 85 percent of its voters being pensioners, the CPRF is very much the party of 
the old. This may, however, not be quite the problem that it first appears as almost all projections, 
Russian and non-Russian, of the future population of Russia indicate a declining and ageing 
population and the proportion of elderly is projected to increase by 12 percent to 24.8 percent by 
2015.902 The results of an ageing population will be greater pressure on the country’s pension 
system and a greater tax burden on the shrinking working-age population903 which, all combined, 
may increase support for the CPRF if the party focuses on pensions and care for the elderly and if 
generational experiences do indeed lead retiring Russians to support the CPRF, there is a potentially 
increasing number of voters for the party over the next few years. 
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 The CPRF’s voters are generally the most ideologically committed of any party’s supporters 
but do the party’s voters compare with the CPRF’s membership in other ways? The next chapter 
focuses on interviews and email correspondence with members of the St Petersburg branch of the 
party to find out whether they hold the same views as the voters, how they compare in terms of age 
with the voters and what their motivation was for joining the new party after the demise of the 
CPSU. A consideration of the views of members of a local branch of the party enables an 
assessment to be made of what issues members feel the party needs to address in order to deal with 
declining support. The CPRF was still claiming over half a million members at the time fieldwork in 
2003 was undertaken,904 however, the party clearly faces a problem with a dramatic decline in 
membership as the figure noted above clearly illustrates. 
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CHAPTER 5    INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PARTY IN ST PETERSBURG  
 
Are the views of voters for the CPRF similar to those of the party’s members? Based on 
fieldwork undertaken in June and July, 2003, this chapter looks at the views of grass-roots members 
and activists in the St Petersburg branch of the party to see what those views can tell us about the 
nature of communism in Russia in the 21st century. The main aspects of the party’s development are 
considered following interviews with members of the local branch of the CPRF in the city. How was 
the party in St Petersburg reconstituted after the ban? What motivates today’s members of the 
CPRF? Are they long-term supporters and former members of the CPSU or are they new converts to 
the cause? Are the majority older citizens or are younger voters joining the party, as the leadership 
claims? Has the social composition of the party changed? Are members generally working class or 
do they tend to be representatives of other classes? Does the party have an active membership or are 
members generally passive? 
Following on from Chapter 3, which considered the views of the party leader, it is possible 
to discuss whether there is a division between what the leadership in Moscow is saying and 
publishing and the views of a group of ordinary members outside the capital. Are rank-and-file 
members satisfied with Zyuganov as leader or do they perceive another within the leadership as 
having better prospects for success in presidential elections or making a better leader? How much 
influence do rank-and-file members have on decision-making within the party and has their 
influence grown in comparison with what it was in the CPSU?  
 This chapter also considers the relationship of the party to its youth organisation and the 
differences in the ‘reformation’ of the two organisations. As it was possible to interview a number of 
young Komsomol members this chapter also includes a discussion of the future direction of the 
party as the younger members will be leading the party through any changes in policy and ideology 
in years to come. This chapter asks whether there is any sense of members wanting to move towards 
social democracy or back to revolutionary tactics and whether there is a full acceptance of 
democratic means of attaining power. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Interviewees were contacted by email from entries on the website guest-book of the St 
Petersburg branch of the CPRF at www.cprf.spb.ru/nforum/index.php where members of the party 
and members of the public had posted messages. Over forty emails were sent to all the possibly 
suitable interviewees explaining that the author was looking to interview members of the CPRF in 
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June and July, 2003. Potential interviewees were chosen on the basis of what they had written (if 
their posts were pro-communist, or at least not anti-communist and on the basis of their contact 
details – if their email address indicated a St Petersburg location or if no location was obvious). This 
approach elicited around twenty responses of which three led to meetings. The total sample of 
interviewees and respondents was twenty-two including seventeen interviewees and five email-only 
responses. Other interviewees were friends and colleagues of initial contacts or those of later 
interviewees. Interviews were tape-recorded or recorded as notes and interviews were later 
transcribed. All respondents were informed that their responses would be annonymised. It was on 
this condition that many respondents agreed to the interviews being recorded. All preliminary emails 
and interviews began with an explanation of the academic nature of the research and an assurance 
that the author’s aims were entirely neutral and that there was no pro- or anti-communist bias to the 
study. 
 Preliminary questions were designed to find suitable respondents and eliminate those from 
the study who were not communists at all or supporters but not members of the party or not based in 
St Petersburg. Respondents were asked if they had been members of the CPSU or the Soviet-era 
Komsomol. If they were members, or just supporters of the CPRF, and, if members, when they had 
joined and why they had joined the party. The first section of the study asked about the specific 
nature of the party in St Petersburg, numbers of members, ages of members, numbers of branches 
and how candidates were selected for elections. Respondents were asked if they knew how the 
transition had taken place from the CPSU to the CPRF in St Petersburg and they were also asked if 
they knew how the party was preparing for the gubernatorial elections in September and the Duma 
elections in December 2003 in order to elucidate present campaigning tactics. 
The second section of questions related to views about the past and present situation of the 
party. To try to determine what it was about the previous system that people might want to recreate, 
they were asked what they perceived as having been the advantages of the socialist system. 
Respondents were also asked if they felt that there had been any disadvantages to the socialist 
system in order to determine what exactly they would like to see recreated, if in fact it was the 
socialist system of the past in its entirety or just some aspects of it. In order to gauge whether there 
was any support in the St Petersburg branch for a move towards social democracy, respondents were 
asked what they understood social democracy to be and how they understood it to differ from 
communism. The discussion of social democracy was phrased in an indirect form for the reason 
discussed below. 
In the third section of the survey, respondents were asked about their views on the future 
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development of the party and its ideology. One way of trying to determine to what extent they 
agreed with Zyuganov’s re-orientation of the party was to ask if respondents were in total agreement 
with the direction in which Zyuganov was leading the party or if they felt that there was another 
tendency within the party, with which they agreed more. The hope was that, if they were unhappy 
with the present course, respondents would name a prominent member of the party associated with a 
different strand of opinion. To determine to what extent members in St Petersburg were in 
agreement with the changes made by Zyuganov to the direction in which the party is moving, 
respondents were asked whether they felt that the party ideology significantly differed from 
traditional Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet doctrine of proletarian internationalism. Respondents 
were also asked what future direction they felt the party should take. This was a further attempt to 
test for any inclination towards social democracy or a more orthodox form of communism and any 
dissatisfaction with Zyuganov’s political leadership. 
 The problems the author encountered with this approach to finding interviewees were quite 
varied. Many respondents to the St Petersburg site turned out to be living in other cities. Some 
responses to initial enquiries appeared not to be from the people the author had tried to contact 
(presumably as a result of shared email addresses) as posts on the guest-book had been pro-
communist but responses were anti-communist and indicated offence at the assumption that the 
writer supported the CPRF. Some responses were anti-British, for example, the war in Iraq was 
mentioned as a reason for not speaking to the author. There were also replies that were bizarre and 
surreal (one respondent answered all questions in terms of the weather) but fortunately also a good 
number from generally young people who were delighted that someone was interested in their 
country and what they believed. 
There was no response from the Central Office of the party which mirrored attempts by a 
postgraduate student at the European University in St Petersburg to help the author. Having 
undertaken similar work, this student tried on several occasions to contact people she had 
interviewed in order to ask them if they would also speak to the author but with no response. She 
also advised the author that she had encountered several difficulties in interviewing communists and 
recommended firstly, not to mention social democracy and secondly, definitely not to ask about 
party funding as both these topics, in her experience, would draw the interview to a very rapid close. 
As a result of this valued advice the author rephrased questions on moves towards social 
democracy.905 
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 Thanks to doctoral student Natalia Zhidkova at the European University in St Petersburg who had already conducted 
interviews of a similar nature for her valued advice. 
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As a foreigner researching the development of communism in Russia, the author encountered 
two opposing assumptions about the present study. Non- and anti-communists assumed that the 
author was a communist and could not understand why someone would be studying the CPRF if 
they were not. Those communists who were hostile largely assumed that, coming from Western 
Europe, the author was anti-communist and that the intention was to portray Russian communists in 
a negative light. One respondent to the initial email enquiry replied that he would only speak to the 
author if she were a communist. This respondent was not interviewed. Younger communists were 
far more prepared to talk and, in a few cases, were surprisingly frank about the party's present 
difficulties and were far more accepting of a foreigner wanting to find out about their beliefs.  
 Over half of those interviewed were under thirty-five whilst the older members were mostly 
in their fifties and sixties, with two exceptions: one in her forties and one probably in his 
seventies.906 All of those who were new to the party (had not been members of the CPSU) were the 
members of the Komsomol. The one exception was the new member in her forties. Older 
interviewees had all been members of the CPSU. Ten respondents were female and twelve were 
male. Younger respondents tended to be students and with one studying journalism and two working 
at the editorial offices of a journal, there was a slight bias towards media-related employment but no 
conclusions should be drawn from this due to the size of the sample. It is, however, worth noting in 
the light of the party’s complaints for several years now about the portrayal of the party on 
television. Many interviewees had higher education and many of the older interviewees were mostly 
retired.907 Email-only responses were all from younger people in employment or at university. 
There was a noticeable difference between the views of members and non-members which 
marked the communists out as holding different views from the rest of society. These differences 
mostly related to the belief or otherwise that the end of the Soviet Union had been a backward step. 
A number of respondents were communists but were not asked to participate in the study as they 
were not members of the CPRF. However, several were keen to make their views known and sent 
detailed email responses. These people had many views in common with members of the party with 
the one notable exception that where members felt betrayed by the ‘democrats’ non-member 
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communist respondents felt betrayed by both the post-communist regime and the CPRF.908 All felt 
betrayed by Gorbachev and the late-Soviet era CPSU. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRANCH IN ST PETERSBURG 
In 1992, after the Constitutional Court declared the ban on the lower levels of the party’s 
organisation to have been illegal, the party began to rebuild itself from below. As the ban on work-
place based party cells remained, the CPRF formed regionally-based organisations. The Second 
Secretary of the CPRF in St Petersburg told the author that despite the ban he had never stopped 
working for the party. In his own words “[i]t was as though there was no break”. He claimed that his 
was the last regional committee of the CPSU in Russia to be shut down, in April 1992, seven 
months after the ban came into effect and afterwards he formed a communist movement which 
became instrumental in the founding of the city branch of the CPRF in St Petersburg. Officially, the 
party was founded at a Congress in Moscow in February 1993 and data from the author’s interviews 
show that during the eighteen months between the ban being imposed and the reformation of the 
party, members of the CPRF were far from inactive. 
In St Petersburg, the author was told the party has District Branches in all eleven regions of 
the city with between 200 and 600 members each split among typically five or six Primary 
Organisations.909 The total city membership is claimed to be near 5,000 with seventy to eighty 
percent of members under the age of seventy. It is not a very active membership but apparently, 
members can be motivated to join election campaigns. There are young people in the party in St 
Petersburg but one respondent pointed out that the party refers to people in their forties and fifties as 
young members.910 
The role of party members has changed in St Petersburg since the role of the party has 
changed – as the party is no longer running the economy but competing for power with other 
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political parties. However, in small cities in agricultural regions, such as Uryupinsk, the CPRF 
retains some of the secondary functions of the CPSU by being involved in running the city’s 
education system, initiating city improvements and generally fulfilling the role of structures of civil 
society.911 In the larger cities, such involvement is unheard of as the respondent below describes as 
those who ran the economy as part of their political duties left the party. 
“Of course it has changed much because the CPSU was in fact the leading state organ. [The 
party] dealt with all social and economic questions ... all the administration. I was recently 
talking to our former party comrades who worked for the CPSU in the factories and so on. 
They told me what they had dealt with: big economic questions - completion of the plan ... a 
factory that couldn’t fulfil the plan was in trouble but today, many of the people who took 
those decisions are old and retired. Now the majority of the people who were in the upper 
echelons of the leadership and had experience, they of course, have left politics. They have 
gone into business. They, and all their experience and connections have gone into business, 
and they are very high up now, they have a lot of money, they have many factories and they 
are simply not interested in politics. They now have enough money to buy themselves 
political influence. This is what happened to those who were good political leaders, and 
those who were not, went [back] into politics. This is what happened with the democrats and 
the communists. As a result, many people joined the party who are not very well suited to 
politics. This is why we are still not in power!”912 
 
Again, it is worth noting the difference between large cities and some smaller towns and 
cities where the CPRF still provides a career path in public service as, with reference to Uryupinsk, 
“[t]he ideological component of [C]PRF activity does not prevent most local activists from joining. 
Many of them have no political preferences or consider ideology something not linked to their 
everyday activities.”913 
As communism for many in Russia represents the past and a failed economic experiment that 
has little relevance in the twenty-first century, the author was interested to know what inspires 
people to join the CPRF when the ideological battle has been declared lost and a market economy 
has been embraced throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. When young 
communists were interviewed in St Petersburg in June and July 2003, typical answers to the 
question ‘why did you join the party?’ were “it is the only party which really reflects the interests of 
the people”914 and “I joined in the interests of Russia.”915 Another respondent replied that “I joined 
the CPRF in winter 2002. I joined because I consider the present [economic] course to be a dead end 
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and destructive for Russia and I have not seen another [party] that is capable of changing it or of 
significantly correcting it”.  This was an interesting response as it was from the woman in her forties 
who had not been a member of the CPSU and had only recently joined the party because she saw it 
as the best chance of improving the economy rather than joining United Russia, despite Putin’s 
popularity and her support for his aim of building a strong state.   
The social composition of the party has also changed over the years since the end of the 
Soviet Union. The author’s research revealed that members of the party interviewed in St Petersburg 
consider few members of the party to be working class in the original sense of the term but the 
industrial working class was 29.6 percent of the population in 1992916 and had fallen to 17.3 percent 
in 2005.917. Members of the Komsomol who were interviewed also tended not to be working class in 
the traditional sense. One member who was actively involved in recruitment gave an illuminating 
response when asked what percentage of the party in St Petersburg are considered to be working 
class. After a pause for reflection, the respondent replied: 
“The exact percentage, I can’t say but there are few workers. If you don’t count those who 
are nonworking class [unemployed] ... those who were working class are now old. That is 
workers in St Petersburg are now few in number because there is far less heavy industry than 
there was. ... and those workers that there are work twelve or more hours a day and after 
work they drink vodka and don’t want to know of anything else. That is active workers, 
those who are socially active, those who are receptive to communist ideology, are very 
few.”918 
 
Although the percentage of working class members has fallen substantially, the CPSU was 
also not an exclusively working class party either. Only 45.5 per cent of new members were 
classified as workers in 1989 and only thirty per cent of the total membership were considered to be 
workers (the term ‘workers’ covering many categories) at this time.919 Also, in 1989, the 
intelligentsia formed forty-four per cent of the total membership.920 Zyuganov now defines the 
working class broadly to include such people as pilots and computer operators as well as people 
working in heavy industries and he claims that “scientific-technical progress long ago united the 
work of the [industrial] worker with intellectual work”.921 
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On the question of how the transition from the CPSU to the CPRF took place in St 
Petersburg, the Second Secretary remarked that the most significant change was in terms of the size 
of the party. “They closed the party. If the party is closed, what can be done? ... There were almost 
19 million members and now there are half a million. How did 19 million become half a million? 
The answer is very simple: there were members of the party who weren’t communists.”922 He 
continued by quoting Lenin on the need for a small committed party of activists. With the exception 
of a few changes to comply with the Law on Political Parties, the structure of the party remains 
practically unchanged from that of the CPSU. A few name changes have taken place such as District 
Organisation changing to District Branch but the structure of the party nationally and in the regions 
and cities remains unchanged.923 
When asked whether the rights and obligations of members have changed, one respondent 
replied that in principal they had not. 
“According to the statutes, no. Members of the party are people who pay the subscription 
regularly, although, there is no way of verifying anyone’s real income, it relies on honesty. 
Officially the subscription is one percent of the income of the party member. ... it is 
necessary to attend party meetings, [members] must not break the [party] statutes, that is, not 
do anything against the agreed party line. Party members may, well, have the right, to 
discuss any matter of party life, including discussion of their opinions, which they may put 
forward, up until the taking of a final decision. That is, in discussion ... after a final decision, 
discussion has to end - even if there is disagreement.”924 
 
The Second Secretary of party had been an active member of the CPSU since 1981. In reply 
to the question of when he had joined the CPRF, he replied: “I created it. I alone, without hesitation, 
restored the party from the first day. We established it immediately after the Constitutional Court 
[ruling] - from the first day.”925 When he was asked about the break in party activities between 1991 
and 1993, his answer was that: 
“... I had been an active party worker for 10 years before 1991. I began [my career in the 
CPSU] in a factory committee, [and rose through the ranks] to become a member of the 
Raikom. The Raikom closed only in April 1992. In August 1991 the party was disbanded but 
my Raikom, my raison d’etre, closed only in April 1992. That is, for half a year I worked in 
the last Raikom in Russia to be closed. Well, after that we created a movement of 
communists ... more than a thousand people ... and we already had the structure in place by 
the time of the Constitutional Court and it was possible to organise through signatures, 
through decisions, by decrees ... by the time of the decision we practically had an 
organisation already in existence. ... We went to the Congress in Moscow [1993]. Yes, they 
                                                 
922
 Interview 04/07/03. 
923
 Interview 04/07/03. 
924
 Interview 09/07/03. 
925
 Interview 04/07/03. 
 203
made things difficult for us and for colleagues in other communist parties - there were many 
nuances which are specific to Russia. Well, that is how we recreated the party.”926 
 
Other responses, however, contradicted those of the Second Secretary and showed that the 
(re)establishment of the party had not been the work of one man alone: 
“We have Yuri Belov ... who was the last Secretary of the City Organisation of the CPSU, he 
was one of the recreators of the CPRF, one of them. Of the other creators and people who 
now, in fact, lead the party, on the basis of communist leaders of the CPSU of the districts of 
the city, of the larger factories, of the schools, ... of those who led the City CPSU, there 
remains only Belov. The rest, all have remained in the shadows, they have not joined the 
official party. But in personal contacts and personal links, they all help, well, many of them 
do.”(respondent 1)927 ... “Particularly, they differ from the leaders of the Komsomol, who, 
after that, became managers of banks and factories. Before this, they remembered, as we say, 
their old comrades and if those old comrades called by for a cup of coffee, politics could be 
openly discussed. But officially, of the old guard, only one has survived. Now, he doesn’t 
lead, his health has been failing since 1991. Because of this he has left the leadership and 
fulfils the role, we joke, of Deng Xiaoping, in China. That is to say, a deeply respected 
person, whom we go to for advice, but who does as he pleases.”(respondent 2)928 
 
A similar situation is reported to have arisen in Samara oblast, where the local leader (in 
1997), V.S. Romanov, had also assumed a ‘charismatic aura’.929 This respondent’s answer indicates 
that there is a clear generational differences between young and old ex-communists - the young ones 
left to take up new careers while older ones remain involved, sometimes in an unofficial capacity.  
Respondents who had been involved in reconstituting the party were asked about the 
difficulties faced in setting up the party again after the two year break between 1991 and 1993. Most 
respondents replied that the task had indeed been difficult. One of the most detailed responses 
indicated that anti-communist propaganda had been one of the toughest obstacles. 
 
“It was. The difficulties were as follows: firstly, from 1991 to 1993, the new regime 
unleashed such a powerful wave of anti-communism that, from the point of view of the 
[new] regime, directed at the young, which did not give a general explanation of history but 
took, in principle, the line of the Bolshevik’s opponents. [They said] ‘Everything that 
happened before we came to power was bad. Now we are here, everything will be good. We 
bring good fortune.’ ... television, newspapers and fashionable magazines all agreed that this 
would be the case. Young people believed this propaganda. ... Up to 1991, there was the 
Soviet Union, there was the party, but in the campaign against them, everything was 
destroyed. Up to 1993 people were told that the Soviet Union was bad, communism was bad, 
the KGB was bad and the new regime said they would do things better and the people, of 
course, believed them. Some people were suspicious but people who had participated in the 
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last regime, First Secretaries and so on were the people who were criticising the old regime 
... time passed and people saw that what had been promised had not appeared. Sceptics 
began to complain - factories had been closed and so on, children were losing consciousness 
at school from hunger, people were hungry. The nation became exasperated. But the 
propaganda that communism was very bad continued and continues up to the present 
although it has abated. Then people said ‘Well, we are hungry, unemployed, the country is 
falling apart but still the communists are bad. We do not want the communists back. But the 
democrats are bad too. All are bad.’ Then some people started to say ‘Yes, the CPSU and 
Soviet Union made a number of mistakes. And there were mistakes. These mistakes must 
never be repeated, but the basic direction was correct. It was simply necessary to correct 
these mistakes. We consider that we should create the Communist Party anew and these calls 
[to join the party] which we give are not backward looking.’ It would cost those welded to 
the current government dearly to admit this. [We need] a return to a defined parallel line, 
and not backwards and movement towards social security for society.”930 
 
The Second Secretary told the author that the majority of current CPRF members in St 
Petersburg - and certainly almost all of the older ones - are former members of the CPSU.931 The 
Second Secretary’s response to the question of whether former CPSU members had joined other 
parties during the ‘break’ before going on to join the CPRF was that they had. Of those who had 
joined other parties, most had been members of the Russian Communist Workers’ Party and some 
had joined the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – VKP(B).932 The former held its 
founding congress on 23rd November, 1991 in Yekaterinburg. It was attended by 500 delegates of 
whom sixteen were ‘workers’ and three were farmers and stated its aims as having a primarily 
working-class base and opposition to social democracy.933 The VKP(B), formed at a founding 
Congress in St Petersburg on 8th November, 1991, was attended by around 200 delegates from 
across the former USSR934 but, according to the Second Secretary was not a registered party. 
Although, or maybe because, members left to join the CPRF, the Russian Communist Workers’ 
Party has co-operated with the CPRF in several elections but this has not been a nationwide 
agreement. The parties formed coalitions in St Petersburg and in Kemerovo and Sverdlovsk oblasts 
in the 1990s but in other regions its candidates have run against those of the CPRF.935 
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Membership of the CPRF is considered to be generally quite passive with the majority of 
members only mobilised at election time to encourage friends and neighbours to vote.936 Meetings 
are attended by the much smaller number of activists. When asked whether members of the CPRF 
have more influence on party activities than they did in the CPSU, responses from different 
participants in the study were very similar in that all replied that there had been little change. 
However, one respondent offered further explanation: 
“No, except for the fact that the CPSU was a large party so there was less influence for 
individuals. There is only more in the CPRF because the party is far smaller. More people 
are heard but many don’t want to be. They are happy to let the leader take decisions and 
follow instructions. However, those that want to make suggestions are listened to. But good 
suggestions are few, unfortunately.”937 
 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PARTY? 
 When asked why they had joined the party, all respondents spoke of a sense of patriotism 
and of the growing gap between rich and poor. “I joined in the interests of Russia”938 was a typical 
initial response. Interviewees would then explain more specific reasons for joining, some of which 
were personal or family experience of hardship. The above respondent expressed concern at the 
“lack of direction among young people for rebuilding Russia’s economy”939 as a reason for joining 
the party. Another respondent told the author of personal experience and national economic 
difficulties as an inspiration for joining the party: 
 
“…Our first task, already by 1993, when the economic situation was very bad, our first task 
was to  save society, first of all, from wild civil war because, ungoverned, hungry workers 
simply come out onto the streets and there have been such situations. ... In any case, it is 
necessary to reestablish state industries. In the past we had the industries but, under the name 
of privatisation, there was a great theft of state property and industries ended up in the hands 
of private citizens, maybe 10 or 20 people at most. They practically ruined these industries. 
My father worked, my mother worked, both in huge factories, powerful factories, in the 
beginning, they stopped paying them their wages, then they explained that there were no jobs 
for them anymore. They bankrupted the factory. Then, say, Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov bought 
the factory for kopecks. ... Under the planned economy, the factories didn’t make a profit but 
the system worked and provided work for people. Once the planned system broke down, the 
factories were privatised. ... and on this wave of national indignation, at that moment, the 
CPRF appeared. People came from the CPSU, almost out of the blue. They came to us from 
what we call the ‘patriotic movement’, this is a very complicated movement. It is a very 
strange union of people who consider themselves at the same time monarchists, fascists, very 
confused people but unsatisfied with the existing expression [of patriotism]. They all had 
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their own ideas. Such was the patriotic movement involved in the events at the White House 
in 1993, well, some of these people were the rebuilders of the Communist Party.”940 
 
There seemed to be a sense of a lack of direction without the socialist system that members 
felt could be regained through the re-establishment of a socialist system: “[t]he advantages [of the 
Soviet era] were that we were citizens of a large multinational country and we had convictions and 
aims.”941 It was also felt that those who sought money and power had brought the country to its 
present economic difficulties.942 One respondent referred to Russia having had to contend with 
“aggressive Western countries” with the results being that Russia had to invest heavily in defence 
and freedom for the Russian population had to be curtailed. This same respondent, in common with 
others, also cited problems with the party in the late Gorbachev era which were seen to have led to a 
reduction in “progress” and the upper levels of the CPSU becoming unjustifiably rich.943  
Another respondent referred to the Soviet education system as having been one of the best in 
the world, equipping children with not just knowledge but also the inclination to be industrious for 
the sake of the country and not for personal gain.944  This was a theme that ran through many of the 
interviews and was frequently mentioned in emails. In the words of another respondent: “The aim of 
the communist system was caring about people. Humanity was the main focus of our education. 
Money wasn’t important. And people were friendly, different nations didn’t have conflicts. We had 
a great aim – happiness for everybody! We created a strong government, we didn’t have an elite 
class.”945 
“Society was led by the party. The party organised everything. To a certain degree, the 
system worked. The problem was that party and state were fused. If this had not happened, if 
the state had been separate, then such repression, political pressure on freedoms, these things 
would not have happened, there would have been no need. In this the party was not correct 
but it was inescapable. ... If someone opposed the party, then he opposed the system. If 
someone wanted to destroy the party, that meant he wanted to destroy the system, because 
the party was joined to the state, the two were linked. The state was protected by the party 
and simple people still confuse the party and the state and communism. ... Because of this, of 
course, freedoms were few. So few that because of this freedom of thought, freedom of 
association, freedom of action, because there was this unified mechanism, these freedoms 
were denied. I can’t say that it could have been otherwise, because Russia and the Soviet 
Union more so, was too big a country that it wasn’t possible to lead, I believe, in principle, it 
isn’t possible to lead it with democratic methods. That is, democracy is present, but it is 
limited, namely because the country is so large. It is too diverse ... nature is too diverse, 
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some parts of the country are hot, some are cold, how would it be possible to get people in a 
democratic system to work in the north of Russia? Well, for money, maybe, if it was very 
much indeed. And if a large amount of money was not paid, people simply would not go. 
That is, as a result of having such a big country, it is necessary to use other methods.  Not 
that I’m saying it has to be prisoners driven there, no, that is not necessary, but to lead the 
country by democratic means was not possible.”946 
 
Although some of the younger members had only been small children at the end of the 
CPSU’s time in power, young party members spoke of the wonders of the Soviet past: the 
educational and career possibilities enjoyed, they believed, by all; the lack of any economic elite in 
society, as far as they could see (although there were benefits for party members which were not 
generally enjoyed by others); and the aim of constructing a just society as they felt the lack of any 
laudable communal aims in the post-Soviet era.947 The respondent who spoke of personal experience 
of parents being made unemployed due to factories having closed told the author that it was the 
security of the former economic system that members missed particularly and the greater social 
equality of the past.948 Those who had been members of the CPSU could also have expected good 
careers, even coming from a peasant background. 
“... there was a high aim – to construct a just society, which would profit not private financial 
interests but the common good, moreover, not only and not so much material interests. In 
this future society, everyone could expect to work according to their ability and vocation. At 
the same time, there must be material comfort, but this must not be the single or even main 
criterion of human prosperity. This was accomplished, to a degree, in practice. For example, 
my mother, [who was] the daughter of poor peasants, received a good higher education and 
became an aviation engineer … I defended my thesis and at the same time it was possible to 
study music and to buy and read a large number of books, to subscribe to several so-called 
‘thick [literary] journals’, to travel around cities and all of my country and many others. And 
my situation was by no means unique, it was absolutely typical – it was the experience of 
millions, well, ‘under communism’.”949 
 
Some respondents also mentioned cultural achievements which they felt had not continued, 
or had even been reversed since the end of the Soviet Union. One was convinced that Western 
propaganda had taught people in the West that the USSR had produced nothing of cultural value and 
also complained of the domination of Western music and films on Russian television since the end 
of the Soviet era.950 Many felt the sharp decline in living standards was the highest price Russian 
society was paying for the end of CPSU rule. These views, however, also highlighted an ignorance 
or denial of the social problems of the Soviet era, such as housing shortages. Those who complained 
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of Western propaganda against the Soviet Union had also accepted Soviet propaganda that the 
Soviet Union had resolved inter-ethnic conflict and solved most social problems. 
“During the ‘communist’ era in the USSR, science and culture developed strongly and 
practically every family subscribed to several newspapers and journals, people could afford 
to go to the theatre, museums, cinema, trips to the countryside, every family could give their 
children a good education and vocational training of their choice. Of course, there were 
families where a parent was an alcoholic or were not interested in their children’s future, but 
even these children could ‘chose their own fate’, the state helped single-parent families, paid 
child benefit, provided bigger flats to large families and so on. In short, the state was social - 
now it is anti-social. We are experiencing an enormous social degradation – tens of millions 
cannot afford not only cultural activities but basic medication and even to live with heat and 
light and this in a country where winter lasts for half the year. Medication is horrendously 
expensive and 37 million people live on less than subsistence wages, who cannot afford 
medicine at all, or in the best case, take the very cheapest medicines instead of the most 
effective ones. Here, the consumption of meat, vegetables and fruit, milk and cheese has 
fallen by half while the consumption of bread and potatoes has increased. Books, visits to the 
theatre and to museums have all become unaffordable luxuries.”951 
 
To be a communist, particularly a member of the Komsomol, is to be inherently honest, it 
would appear from several responses. To be concerned with money, to be a member of another 
party, to be unpatriotic (by not being a communist), to be associated with Gorbachev or to have been 
involved in the dismantling of the old regime is to be dishonest, in the opinion of many party 
members. The emphasis on ‘honesty’ dates from the Soviet era952 and the perception that democrats, 
in particular, lied to the nation in the early 1990s about what Russia could expect from capitalism. 
One seventeen year-old respondent replied that: “I have been in the Komsomol for one year. Our 
organisation is not very big but our members are honest and don’t think about money. They love 
Russia. I will join the CPRF when I am 18, in October. I will join the party because it is the only 
party which really reflects the interests of the people.”953 
Membership of the CPRF now signifies acceptance of democracy and a route back to power, 
in the minds of members at least, through elections. No respondent at any point (with the one 
exception of a non-member who was not included in this study) suggested that an undemocratic 
seizure of power was ever likely on the part of the CPRF. One respondent was even keen to draw 
attention to the CPRF’s participation in the introduction of democracy to St Petersburg: 
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“… Since the advent of the new Communist Party, there has been no rejection of the 
understanding of democracy, understanding of the freedom of speech, things which it is not 
possible to reject ... of course not. This has been proposed by one of the recreators of the 
CPRF, Yuri Belov, the last leader of the Leningrad Communist Party. He left the Smolny 
[Institute] in 1991. He in fact gave the Smolny its new democratic regime. And he instituted 
the new ideas which raised the CPRF in 1993. These ideas of state socialism, well, as it was 
then said ‘with a human face’. That is, in fact, it was recognised that, yes, we had not 
achieved communism, but this aim is a very distant prospect. There is an inclination to say 
that it is a romantic dream. Although adults well understand that we will not live to see it. It 
is a very distant dream. Now, from the existing conditions, we can only build state 
socialism.”954 
 
 Membership of the party also signifies a deep pride in the achievements of the Soviet Union. 
Industrialisation and the transformation of Russia from an agricultural society into a world 
superpower in a few decades and how this had enabled Russia to survive the Second World War 
were the achievements most often cited as examples of the party’s successes. The following 
response was in reply to a question about disadvantages of the Soviet era, asked in the hope of 
eliciting replies that would indicate what respondents would wish to see recreated in any future 
socialist state and what they would not. Answers, many of which were similar to the one below, 
showed that the economic system was greatly missed as it had enabled Russia to increase its 
standing in the world but there were hints that people should not have to suffer in return for 
economic progress in any future socialist state. 
 
“… ideal societies do not exist. For example, all Russian modernisation – including that 
which took place in the Soviet era – took place at the expense of villages, peasants and 
generally were tough in several senses. In principle, this was inescapable – Russia is a truly 
cold and very large country, surplus product from any industry is necessarily small by 
comparison with any other country … but maybe it could have been managed with less 
cruelty. In any case, the country was turned from a peasant country into an industrial one, 
creating a powerful military industry in 13-15 years from around 1928 to 1941, and in this 
time military industry doubled beyond the Urals and in Central Asia – when it became clear 
that the greater part of European Russia would be occupied, and in order that everything 
would be done as quickly as possible, but also ‘lightly’. It is possible to give examples of 
many other disadvantages in this life, but the main one, in my opinion was the gradual post-
war degeneration of the ruling CPSU elite. Up until the war, we practically had no 
alternative – everything dictated one aim: how to rebuild the country, in order that in the 
inevitable and approaching war, the country would survive and remain independent. And 
after approximately 1951 –53, this task was safely achieved and options were then available 
– what next? Where next? What aims to set? And how to realise them? Well, the elite or 
upper levels of the CPSU and their analysts were unequal to the task – from here grew the 
roots of our present situation.”955 
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Like Zyuganov, this member was critical of the last years of the CPSU. This era of the 
CPRF’s predecessor was seen as not being part of the history of the ‘real’ party. The comment that 
‘ideal societies do not exist’ raises the question of what the respondent expects the anticipated future 
communist society to achieve. When asked if, or when, there is a communist system again in Russia, 
do you think it will be as before or different, all respondents replied that they anticipated 
differences.  In the words of one respondent: “[t]he mistake before was that the party and the state 
became joined. The party must be separate from the state. People must in the first place feel free. 
This means that the party must not implement policies against any political views and then there will 
be no need for opposition to the party or to the state.”956 Whilst all respondents who expressed a 
view on the need for civil liberties indicated that they were in favour of such freedoms in any future 
socialist or communist state, there was frequently an assumption that lack of oppression would lead 
to an acceptance of or agreement with communist aims. 
 
MEMBERS’ AGE 
As with all political parties, there is a need for younger members as the party’s membership 
is ageing. Although CPRF members tend to be older citizens, a study published in 2002 found that 
amongst new members, rather than increasing numbers of pensioners, it was workers and the 
unemployed who were approaching retirement age who were more likely to be joining the party.957 
This mirrors what young communists told the author in St Petersburg: that young members are not 
joining the organisation in large numbers but that people joining in their forties and fifties were 
noticeably more numerous in recent years.958 A response from a new member in her 40s indicates 
that her reasons for joining the party were Russia’s current economic problems: 
“I was in the Komsomol, like almost all young people then but I was not in the CPSU. 
Generally, until 1988 I was not involved in politics. I became interested in politics in the 
autumn of 1988 as the following spring there was informal voting ahead of us and I did not 
understand for whom I should vote intelligently. From that time and until this day, I have not 
stopped being interested in [politics] and even, in some measure, have participated in it ... I 
joined the CPRF in winter 2002, that is one and a half years ago. I joined because I consider 
the current [political] course to be a dead end and destructive for Russia and I have not seen 
another power [party] capable of changing it or even of significantly correcting it ... So this 
is why I joined the CPRF and in the interests of Russia.”959 
                                                 
956
 Email response 4, 25/07/03. 
957
 Kiewiet, R. and Myagkov, M.  (2002) ‘Are the Communists Dying Out in Russia?’  Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p.48. 
958
 Interview, 26/06/03. 
959
 Interview 22/07/03[2]. 
 211
  
Approaches to answering questions on the declining/ageing membership differed from 
disarming frankness to outright denial of any recruitment problem. When asked about the difficulty 
in signing up young members, the Second Secretary avoided the question by feigning offence and 
pretending he thought the author was implying he was old as this is a sensitive subject for the party. 
What the author had hoped to find out was whether the need to find two sponsors who are already 
members of the party to support an application to join was a barrier to young people joining the 
party. As the majority of existing members are apparently pensioners or approaching pension age 
young people might not know any existing members if they did not have older relatives who were 
already members of the party. However, in the interests of continuing the interview, it wasn’t really 
possible to press the subject any further and the Second Secretary did offer a description of the ages 
of members of the Executive of the City Committee: 
“There is no such difficulty! What is young? I am fifty-three - am I young? Do I look young? 
I consider myself young! We have even younger people in the leadership - the highest 
leadership in our region, members of the City Committee Executive - young people, who not 
only joined the party without problems but who are already elected to the leadership. Today 
we have in the leadership, the highest of any working organ which works between plenums - 
this is the Executive of the City Committee - it has today eleven people. We have one of 
seventy or seventy-one, several in their fifties, some in their sixties and three in their thirties. 
This is normal - we have had people of all ages for a long time. People want us to have 
problems, that we lose young people, that we have problems with young people.”960 
 
Aware of the likely perceptions of a foreigner, one party member replied to the initial email 
asking about membership of the party that: “I am not alone and a dying breed – my wife and three of 
my sons share my convictions!”961 However, at the regional party office on Shkolnaya Ulitsa, set up 
to run the campaign for the gubernatorial and Duma elections, younger members were particularly 
noticeable. A member of the Komsomol explained the reason for younger members being 
comparatively prominent in the party leadership: 
 
“Young people, of course, fly to the top, simply because they have more energy, greater 
strength, ah ... older folks sit lower down the organisation in the lower primary organisations 
and say “Well, yes, this is all good”, “This is correct”, “We’ll vote for this and you go out 
and work”. Therefore, although the number [of members] is large for the [size of] the city, it 
is not in fact felt in the city. It is felt only at election time when this body of experienced, 
older people start urging their family, friends and neighbours to vote, because in Russia, it is 
the case that experienced people, especially veterans of the war are by far more socially 
active than the young. They are prepared to defend their beliefs whether communist or non-
                                                 
960
 Interview 04/07/03. 
961
 Interview 24/07/03 (respondent 1 initial email contact 15/06/03). 
 212
communist, they are prepared to engage with anyone: neighbours, people in the street, ... in 
this respect they are very energetic.”962 
 
One recent study found that voters approaching retirement during the 1990s were more 
inclined to support the CPRF than those who had already retired. The authors of this study attributed 
this change in preference to workers approaching retirement being more adversely affected by the 
economic transition than those who had already retired as those who had been working lost not just 
their savings but their jobs as well and, unlike younger workers who lost their jobs, had fewer 
opportunities to retrain for the skills required in the new economy.963 
It has been written that “… the CPRF is largely made up of non-enterprising and 
unimaginative people who remained in the Communist Party after their more daring and pragmatic 
comrades had gone. … To all intents and purposes, today’s CPRF is a party not of revolutionaries 
but of unemployed has-been apparatchiks.”964 While this certainly seems from the fieldwork 
discussed above to be true in part, it is not the whole story. While the Second Secretary appeared to 
fit this description, there were many new, young members joining out of ideological conviction 
(though not anticipating a revolution). Although those over fifty far outnumber younger members, 
the younger members interviewed in 2003 were enthusiastic campaigners for a more just society and 
convinced of the correctness of the party’s direction so are likely to be enthusiastic members for 
some years to come. 
While Matsuzato writes that “[t]he conventional wisdom that most activists of the left-
centrist opposition – in particular the Communist Party of the Russian Federation … – are 
pensioners is somewhat inaccurate,”965 he justifies this statement not in terms of the ages of current 
activists but in terms of them not being “average pensioners”. After the party was banned, these 
people’s lifetime’s work was questioned and they were then driven to defend what they had done 
throughout the course of their careers. However, these people are still notables in their respective 
local communities and are still able to mobilise voters.966 
While young supporters do exist, the CPRF is probably exaggerating their numbers. At the 
2003 conference celebrating the tenth anniversary of the CPRF, Zyuganov denied that the party's 
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members were mostly pensioners. The Moscow City branch of the party reported an increase of 
1,000 new members including between 700 and 800 students and an overall lowering of the average 
age of members as older communists died967 but these figures have not been independently 
confirmed. As a rough indication of the numbers of young activists: at the Third Congress of the 
Russian Komsomol, it was claimed that 266 delegates had been elected to attend the event from 79 
of Russia’s 89 regions and a total of 251 actually attended968 and in terms of total numbers of 
members of the Komsomol, it was claimed in 1997 that there were 21,000.969 In 2000 it was 
reported that the Komsomol had 35,000 members.970 
  
THE KOMSOMOL 
The party’s youth movement, the Union of Communist Youth – Russian Federation, better 
known by the abbreviation of its Soviet-era predecessor, the Komsomol, is a comparatively small 
but active organisation that aims to continue many of its predecessor’s traditions. The Komsomol 
had been an important institution throughout the Soviet Union; most young people were members, 
they undertook voluntary work, took part in marches and rallies and encouraged others to participate 
in officially sanctioned political activities. Those who were ambitious went on to join the CPSU 
where they could expect better career prospects and benefits not available to those outside the party. 
The young people who are drawn to the party, mostly new recruits who had never been members of 
the Soviet-era Komsomol, as opposed to the older members of the CPRF, nostalgic for the economic 
security of the past, are joining what has been derided as a ‘party of pensioners’, against the 
prevailing trends amongst the young in 2003 either to support President Putin or to abstain from 
voting and interest in politics altogether. 
Along with the CPSU, the Komsomol vanished in 1991 not to re-appear until around 1994. 
According to one interviewee, the organisation has also been re-established in the majority of the 
other former Soviet republics but with varying degrees of success.971 However, two completely 
different trajectories can be seen for the ‘reformation’ of the CPRF and the Komsomol. The 
reformation of the CPRF is perhaps somewhat predictable – those who were truly committed 
believers just started meeting again as soon as possible after the Constitutional Court lifted the ban 
on the party’s activities. However, the Komsomol took an entirely different route, reforming as a 
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series of independent organisations and joining under the Communist umbrella only quite some time 
later. 
A response from a member of the Soviet era Komsomol, who had joined the organisation 
two years before it was ‘liquidated’972 and had been instrumental in re-orientating the new 
organisation in St Petersburg towards the CPRF, describes the process by which the organisation 
moved towards its present role as the youth movement of the CPRF. The local branch joined the 
CPRF separately from the national leadership so in the past, there must have been a phase when 
different branches were affiliated to at least two different parties. 
“I joined in 1994. One year after the party had been created. Before that, I had been one of 
the recreators of the Russian Komsomol. VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Komsomol] was 
liquidated. On the basis [of the VLKSM], in 1993 the [Russian] Republic Komsomol was 
created. That is, the Komsomol of the former Union Republic. Not everywhere [in the ormer 
USSR], but several were created, including the organisation in Russia. It is called the 
RKSM: Rossiiskii Komsomol.973 I was one of the creators in our city, Petersburg. When it 
was recreated, it was quickly orientated towards the RCWP [Russian Communist Workers’ 
Party].974 This is a more left wing party than the CPRF. It was the only worker party in 
Russia at that time. Simply because at that time in Russia, the CPRF did not exist. It was 
reconstituted then by the Court, later, after that we reconstituted the Komsomol. And, a year 
later, Working Russia was working with worker parties ... and we met young people - a 
young person in the CPRF ... at the Congress they invited our leader to the Congress in 
Moscow and we, by chance, met a communist from Petersburg. We talked and decided that 
their work was more interesting than that of the worker parties. And so, through independent 
contacts, we were by chance, shall we say, convinced. I consider that we are a free youth 
organisation that was at that time convinced [to join the CPRF]. This same process took 
place in the leadership of the Russian Komsomol ... they were also convinced ... and after 
some time, the Russian Komsomol became, in fact, the youth organisation of the CPRF.”975 
 
This respondent described the formation of Komsomol movements in other areas of Russia. 
In the Urals and Siberia particularly, the organisation had been recreated on an informal basis as 
independent groups in different regions, some affiliated to Working Russia and some to other 
independent workers’ organisations and small, unregistered socialist parties. She described how the 
reformation of the Komsomol across Russia on the basis of the Soviet-era predecessor had been 
influenced by many groups but that the new youth organisations had been approached by the CPRF 
and invited to affiliate with their Komsomol and by so doing, the CPRF.  
Neither the reformation of the Komsomol nor its realignment with the CPRF has been 
uniform as some regions are still aiming to reform a Komsomol in order to create a youth movement 
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for their branch of the party. In St Petersburg, the Komsomol was reorganised ‘from below’ by 
young people who wanted to be active in politics. However, in some regions it is being re-organised 
‘from above’ by members of the CPRF with the aim of giving young people something to do in an 
attempt to discourage them from engaging in criminal activities.976 
The Komsomol is holding apparently non-political events, such as camping trips (St 
Petersburg) and musical events (in Moscow) in the hope of attracting new members and being able 
to spread the word to a new and, sometimes, unsuspecting audience.977 One Komsomol leader who 
was responsible for working with young people outside the party explained that her aim in 
organising the above-mentioned camping trip (to Poligrad, a small town near St Petersburg) had 
been partly to combat the anti-communism of the 1990s. She explained that there was a very great 
difference between her generation and her parents’ generation as resentment for the blockade of St 
Petersburg during the Second World War was stronger among the older generations as her 
generation’s grandparents had had to live through it and in the past, this was one of the causes that 
had drawn young people to the party. Although school textbooks contained details of the blockade, 
students generally had a very poor understanding of history, in her view. She remarked that as the 
old films about the blockade weren’t shown on television anymore, people don’t remember the 
blockade and so the party in St Petersburg has lost one of its strongest factors in recruitment.  
The students on this camping trip were taken to see a monument of a woman partisan 
holding a sub-machine gun (apparently the largest statue in the region) and as a result, it was 
implied, of the students having consumed a fair amount of alcohol and the gathering darkness, the 
statue appeared particularly imposing and the students felt moved to listen to the stories of a war 
veteran who just happened to be passing.978 The author was not told that any of these students had 
subsequently joined the party, but the respondent felt that at least some degree of anti-communist 
propaganda had been reversed as the students now understood the party’s role in resisting the 
blockade. This respondent (also quoted below) was in her twenties and very clearly experienced in 
defending the party and promoting its policies among young people. She was clearly aware of the 
apathy and cynicism towards politics among young people not just in Russia (she also spoke of 
Western Europe) and as a result was finding different ways to get the communist message across: 
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“… Young people, even our supporters, ... [interruption] ... a young person, even if he has 
fixed views, here I am speaking not just of communists but of young people generally in 
Petersburg, in central European Russian towns, young people are very apolitical, extremely 
apolitical and even if people have some of the more insistent political convictions, they are 
not prepared to and do not want to see the sense in evangelical activity. They will say “I am 
a Red ... ” or “I am a democrat ...” or “I am a fascist ...but that’s me. And what are you? This 
doesn’t interest me.” Of course, there are people who try to convince others [of their views], 
but amongst young people, this is uncharacteristic. Amongst my acquaintance, there are 
people who are completely opposed to doing this. ... The older generation will of course put 
their opinions forward and try to convince others. This is why we communists rely so 
heavily on our grandmothers and grandfathers. ... [With] young people you have to try to get 
ideas across in a different way ... they turn away from anything communist and anything 
political in general. People don’t believe [propaganda] ... You need to explain things to 
young people not directly in words, but in actions. Invite them to some activity or to a show 
maybe and then, gradually tell them, explain to them what you want [to say], why you want 
to say it, exactly how it works in principle, is the same as all other political expressions.”979 
 
From interviews and discussions with non-communists during the course of undertaking this 
study, it is apparent that society is largely polarised into communists (or communist sympathisers) 
and anti-communists. The most common of the, apparently rarely held, alternative views was the 
absence of party-political convictions. One email respondent, who was not interviewed as he turned 
out not to be a communist, despite having posted a message on the CPRF’s internet guest-book, 
informed the author that he did not agree with the holding of political opinions.980 This is probably 
an indication of the legacy of the CPSU and the idea that one party unites all the people whereas the 
existence of many is seen to divide the people. 
The respondent responsible for convincing young people to join the party spoke of her own 
reasons for joining the Komsomol: 
“At the time of the Soviet Union, I was a child, I didn’t understand how everything was 
controlled, in particular, to what degree our way of life was led in relation to the 
Communists. ... ... And I was sceptical about Soviet propaganda, as everyone was. Not long 
ago I saw a film that was quite clearly propaganda, it was, of course, a Soviet film, about the 
history of a Siberian village from the Revolution to the present [time at which the film was 
made]. It was about the Revolution, the Civil War, Collectivisation, the film was very 
powerful and I remembered seeing this film during the time of the Soviet Union. It was [part 
of] a series on the Great Patriotic War, about how this small Siberian village became the new 
location for a huge factory from near Moscow that was relocated there during the War and 
the local communist leaders organised the rebuilding in less than two weeks, well, ten days. 
When I was a child, I saw this as a boring industrial theme, that some factory had been 
moved somewhere, but now that I work for the party, I saw a political situation, I saw what 
powerful people they were. This was absolutely true. They were just simple communists, 
following orders. Of course, it was hard, they hardly slept for ten nights. Now people would 
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have to be paid a lot of money to do this. Then, they just went, they got up and went, they 
were hungry, and for ten days they built [the factory]. They built it in a field, simply in a 
field, and the same workers from Moscow came, from Leningrad, who came from 
comfortable flats with heating and water to live for 24 hours a day in a field, without 
anything.  What supported them? They were supported by that same system which works so 
well in wartime conditions, in conditions of stress. This system is prepared to work in stress 
situations ... but in peace time, it begins to diminish. So, to say what was good, what was 
bad, I don’t know. That is, maybe, when life in the country has become better, maybe in that 
situation the system must be developed. Namely, because, the country had been constructed, 
practically, as an anti-stress system. And when a situation arises when it is necessary to 
mobilise this huge territory, this huge nation, there will be problems [without communism], 
there will be contradictions and divisions between different national groups. Mobilisation 
can only be undertaken in such a severe system.”981 
 
“Now people would have to be paid a lot of money to do this” acknowledges that it was the 
totalitarian Soviet system that mobilised people to do whatever it required and that without it, the 
‘power’ of the local communist leaders that the respondent so admired would have been much less.  
In the few comments that have been made in existing literature on the relationship between 
the CPRF and the Komsomol, it has been suggested that there was a nationwide split in the 25,000-
member organisation in 1999 and that a new organisation was formed “uniting several small 
organisations”982 or that a complete split with the CPRF occurred in 1997 and the organisation 
transferred its support first to the radical Stalinist Bloc, led by Anpilov, and later to Unity and 
President Putin.983 However, these reports appear to focus on the actions of Igor Malyarov, First 
Secretary of the Komsomol during the late 1990s, and a few of his colleagues. Malyarov stood for 
election in the 1999 Duma elections for the Stalinist Bloc and later worked to set up ‘Walking 
Together’ with two other former members of the Komsomol.984 There was no indication from 
interviews conducted with members of the Komsomol in St Petersburg for this study that any split 
affected the organisation as a whole and it would appear that whatever splits have taken place have 
been limited to a few members who have spoken to Western media and implied that the whole 
organisation was following them in a new direction.985 
As a result of the move towards what has been described as ‘authoritarian democracy’ and 
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“the dominance of the ruling elite on the political scene and in traditional media,”986 Russian 
political parties are having to use the internet as it is free and, as yet, not controlled by the state. The 
Komsomol is becoming adept at circumventing the problem of state controlled media through their 
website guest-book, from which participants in this study were contacted. The site is actively used 
by members of the Komsomol in an attempt to counteract the state-sponsored propaganda in other 
media by debating political matters with supporters and opponents of communism alike. Some 
writers (members of the party) are very active on the local branch’s website, replying to queries and 
dismissing the arguments of those respondents who are clearly anti-communist.  
Despite the limited access to the internet outside Moscow and St Petersburg, this form of 
communication is vital for the party as it is uncensored (even by the party, in the case of apparently 
not censoring the content of the internet guest-book during 2003). An indication of how seriously 
this form of communication is taken by the CPRF can be seen in the results of a study of political 
parties’ websites in Russia and Ukraine which found that in both countries the Communist Party 
websites were the highest quality party websites in terms of user friendliness, updatedness and 
accessibility.987  
Along with more modern methods of communication, the Komsomol is also engaged in 
more traditional campaign methods: on-street campaigning; handing out ‘agitation-literature’; door-
to-door campaigning and putting up posters for local communist candidates.988 This was one area 
where, until recently, the CPRF had an advantage in terms of the numbers of activists the party 
could mobilise to undertake these tasks. Since the advent of United Russia, and the accusations of 
abuse of administrative resources by that party, in terms of the employment of people to distribute 
election materials on their behalf,989 this advantage has diminished.  
The Komsomol has tried to broaden its appeal to young people with the adoption of anti-
globalisation as an aspect of communist beliefs. The Komsomol participated, along with other 
groups, in the “Anti-Capitalism 2002” campaign in Russia990 which enabled them to campaign on an 
issue that is generally popular with young people regardless of which political party they support or 
whether they support any political party at all. Like the CPRF, the Komsomol can be pragmatic and 
is prepared to work with other ‘left’ and ‘patriotic’ groups where they share aims. They see their 
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mission now as saving Russia, rather than immediate world-wide proletarian revolution.  
Another challenge facing the party in terms of recruitment of younger members is the youth 
organisation Walking Together, a youth movement set up to support President Putin and in 
competition with the Komsomol. ORT (television) news on Tuesday 25th February, 2003 showed 
members of Walking Together starting a voluntary work group in the form of the Komsomol with 
red, white and blue patterned neck scarves in imitation of the Soviet Komsomol’s red scarves and 
undertaking work to help the elderly. The organisation led a march of reportedly 10,000 young 
people in support of President Putin and “its participants committed themselves to ‘no swearing, 
respect for the elderly and love for the President.’”991 Komsomol members in St Petersburg 
complained that supporting Putin was at that point very ‘fashionable’ amongst the young and 
Walking Together has clearly been set up to provide an alternative ‘patriotic’ youth organisation to 
the Komsomol.  
There is an enormous difficulty in attracting new members, especially amongst the young as 
many are not interested in politics, and supporting President Putin, the author was told, is considered 
very fashionable (these interviews were conducted before the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine which 
has since inspired youth groups such as ‘Walking Without Putin’ to campaign against media 
restrictions). Yet another pro-Putin youth group, Nashi (Our People), set up in 2005, is considered to 
be an attempt to avert an ‘Orange Revolution’ in Russia as anti-government youth groups were 
instrumental in the overthrow of unpopular governments in Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2003.992 
One member of the new organisation was quoted at a training session as saying “People today are 
far too interested in money … I think that is wrong. There are more important values in life like self-
respect and love for your country”.993 Views almost identical to those expressed by young 
communists in this study thereby showing the difficulty the Komsomol faces in attracting new 
members when other youth organisations are also concerned with ‘saving Russia’. 
Although effectively a separate organisation, the Komsomol membership is counted as part 
of the total of CPRF members in order to boost the number of young members. This can be seen in 
the statistics the party quotes of 18 to 24 year olds that it claims are party members.994 However, 
there seems to be little consistency in the age at which Komsomol members can join the CPRF with 
some interviewees claiming they joined the party when they were 18 and others saying that they 
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could not join the party at that age.995 There would appear to be regional variation in minimum ages 
for membership of the two organisations as the respondent who replied that he could not join the 
party as he was only nineteen, was not from St Petersburg. 
 
VIEWS ON SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
It is argued that the CPRF’s evolution conforms to the general pattern of communist parties 
that are no longer primarily concerned with the defeat of capitalism in that there is a strong tendency 
for them to become defenders of traditional national culture against the effects of capitalism and 
globalisation.996 That is not to say that the defeat of capitalism is off the agenda, this is far from the 
case, it is just that this is now considered to be a far longer term task than was originally envisaged. 
Interviewees spoke of communism being achieved in the very distant future. However, with one 
partial exception, CPRF members in St Petersburg saw no need to alter their political outlook. One 
respondent explained why, in her view, social democracy had not replaced communism as the 
ideology of the CPRF. Her argument was that, as Russia had no middle class of any size, social 
democracy was irrelevant to Russia. 
 “Well, I could begin like this: at the start of the 1990s, there was an anti-communist hysteria 
in Russia. There was a strange switch. The democrats became the ‘left’ wing and 
communists became conservatives so people began to see them as ‘right’ wing. There was no 
way to create a new social democratic party. … [The respondent mentioned Gorbachev’s 
party and its failure in previous elections] ... To explain this is difficult, everybody says this: 
there is no simple explanation, in Russia there is no niche for social-democracy. In Russia, 
no one needs social-democracy. How is this the case? It is difficult to explain but we don’t 
have a middle class. We have the poor and aggrieved and they are in opposition. They see 
the current regime as wholly bad. Then there are those who now live very well, they have a 
lot of money, have their own businesses, they have no problems, they can solve any problem 
with money and they need those who can protect the existing situation. They need the ‘right’, 
namely the liberal right, not conservatives, but liberals who introduced the current policies 
and continue these policies up to now.”997 
 
The views of a seventeen year-old would-be member were typical in that she saw no way in 
which social democracy could resolve Russia’s economic problems. Whilst admitting that 
communism had its detractors, she felt that social democracy was simply alien to Russia.998 The 
views of the new member in her forties, however, were the only indication from any participant in 
the study that social democracy could even be considered as a viable course for the CPRF. When 
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asked how she considered social democracy to differ from communism, she replied: 
“I seriously don’t know this. I think that social democracy allows private material interests 
not only in practice, but as the greatest core of existing society – that is social democracy 
simply endeavours to reduce the negative social consequences of capitalism, not encroaching 
on its foundation, its sense. Social democracy agrees that the world and historical process are 
governed by capital and linked with these values or stereotypes whereas communists do not 
agree with this. However, in a concrete situation, communists can take a social democratic 
position – as the only one possible in that situation. However, the root question – should 
there be a market, should capital dictate all areas of life and all values in place of all social 
institutions – communists decide in principle otherwise: no, not a market. Someone here [in 
Russia] called the great anti-globalisation action ‘Peace, Not Trade’. I am convinced that 
communists are fully in agreement with this and that social democracy is not convinced [of 
this].”999 
 
This was the only respondent included in the study who acknowledged the possibility of the 
CPRF moving towards social democracy, albeit for purely practical reasons, and this would only be 
a temporary shift and communism would still be the long term aim, in this respondent’s view. The 
only respondent to recommend a change of ideology to social democracy was also a former member 
of the CPSU who had not joined the CPRF (and therefore was not interviewed).1000  
The Second Secretary when asked if he thought that the ideology of the Party today differs 
greatly from traditional Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet doctrine of proletarian internationalism, 
replied: “[n]ot at all. Absolutely not. In what way does it differ? Well, we have travelled a bit 
further. After Marx, there was Lenin, after Lenin, Stalin and Stalin achieved further development. ... 
Well, everything Marx wrote, he wrote in Germany, and he could not, did not live long enough, nor 
did Lenin or Stalin, to answer every question. And there are national differences as well ...”1001 
Whilst no respondent criticised Stalin, none of the interviewees went so far as to praise him 
either but the claim that Stalin achieved ‘further development’ of communism was the nearest any 
respondent came to praise. Other respondents alluded to ‘mistakes’ of the past but did not specify 
what these were. However, from the contexts, excesses of the Stalin era could sometimes be 
inferred. On the whole, Stalin was seen by members and non-members alike as having achieved the 
transformation of Russia from an agricultural state to a superpower and having led Russia to victory 
in the Second World War. 
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The Second Secretary respondent to the question on what direction the party ideology should 
take in the future by arguing that changes to the ideology would change the nature of the party and 
therefore should be avoided. 
“Only in terms of explanation ... with the outcome of continuing practical work. It is possible 
to spend half a year theorising and ‘correctness’ could be debated for a lifetime. ... and if 
practical work leads to lack of ‘correctness’ then it is necessary to think again. [Practical 
work needs to develop] far more than ideology because if you reconsider [the ideology] then 
it becomes another party in the sphere of politics and economics, yes?”1002 
 
Members of the Komsomol, however, considered that the ideology should develop over time 
but that debates over ideology should not risk divisions within the party as unity in the face of 
competition was far more important. Although the second respondent in the interview quoted below 
referred to a ‘dialogue’ with society, there was also a sense that this ‘dialogue’ was intended to be 
closer to the ‘explanation’ of the ideology that the Second Secretary referred to than the two-way 
discussion that is stated below. 
“[respondent 1]… it is difficult to say ... from opinions and ideology there are various 
movements in the party, various tendencies, all of which are communist, in Marxist terms, in 
the understanding of the Marxist idea ...what is important is the saving of the party ... 
problems can arise if one movement claims “I am more correct”, “I am more communist and 
you are less communist, less correct” - the party will collapse, as happened with the Soviet 
Union.”1003 
“[respondent 2] As the situation in our country changes, so ideology has to change. ... ... 
Ideology will be the path for life. In any case, dialogue with society is necessary. It needs to 
be understood that Marxism is, of course, not the only philosophical method ... although 
Marxism sustains the method.”1004 
 
The fact that there has been such a noticeable move by the CPRF away from internationalism 
(despite the insistence to the opposite of the Second Secretary) and revolution raises the question of 
to what extent it is communism that party members are really trying to implement in terms of what 
the party currently stands for. As can be seen from the interviews quoted above, however, this shift 
has not encouraged members in St Petersburg to consider a move towards social democracy. 
Communism is now seen by both the CPRF and the Komsomol as a very distant prospect but, true to 
Marxism-Leninism, an inevitable one nevertheless. 
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ATTITUDES TO ZYUGANOV 
Amongst members, there was a very high degree of loyalty to Zyuganov and it was only in 
initial contacts with people who turned out not to be members of the party that any genuine criticism 
could be found.1005 There was a reluctance to question Zyuganov’s leadership and a sense of 
obligation, on the part of those who were members, to appear united when talking to an outsider. 
Those who were supporters were more willing to criticise but there was no sense of any serious 
support for any other possible leadership figure. In one interview with two members of the 
Komsomol, Zyuganov’s leadership was praised in so far as he appeared able to unite the different 
factions of the party. However, the second respondent noted that Zyuganov was not a charismatic 
leader of the order of Lenin, Castro or Che Guevara.1006 
It has been suggested that “Zyuganov’s leadership and approach were probably the only way 
to ensure both the unity of the CPRF and its predominant position in Russia’s party system”.1007 
This view also appears to be held by the party members. In reply to the question “do you agree with 
the tendency in the party that Zyuganov represents or is there another tendency within the party that 
you agree with more?” respondents were generally unwilling to admit to internal divisions in the 
party and typically said that talk of divisions was unhelpful. None admitted to supporting any 
tendency within the party. Many refused to criticise the leader but there were a small number of 
more open responses, for example: “[i]t is sad but there are a lot of tendencies and provocateurs in 
the party and it is difficult to be strong in such a situation. I do not agree with everything that 
Zyuganov says and would prefer another leader but we don’t have such an opportunity at the 
moment. He is a clever and honest man but I know that we need another leader who is better at 
P.R.”1008 There was much talk of honesty, as communists, especially Komsomol members, were 
seen as being inherently honest by party members and the democrats were seen as having lied to the 
whole of Russian society in the early 1990s about Russia’s future prosperity.  
When asked whether they agreed with the political views of Zyuganov or if there was 
someone else in the leadership with whom they agreed more, one of the two re-founders of the 
Komsomol replied that “[w]ell, I would be a bit more radical, myself. But if I were Zyuganov’s age, 
maybe I would be following the same path as him, I don’t know. The direction I think is right.”1009 
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In an attempt to clarify their views on Zyuganov’s leadership the author asked whether these 
respondents considered Zyuganov to be a good leader. The first respondent replied that ‘good’ was 
difficult to define but that Zyuganov led the party well - a remark which the second respondent 
qualified by saying that he led the Party sufficiently well.1010 The second respondent replied that, to 
outsiders, it might look as though the leadership have become democrats, to which the first 
respondent hastily added “[i]n appearance, in appearance.” 1011 The second respondent continued by 
explaining that there is a persistent political search for the best way forward. Zyuganov was further 
considered to be a useful leader in that he had been able to increase party finances.1012 
The only member interviewed who was prepared to hint at another leader, albeit one who 
had been a member of another party, was the comparatively new member in her forties. However, 
she also saw a need for unity and keeping the present leadership whilst dealing with more urgent 
matters: 
 “It is not a matter of tendencies. I do not agree with the present level and quality of specific 
work – but, you see, the leader answers for that. I think that the party needs now a leader-
organiser, who can obtain greater activity and energy from the CPRF. I am not ready to 
name straight away such a leader – this must be the result of discussion in the party – but 
there are excellent organisers in the party … We must move away from the edge, to deal 
with the most urgent matters first, there is no alternative – and only then can we start to think 
about long term ideology. This is why I think we need a leader-organiser.  … the party of 
Glaz’ev … true, it has only just been set up, but it is led by one of the most talented and 
honest of our economists – pro-market but also in favour of controls.”1013 
 
Some responses such as “I do not agree with all tendencies in the party”1014 betrayed a lack 
of understanding of how political parties function in democracies. Another respondent replied that 
ideology was very much a secondary matter to saving the nation: 
“We have, Russia has, so many absolutely immediate urgent tasks that there is no time for 
me to think about ideology. We have a catastrophic situation in, firstly, science – middle 
aged and pre-pension; secondly in industry – 60-70 per cent of basic resources/workforce are 
physically and morally worn out; thirdly, in demography – a very high mortality rate in the 
active ages, especially for men, they are not surviving, on average, to reach their pensions – 
58 years is the mean duration of their lives; fourthly, in defence and military industry - … 
our ‘defence’ works almost only as export and defends foreign armies; fifthly, in agriculture 
and food production – around 50 per cent of out food provision is supplied by imports, that is 
we have lost independence [self sufficiency] and many other things.”1015 
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... while another respondent saw ideology as being very important, especially for her 
generation, but again, secondary to saving the nation: “[o]ur party must be strong and united. About 
the new ideology – it is our question – the question for young people. But the main thing is to save 
Russia and unite all the people who love Russia. It is simple, when the country has a lot of 
problems, for people to unite on the basis of nationality but we are for internationalism and will not 
change our position.”1016 When asked about divisions within the party most of those interviewed 
stressed the need for unity and none were willing to criticise the leader directly. March refers to the 
‘cult of unity’ within the party1017 which results from the adherence to democratic centralism. 
Questions on the use of democratic centralism by the CPRF were met almost with surprise by 
interviewees as if there were no reason to doubt its continued use. 
When asked if an envisaged future communist system would be similar to the socialist 
system of the past, the two leaders of the Komsomol were convinced that it would be different. This 
far distant future society would differ from its socialist predecessor because the party had now 
renounced its monopoly on power, on property and on ideology. The second respondent remarked 
that “[a] monopoly on power, doesn’t even need a party ... Putin is purging the media so that United 
Russia can do whatever it needs to monopolise the political field.”1018 However, it was not clear how 
either respondent envisaged a future communist society operating under conditions where power 
was shared between different groups. 
The CPRF is a broad coalition encompassing those prepared to accept the existence of 
private ownership of property and a mixed economy as well as those who argue for complete 
renationalisation.1019 Zyuganov has been working since the party’s formation to broaden the 
communists’ support base further by forming coalitions outside the party with various nationalist 
organisations such as the National Salvation Front. The party’s leadership is very aware of the limits 
of the support for the CPRF so despite divisions within the party, the national-communist or statist-
patriotic ideology is tolerated, at least for the time being, by those who would follow another course. 
 
CURRENT ELECTION STRATEGY 
Of particular interest when questioning interviewees about the upcoming elections was the 
method used to select candidates for elections, in light of the fact that claims have been made that 
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businessmen have been able to purchase places on the CPRF party list in some elections.1020 
However, it would appear that little has changed since Soviet times, as far as people knew or were 
prepared to describe to an outsider. The Second Secretary described the method of candidate 
selection: 
“[Candidates are chosen] Very simply! Primary organisations within the city make their 
suggestions, we consider these. We meet at the party office, consider them all, discuss them, 
talk with the candidates, then discuss them again and at the Plenum - a full meeting of the 
Committee - then we vote by a show of hands - who is for and who against. ... We take the 
decision here in our region. The local list is our business but the central list [decided 
centrally?] ... the single mandate ... is our decision.”1021 
 
 An illuminating response was also provided by one of the leading members of the 
Komsomol. 
“[Candidates are chosen] By various means. Firstly, there are members of the party. As a 
rule, this takes place all from the primary organisations. If there are suitable people there in 
the primary or city branches they can put forward their comrades and in the leading organs 
of the party and for elections at any level it begins in the primary organisations ...  The City 
organs of power elect to the Republic level organisation and to the State Duma. ... ... And the 
party also selects people who are non-members. It is possible to put forward or support those 
who are not members. Here the procedure is different - here the candidate presents himself ... 
And then there is consideration of our leading organs, discussion takes place, as ever. Well, 
often as not, if it is a very big election, discussions take place in the primary organisations, 
will we support this person or not, these conversations take place about the whole rank put 
forward by the CPRF and other organisations. We have very many of these discussions. Will 
there be a bloc? Should there not be a bloc? With whom will we form a bloc? Who will we 
admit into the bloc? All this is of course set out in the statutes. That is it is decided there. 
And discussion takes place about businessmen and about famous people, [who want to stand 
for election as communists], politicians representing the little parties ...”1022 
 
 As the party is still deciding whom it will allow to join its ‘bloc’, it is still assuming a 
‘leading role’ where it can. However, the party realises it needs to co-operate with other parties if it 
is to increase its influence. Golosov notes that between 1995 and 1998, the CPRF selected 
candidates to run in sixty-nine regions but that it was not necessarily the CPRF’s party name on the 
ballot in regional elections as some of the communist parties in the national republics were 
independent from the national organisation.1023 The CPRF has formed coalitions with other left-
wing and nationalist parties during this time, particularly with the Agrarian Party and the Russian 
Communist Workers’ Party, often as the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia and CPRF candidates 
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have also run under the name of the Komsomol.1024 The party has also supported non-party 
members for election under the CPRF name in Primore, Kursk and Saratov and Amur Communists 
ran without the CPRF name on the ballot while the party still gained a majority in the region’s 
assembly.1025 
In terms of the St Petersburg gubernatorial elections in September 2003, concerns were 
raised about the influence of central government, media manipulation by central government, 
electors being away at dachas over the summer (and therefore out of reach in terms of campaigning) 
and abuse of administrative resources by United Russia.1026 The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) expressed more concern over the fairness of the 2003 Duma and 2004 
Presidential elections than any they had monitored in the past. Concerns included the denial of 
access to meeting places for opposition candidates and detention campaigners by the police. The 
OSCE also raised concerns about the lack of free access to the media for opposition parties.1027 
 The responses to questions about preparations for the December 2003 Duma elections all 
raised the same issues. There was much concern about the eroding class base of support for the party 
as traditional industrial jobs vanish ... 
 “We are seeing interest from people with higher education. Workers are fewer [in the party] 
but they are fewer in number now anyway. We no longer have a proletariat. And no doubt in 
the near future, there won’t be one either. Because of this, there is little interest in the 
working class ... We need a working class, this is the basis [of the party] but everyone 
understands that there is almost no proletariat to organise, this is stupid, unfortunately.”1028 
 
 Although the perceived scale of the problems faced depended on the proximity of the 
respondent to active campaigning as “[p]reparations for elections are better than before. There is 
noticeable work by PR specialists”1029 was a response from a member who was far less active in 
day-to-day organisation and campaigning than many of those interviewed. While one Komsomol 
member, in reply to a question about how the party was preparing for the Duma elections in 
December 2003, openly admitted, without any prompting, that the party was facing serious 
difficulties due to declining numbers of activists and ageing activists: 
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“Badly, ... our support has dropped to a lower level than last year. In principle we are losing 
members ... the older generation are gradually dying so the percentage of older voters [who 
are likely to vote for us] is decreasing, [however] people in their forties and fifties are 
beginning to vote for us and here we have a persistent, healthy growth [in the communist 
vote]. These people in their forties and fifties are particularly of interest to us. Notably, these 
are not workers, they are intelligentsia. They are middle-level managers, scientists.”1030 
 
However, another respondent was confident that at least in the countryside, the CPRF could 
rely on support as a matter of course: “... outside the cities, in the countryside, the population, it 
could be said, of this group, it is a separate question, their relation to the communists ... they are 
accustomed to thinking well of the communists. There is a tradition - my father voted for them and 
his father too so I will as well.”1031 
Another respondent replied that preparations for the 2003 Duma election were only just 
beginning around the time of the interview. He replied that there would be a congress at which 
decisions would be taken about the national list of candidates; pre-election staff and so on and that 
closer to the election the party would prepare to take part in the work of “each electoral commission 
and will not allow the infringement of the registration of votes.”1032 One respondent replied, when 
talking about the party as a whole that “[o]ur people can reach every elector with banners, leaflets, 
loud speakers ... our members stand at metro stations and other points of transport ... we can reach 
all the adult population.”1033 
The members of the Komsomol were acutely aware of the difficulties the party was facing, 
not just that year, but as their support base grows older and younger voters do not remember the 
perceived advantages of the old economic system ... 
“We are trying to work with young people. Despite the large number of young people in the 
city, young members of the party are few. With the aim of changing this, I am leading the 
work with young people in our city organisation. The work is difficult. With young people 
the work is naturally difficult. But my personal task is to raise interest in our mission. To 
return to a situation where there is interest in the party and to liquidate the influence of the 
Yeltsin-era propaganda that communists are old, going senile, evil, well, that they are crazy 
old folks, boring, ill people sitting in meetings. My task is to explain to young people that 
this is absolutely untrue. I realise that these young people won’t be voting for another four or 
five years yet but they will be voting next time [2007 Duma election].”1034 
 
The CPRF is also having to deal with many other parties encroaching on its new, patriotic, 
electoral space. The party claims to have been the first to adopt ‘patriotism’ as part of its ideology 
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and to have been followed by most other parties once this tactic was seen to attract voters. The 
greatest problem in this respect is United Russia: 
“… Putin is very fashionable, because he has, in fact, very adroitly taken the ideas of the 
CPRF. He talks of the rebirth of Russia, but an imperial rebirth of Russia. He talks of us 
needing to become a leading world power. He has criticised the dissolution of the Union. He 
plays on the collapse of the Union in every way possible, practically speculates on it. And in 
this way, he has stolen the initiative from the communists in terms of ‘patriotism’ ... During 
the Yeltsin era, the word ‘patriot’ was an obscenity. It was said that a patriot was a fascist. 
Putin has turned this round. Now, many parties do not have their own programme or 
platform and don’t know in what way Russia should move forward so they say that their 
action is simple – ‘We are like Putin’ ... People see Putin as such an intelligent and 
fashionable person, for simple electors and as a result of this, they begin to see a 
convergence between the communists and Putin and begin to say they are the same.”1035 
 
The second respondent in the above interview remarked that people in Russia tend to have a 
sense of loyalty to whoever is in power simply because of their position and that in this respect, 
Russians differ from populations of (other) European states. The first respondent replied that the 
state was seen as the ‘father’ in Russia and added that this was a result of the country’s history and 
climate so people will support the President out of a sense of duty as they want to believe him. Both 
respondents then went on to discuss Putin’s and United Russia’s use of ‘public relations’ and the 
government’s monopoly on the broadcast media and how this adversely affected the CPRF in terms 
of difficulty in getting their message across and propaganda employed against them.1036 
 The manipulation of election results is one of the considerable challenges the communists 
now face. The Moscow Times reported in September 2000 that enough falsification of the vote in 
the presidential election had occurred to put the legitimacy of the vote in doubt. The worst 
allegations included the theft of 88,000 votes in Dagestan from other candidates which were 
subsequently given to President Putin and the addition of 1.3 million voters to the electoral roll 
nationwide, the majority of whom, the paper claimed, were fictitious.1037 While the communists’ 
frequent complaints of electoral foul play may be exaggerated, they are not unfounded. International 
election monitors criticised the biased campaigning of both the December 2003 Duma elections1038 
and the presidential election in March 2004 as well as irregularities in the counting of the vote in 
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one quarter of all counts that were monitored in the presidential election.1039 
An even greater challenge, however, is media manipulation and what the communists see as 
President Putin having taken over much of their political space through the adoption of ‘patriotism’ 
and calls for the restoration of Russia’s Cold War era levels of influence.1040 Putin has also gradually 
reduced the opposition’s opportunities to communicate with the public through the state take-over of 
independent television stations. These stations now broadcast the government line on most issues. 
Zyuganov must surely regret his declaration in 2002 that state television “must serve executive 
power.”1041 Now that all national television stations are controlled by the state, there is a serious 
problem for the CPRF as the majority of references to the party on television tend to be negative, 
such as the regular claims that the CPRF is a party of pensioners1042 and, in common with other 
opposition parties, they cannot get a balanced view of their policies across to the electorate. The 
communists now find themselves in the kind of situation their opponents were in for the duration of 
their seventy-year rule. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the party’s membership is largely composed of people of, or near, retirement age this 
does mean that with over half the respondents in this study under 35, the sample is not particularly 
representative. It is, however, particularly interesting, as these are some of the people who will be 
guiding the future direction of communism in Russia. Those members interviewed were not working 
class in the traditional sense, partly due to retirement after having lost their former jobs and partly 
due to having office-based jobs in the case of younger respondents rather than industrial jobs, but 
they were actively campaigning for the rights of workers and the disadvantaged with the aim of 
achieving a communist state at some distant point in the future. 
The acceptance of democracy marks a significant shift in party strategy away from its 
revolutionary origins. This seems, as far as it is possible to tell from this fieldwork, to have been 
accepted by party members. No one interviewed in St Petersburg questioned the acceptance by the 
party of elections as the route back to power and no interviewee even mentioned the violent 
overthrow of the existing order. 
Support for social democracy is not only absent among members of the party interviewed, 
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but these members voiced very strong opposition to the idea of social democracy so there is little 
prospect at the moment that there will be a move in the future from younger members of the party to 
change the political orientation of the party away from communism and towards the centre ground. 
Overall, there was not much sense of a need for a change of direction. The interviewees and survey 
respondents who were party members were all in close agreement about the future course of party 
strategy – onwards to the distant goal of communism. With one quarter of the country’s wealth now 
held by around one hundred people, the CPRF was benefiting from disenchantment with market 
reforms and the rapid privatisations of the early 1990s that enabled a few to accumulate enormous 
wealth.1043 As a result of continued poverty and unemployment, the party members interviewed saw 
no need for a change of direction in 2003. 
Considering the organisation has reformed again from below, as has the Komsomol, a 
considerable degree of unity was reached very quickly. March has referred to an “ideology of 
organisation” as being vital in uniting the CPRF in its adherence to communism and communists 
perceiving themselves as a “moral community” of believers, attaching great importance to party 
discipline, respect for higher authority and an aspiration for consensus.1044 This was evident from 
the interviews conducted. 
The evidence that people in their forties and fifties are turning to the communists in St 
Petersburg (one new member in her forties and data from one of the best-informed interviewees) 
supports the work of Kiewiet and Myagkov who observed this phenomenon in the generation 
currently of these ages, although the sample for this chapter is small. The largest age group in the 
party however, is still those who are retired but whilst this section of the membership is generally 
considered to be quite passive, these older members will campaign actively for the party at election 
time and are generally considered to be the party’s greatest asset in this respect.  
The younger members in the Komsomol also play an important role in election campaigns, 
recruitment, raising awareness and encouraging youth participation in politics, although its degree of 
success is difficult to judge and the organisation is comparatively small. In St Petersburg and 
elsewhere, where the Komsomol was organised ‘from below’ as an organisation of young people 
rather than ‘from above’ as an organisation for young people, it can be described as a small but 
dynamic group fighting against the ‘fashion’ of President Putin and for what its members see as a 
more just society. Whilst traditional campaign methods are still being used, those members with 
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internet access are now turning to the internet to get their message across as television and radio 
stations are state controlled. Despite the discouragement of manipulated media and election results 
and the ‘unfashionable’ image of the CPRF, the members of the Komsomol are enthusiastically 
engaging in modern methods of communication and agitation to keep political debate alive, from the 
communist perspective, on the internet and on the streets when other forms of communication are 
censored. 
To what extent has the party changed? The acceptance amongst both leadership and 
membership of multi-party competitive elections despite media bias in recent years towards the 
ruling party means that the CPRF has moved a long way from its revolutionary origins and now full 
participation in elections by the CPRF is seen by all respondents as the only realistic option for 
regaining power. There was also an acceptance that any future communist state would have to be 
different from the USSR with a far greater degree of freedom for its citizens. When asked about the 
advantages and disadvantages of the old system, responses reveal that it is the security of the former 
economic system that members wish to see recreated, not the entire system itself with restrictions on 
freedoms. There was also an acceptance that times had changed and that party policy had to reflect 
this and that the attainment of ‘true’ communism was a very distant prospect indeed but an 
inevitable one, nevertheless. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
The origins of the CPRF can be seen in the divisions that formed in the CPSU in its final 
years. The foundation of the CP RSFSR was a reaction to the reforms that Gorbachev introduced 
and it was as a reaction to those reforms which brought about the end of the communist regime that 
the CPRF was founded. With the discarding of democratic centralism, the officially united CPSU 
allowed the formation of platforms within the party and later the formation of parties in opposition 
to the CP RSFSR as the admission that the party needed to reform replaced the assertion of the 
inevitable triumph of communism. The change in tone of programmes from 1986 to 1991 as 
Gorbachev tried to move the party towards social democracy in an attempt to preserve the party in 
fact led to the coup as hardliners acted to try to prevent the signing of a new Union treaty that would 
have allowed republics to secede from the USSR and to prevent the adoption of the draft 
programme. In 1986, the CPSU was a party of Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary action but by 
1991, according to the new draft programme, it was a party of social progress, democratic reforms 
and economic, political and spiritual freedom. However, the attempt to preserve the party’s 
communist ideology backfired and, as a result of the coup, the CPSU was banned. 
The fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989 did not provide the impetus 
for change in the CPSU that the party needed were it to have any chance of surviving. Although the 
party lasted a further two years beyond the end of communist control of many of the Soviet Union’s 
neighbours, it did not survive the wave of growing nationalism in many Soviet republics and the 
efforts of reformers to democratise Russia’s political system. The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 
and the ban on the activity of the CPSU resulted in the formation of several small communist parties 
in Russia and the newly independent republics. An unavoidable delay in forming a successor party 
to the CP RSFSR until 1993 meant that the CPRF had difficulty in uniting the various elements of 
the left but the decision to participate in elections and the strategy of adopting nationalism to 
broaden the party’s potential support made the CPRF the largest party on the left and led to the 
electoral successes of 1993, 1995 and 1999. The electoral decline in 2003, however, was due to 
several factors including the party’s ageing membership and problems in attracting younger 
members, the improving Russian economy and the competition the party is facing from increasingly 
well-organised and well-funded opposition with the result that the long-term survival of the CPRF 
now looks uncertain. 
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IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The leadership of the CPSU lost control over the membership of the party in its final years as 
a result of changes in the law that it had itself enacted. With democratisation the party unwittingly 
brought about its own demise as it became possible to express different opinions and eventually to 
criticise the CPSU. Despite the new choices available in elections, the CPSU clearly expected the 
voters to choose the party that claimed to govern in their name and there was a failure to understand 
that voters would use the choices given to them rather than vote for the CPSU. The expectation that 
the party’s legitimacy would be increased in the face of political choice was misplaced as multi-
candidate elections led instead to a loss of power as opposition groups were elected in large 
numbers, to the surprise of the party leadership. The CPSU was well aware of its rapid loss of 
authority and legitimacy towards the end of its tenure, however, there had been a failure to face 
reality soon enough. There was clearly a degree of unwillingness in the party to accept the 
overthrow of communism in Eastern Europe as being a rejection of communism itself, rather than 
just a rejection of the parties that had been in government in the region and also a failure to accept 
that the end of the communist-led regimes in Eastern Europe could lead to the end of the CPSU.  
However, it is clear that there was considerable support for communism in terms of what it 
achieved for Russia as the demonstrations on the first post-Soviet anniversary of the October 
revolution brought thousands out on to the streets voluntarily, showing that there were many people 
prepared to support a renewed communist party. The CP RSFSR, in its opposition to moves towards 
social democracy and its aim to save Russia and the Soviet Union (as Russia’s empire), make it the 
forerunner of the CPRF. The CPSU was losing elections in its final years but the CPRF was winning 
them from 1993 onwards, showing that there was still support for communism in terms of ideology 
and as a Russian national tradition.  
The old CPSU split into its national components, which have each taken different paths. In 
Central Asia the successor communist parties are small and largely ineffective but it is the former 
CPSU national elites and effectively the former national communist parties that are running the 
independent states. The former ruling parties became new ruling parties after name changes and the 
new communist parties were formed by those who were still believers in communism who left the 
ruling parties. Similarly, in the Caucasus the former communists are also largely still in power, but 
not the former communist parties. As in Central Asia, the successor communist parties are largely 
groups that split from the ruling parties. It is former communists now in power who have adopted 
the nationalists’ policies and the reformed communist parties are small and exert little influence.  
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There has been a break with classical Marxism for most former communist parties across 
Central and Eastern Europe but different parties have followed very different paths. The former 
communist parties of Hungary and Poland are now social democratic and have been re-elected to 
govern several times. In the Baltics, the section of the Lithuanian party that broke away from the 
CPSU adopted social democracy and was elected to govern and later merged with its revived 
historical social democratic competitor. Dissatisfaction with economic reform lead to nostalgia for 
the former economic stability and allowed the former communist parties to return to power as 
experienced economic administrators, as the new parties had no experience of government. 
While the first political cleavage to develop was that of communism versus anti-communism 
and this dominated the first, and sometimes subsequent, elections in most countries, many reform 
movements suffered from a loss of purpose after their aim was achieved. Some found new causes 
but the loss of momentum after their initial aim of defeating communism had been achieved paved 
the way for the return of reformed communist parties. In Poland and Slovakia, however, other 
political cleavages had survived the communist years yet in other countries, reformed historical 
parties returned to find their constituencies erased by the long period of communist rule and many 
revived social-democratic parties fared badly, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic. 
Divisions closer to the standard left-right political cleavages over economic reform emerged later as 
it became obvious that there were going to be losers in the economic transformation as well as 
winners. 
In Albania and Bulgaria, socialism has been the successful adaptation strategy for former 
communist parties. The partially reinvented communist parties have been re-elected to resolve the 
problems resulting from the economic reforms that were instituted by the non-communist 
governments that followed their departure. The former Albanian Party of Labour is now the 
Socialist Party of Albania. It remained in power until 1992 when it was defeated but was returned to 
power in an early parliamentary election in 1997 as a result of economic chaos. The party restored 
order and was re-elected in 2001. In Bulgaria, the communist party changed its name to the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party and was elected to govern in 1994. The party lost parliamentary elections 
in 1997 but returned to power in 2005 as part of a broad coalition.  
Parties that have retained their communist ideology, such as the Ukrainian, Moldovan and 
Russian parties have also experienced some electoral successes. The most successful has been the 
relatively unreformed Moldovan communist party which has been re-elected to govern twice, in 
2001 and 2005, on the basis of Moldova’s parliamentary system of government rather than a 
presidential system, such as those in Ukraine and Russia. In the Czech Republic the CPBM, which 
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also still adheres to Marxism-Leninism, has experienced an improvement in its electoral fortunes in 
recent years, despite facing competition on the left from a social democratic party. The CPRF faces 
no such competition and yet has felt the need to adopt nationalism in an attempt to broaden its 
support base, a tactic seen among various former communist parties.  
Reformers in the CPSU left the party to form new, non-communist parties while those who 
formed the CPRF were committed communists in the Soviet era. However, it is hardly traditional 
communism that forms the ideology of the new party. All former communist parties, even those that 
have reformed the least, now accept democracy and elections as their (potential) route back to power 
rather than revolution along with various compromises with the post-Soviet reality such as the 
existence of private property. Whilst several still retain the title ‘communist’, they have designated 
the achievement of communism as a very distant aim.  
There has been a change on the left in general following the end of the Cold War with a 
move in Western Europe towards the centre ground and the dissolution of many West European 
communist parties, while on the right, Western Europe has also seen the return of nationalist parties. 
Some former communist parties merged with green parties while others, such as the CPGB, 
dissolved themselves. In Italy, the Italian Communist Party was dissolved and the more moderate 
Democratic Party of the Left was formed in its place. Hardline, pro-Moscow communists formed 
Communist Refoundation and a splinter group from this party, the Party of Italian Communists, 
joined the Democratic Party of the Left (the largest party) in a coalition government in 1998. 
Those successor parties in Eastern Europe that have been the most successful have been 
those that have adopted social democracy, where there has been support for social democracy, and 
those that have adopted socialism or communism, where the economy has failed or nationalism, 
where there has been a sense of loss of national pride or heightened ethnic tensions. By the end of 
the Soviet era, it can be seen that the fight was about retaining power rather than preserving the 
ideology. This is a theme that has continued in the post-communist era with many communist 
parties leaving Marxism-Leninism behind in favour of policies that will help return them to power. 
The acceptance of democracy marks a significant shift in these parties’ strategies away from their 
revolutionary origins – a change which seems to have been accepted by those who have remained 
party members. No one interviewed in St Petersburg questioned the acceptance by the CPRF of 
elections as the route back to power and no interviewee even mentioned the violent overthrow of the 
existing political order.  
Can the CPRF change its ideology to return to power? Support for social-democracy is not 
only absent among members of the party interviewed in St Petersburg, but these members voiced 
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very strong opposition to the idea of social democracy. Support for social democracy as an ideology 
is also traditionally very low in Russia as a whole so there is little prospect at the moment that there 
will be a move in the future to change the political orientation of the party away from communism 
and towards the centre ground. Since the interviews were conducted, those in the party who have 
tried to lead such a change have either been expelled from the party or have left. Overall, there was 
not much sense of a need for a change of direction in St Petersburg. The interviewees and survey 
respondents who were party members were all in close agreement about the future course of party 
strategy – onwards to the distant goal of communism. As a result of continued poverty and 
unemployment, the party sees no need for a change of direction. However, the economy is growing 
stronger so depriving the CPRF of its main argument that capitalism is impoverishing the majority. 
This raises the question of which direction the CPRF should move in, if indeed the party has 
any room for ideological manoeuvre as there is a lack of support for social democracy among 
members of the CPRF and the more extreme left wing political positions are already well covered 
by smaller parties which have consistently failed to attract sufficient votes at elections to gain 
representation in the Duma. Although the results in Chapter 4 show that there is considerable 
support for traditionally communist ideas among CPRF voters, they also reflect the unwillingness of 
the majority of the population to elect Zyuganov or his party as already seen in the Duma and 
Presidential elections which preceded these surveys. The party also faces the further problem of 
being unable to appeal to large enough numbers of young people to replace its older supporters in 
sufficient numbers as they die. Ultimately, as party identification and the strength of that 
identification have been shown to increase with age (as discussed in Chapter 4), it may be difficult 
to attract the support of the young anyway but with a leader who is unpopular in comparison with 
the current President and very unpopular with the young, it is difficult to see how the CPRF can 
attract new support while Zyuganov remains the leader. 
The CPRF is far from united internally, having various tendencies, described in different 
terms by different writers, though not organised platforms, in the party. The former communist 
parties had united believers and careerists as well as pro-reform and anti-reform factions so when 
the parties reformed in the early 1990s, they were left with a more committed membership. The 
CPRF achieved an apparent unity under Zyuganov and members interviewed in St Petersburg in 
2003 felt that his ability to unite the party (until that time) was Zyuganov’s main strength as a 
leader. Despite internal divisions over the future course of the CPRF, democratic centralism enabled 
a considerable degree of unity to be reached. One idea that does help unite the various tendencies in 
the party is that of ‘honest communists’ expressed in Zyuganov’s writings and by the members 
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interviewed in St Petersburg.  This is how the present members of the party see themselves and 
those who belonged to its predecessor for reasons of ideological belief and not for material benefits. 
By this description, current members exclude former leaders such as Gorbachev, Yeltsin, other 
‘traitors’ and supporters of other ideologies or political views. Apparent unity has been needed for 
the party to be taken seriously enough to be elected to the Duma but, as the party has failed to adapt 
to changing political circumstances, such as Russia’s improving economy and competition from an 
increasingly powerful Kremlin-sponsored party, divisions have become more apparent and those 
who have disagreed with Zyuganov have left with CPRF membership now declining to a small core 
of supporters. 
 
NATIONALISM 
Nationalism has been adopted by many post-communist parties in an attempt to survive and 
salvage something for their respective nations from the communist past. While the CPRF has 
focused on the fall of the Soviet Union as a matter of lost national pride for Russia, other successor 
parties have taken a more extreme approach. In Romania, the communist party claimed to have 
adopted social democracy but in fact splintered into several nationalist parties which were variously 
returned to power after the fall of communism but with none claiming to be the successor party to 
the widely hated former communist party. In Yugoslavia, extreme nationalism on the part of the 
former ruling communist party kept the same leaders in power through several years of genocide 
following the end of the communist era. 
Nationalist movements mobilised against the CPSU in some republics, notably in the Baltics, 
Armenia and Georgia. Towards the end of the Soviet era, as it became possible to discuss national 
grievances against the CPSU, such as the opinion that Soviet rule was a foreign occupation, 
nationalism became a mobilising force that hastened the end of communist rule. Communist parties 
in some of the non-Russian republics were obliged to adopt a nationalist stance against Russia so as 
not to appear ‘unpatriotic’.  
Patriotism was adopted immediately by the CPRF on its founding but now all Russian 
parties have since realised that there is much support to be gained by declaring a nationalist stance 
and the CPRF has lost its earlier electoral gains now parties such as United Russia have taken 
advantage of the sense of injured national pride capitalised on so early in the post-Soviet era by the 
CPRF. Whilst internationalism in the party has not disappeared completely, those interviewed in St 
Petersburg believed either that the USSR and super-power status should be restored for nationalist 
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reasons or that patriotism was a necessary policy for the party for the present in order to gain 
support from as wide a range of voters and potential coalition partners as possible.  
As Russia has a presidential system of government, any electoral success in the Duma will 
be limited in its effect if the CPRF cannot also win the Presidency, something it has failed to do in 
every Presidential election since the end of the Soviet era. However, through the merging of 
nationalist theories with communism, Zyuganov took the CPRF to a level of parliamentary 
representation that provided considerable influence. The subsequent decline in the party’s electoral 
success from the 2003 Duma elections onwards, however, is currently looking difficult, if not 
impossible, to reverse and is probably due, in part, to the adoption of a patriotic stance by United 
Russia and endorsement of that party by President Putin. While the move towards nationalism was 
needed to draw more support from voters, it is perhaps more a change in the scale of adherence to 
nationalism than a complete change of direction since the CPSU also relied on nationalism at times 
to rally support for various policies.  
Zyuganov’s views vary depending on his audience, inevitably, as he has a balancing act to 
perform in terms of appealing to factions within the party, the members and potential voters and 
those groups that he is trying to draw into a ‘patriotic coalition’ with the CPRF. Zyuganov’s writings 
are contradictory and, at times, bizarre for a communist but after publishing several books 
throughout the 1990s that hardly mentioned Lenin, Zyuganov has made far more references to Lenin 
in his recent works. However, he continues to write of ‘inter-class agreement’ and Russia as a 
unique civilisation. Other changes in later books include a focus on globalisation, terrorism and the 
benefits and evils of the internet and television, but until 2006, Zyuganov did not even begin to write 
of the challenges the party faces from Putin and United Russia. Even in his most recent work, he 
only deals with these subjects very briefly and does not address how the CPRF should respond to 
successful, ‘patriotic’ competition. Patriotism is hardly a policy the CPRF can abandon in search of 
a new place in the Russian political spectrum and it is failing to adapt to the new political reality as 
the party does not know how to deal with a ‘patriotic’ President and ‘patriotic’ parties that are in 
opposition to the CPRF. Putin is perhaps difficult for the communists to criticise in this respect as he 
has spoken of the fall of the USSR with regret so the party focuses its attention on the regime in 
general. 
Zyuganov continues the apocalyptic phraseology of Communism in predicting “planetary 
catastrophe” in the same way as Marx and Lenin predicted revolution but the tone of his writing is 
perhaps one of the greatest similarities with the Party's former philosophy rather than its content. He 
still writes using Cold War era terminology and still sees Russia’s traditional opponents as enemies 
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in the same way they were seen in Soviet times but now Zyuganov calls for an international 
coalition against globalisation instead of a proletarian revolution. Since the economy has stabilised, 
he writes of needing to ‘improve’ capitalism in the short-term. It is left to the party programme and 
election platforms to refer to the working class and the need for better state welfare provision. 
To try to justify his nationalist theories, Zyuganov refers to various writers on geopolitics. 
He sees ‘Russia’ as not being confined to its present borders but extending to those of the former 
USSR, and even beyond. Such geopolitical theories lead Zyuganov to propose a new alliance of 
Russia, China and the Islamic world against the West as he writes of there being a clash of 
civilisations in East and West as opposed to a class war in an attempt to forge a broad coalition of 
communists and nationalists. This coalition would, on gaining power, restore Russia’s super-power 
status and work for a voluntary restoration of the USSR. The CPRF has moved away from 
traditional communism like other parties in former communist countries and Zyuganov now writes 
in defence of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the October 1917 Revolution as an attempt to 
save the Russian state, not as the first step of a proletarian revolution.  
 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTINUITY 
There is no single classification that describes all transitions that the post-soviet states have 
undergone but one characteristic that many post-Soviet states have in common is that former 
communists are still in charge. The communists in some countries still have stronger organisations 
than their rivals and were returned to power quickly after their initial rejection in the first post-
communist elections. Communist parties have proved to be very successful political organisations 
and while across the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, former communists and former 
communist parties are still in power they are not, generally, governing as communists (with the 
exception of Moldova). Some former communists are now governing as democrats, such as those in 
Hungary and Poland, and some as autocrats in Central Asia and Belarus. Ideological divisions had 
always existed in the individual communist parties, a fact that became clearer toward the end of the 
communist era when the faction that took over the former communist party determined its future 
electoral success or failure. The faction in favour of reform took over in Hungary and Poland and 
the faction that opposed reform, in Russia.  
The CPRF has replicated the structure of the CPSU in Russia and while the CPSU 
effectively abandoned democratic centralism as it began to allow a diversity of opinion in the party, 
the CPRF adopted this element of party organisation immediately and it has been retained, with the 
aim of keeping greater control over the members. With many new parties across Eastern Europe 
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since the end of communist rule, supposedly national parties do not have branches throughout the 
country, sometimes with none outside the capital at all. Former communist parties, however, tend to 
be the largest in terms of membership and had an early advantage in being national parties, having 
branches throughout the country. The CPRF benefited from such a national structure as some 
branches, such as that in St Petersburg, carried on working anyway for a considerable time after the 
ban and were able to reform quickly once the ban on local branches was revoked.  
Some communist parties in Eastern Europe just changed their names and kept their 
membership while others reformed completely, requiring members to re-register. Many kept some 
of their predecessors’ property and therefore some material advantages over their newer 
competitors. The organisational and administrative experience of the communists gave them an 
advantage in the early post-communist years as the new parties led by anti-communist campaigners 
lacked the administrative experience of the communists. The communist parties, however, still had 
many of their members with many years of organisational experience to rely on. The CPRF needed 
to re-register members as a result of the ban but still had the advantage of being the largest party by 
a sizeable margin for many years and while having lost much of its property, was able to rely on the 
members to campaign for the party in elections, an advantage that new parties did not have outside 
Moscow and St Petersburg. 
Not all successors have formed just one, united party. In Russia this was as a result of the 
ban on the party and the subsequent delay in forming a successor party as, with over two years 
between the ban being imposed and it being revoked, various small communist parties appeared in 
the intervening period with the result that the CPRF was unable to unite all communists in the one 
party. The party has tried various coalitions to unite communists and nationalists to fight elections as 
part of a common front but these have always involved the CPRF dominating the coalition rather 
than seeking compromises. Whilst the party managed considerable cooperation with the Agrarian 
Party in the 1995 Duma elections, such cooperation has not been achieved at subsequent elections 
and the party faces growing competition, not just from small parties to its left but also new left-
patriotic groups that are appealing to the traditional CPRF voters.  
The CPRF had been relatively united until Gennady Seleznev’s expulsion in 2002 resulted in 
the formation of the Party of Russia’s Rebirth, Gennady Semigin’s expulsion in 2004, after which he 
formed the Patriots of Russia bloc and the formation of the All-Russian Communist Party of the 
Future by others who opposed Zyuganov’s leadership in 2004. However, there had been 
considerable variation across the Russian Federation since the party was formed in terms of 
allegiance to the Moscow organisation as the Tatarstan branch of the party, for example, only 
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officially joined the national organisation in 1997 (as discussed in Chapter 1). The party has also 
experienced considerable regional variation in electoral alliances formed across the country with 
some regions continuing to form local coalitions with the Agrarians long after national-level 
cooperation ceased. The Komsomol apparently underwent two waves of splits from the CPRF but it 
is not at all clear that these splits were uniform across the nation as reports of splits relied on the 
declarations of the Moscow-based leadership of the Komsomol which has declared that members are 
following the leaders to other parties, despite the fact that little has since been heard of the former 
Komsomol leaders who led the splits. Some St Petersburg Komsomol members interviewed for this 
thesis had been with the CPRF since 1994, which suggests some regional variation in the divisions 
that have occurred in the youth section of the party. 
The endurance of the former communist parties as organisations is one of the most striking 
aspects of the post-communist era but these parties have changed beyond recognition ideologically, 
having either abandoned the achievement of communism altogether or relegated such an 
achievement to the very distant future. However, in organisational terms, there is far greater 
continuity with the past as the CPRF, along with most other communist successor parties, has 
formed a traditional mass party, in contrast to many new parties in Russia and Eastern Europe that 
have formed small parties that rely on media campaigns to communicate their message, rather than 
relying on a large and active membership, as Western political parties are increasingly doing as their 
memberships fall. The CPRF has lost members rapidly though as it has an ageing membership and 
has difficulty in attracting younger members as it cannot offer the same benefits that its predecessor 
could. The benefits can now be offered in part, in terms of career advancement, by United Russia, 
the party that has overtaken the CPRF in terms of size of membership.  
Although it has gained control of various regions, the CPRF cannot currently return to power 
as the party is too weak to win a parliamentary majority and Russia has a presidential system, so the 
CPRF would also need to win the presidency in order to effect any considerable change. The CPRF 
has been out-manoeuvred by United Russia’s adoption of a patriotic stance and the presidential 
administration which is increasingly sponsoring splinter parties and new left-patriotic parties to split 
it or draw support away from the communists. With the political space it could move into on the left 
already occupied by smaller parties and social democracy not an option, the party may become far 
more reliant on finding compromises with potential coalition partners than it has been in the past. 
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MEMBERS AND VOTERS 
Does the membership of the party reflect the social profile of the party’s voters? Are they the 
deprived or the relatively deprived? The statistical analysis of the vote for the CPRF in the 1999 and 
2003 Duma elections conducted for this thesis revealed that a CPRF supporter could be predicted to 
be older and with more strongly held political views than the average Russian citizen. As many 
previous studies have found, age is clearly one of the most significant factors in predicting support 
for the CPRF but this factor was outweighed in the surveys considered here by party identification 
and ideological conviction. If a voter identified with a political party and an ideology, there was a 
greater probability that that voter would support the CPRF rather than any other party. 
In 1999, the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF was most clearly influenced by a 
voter’s ideology and identification with a political party. Of secondary, but still significant 
importance, was their age, with those 60 and over only slightly more likely to be CPRF voters than 
those from 40 to 59. In 2003, again it was political orientation and the strength of identification with 
a political party that most readily indicated the probability of a vote being cast for the CPRF. Age 60 
and over was the next most reliable indicator of communist support followed by strong disapproval 
of President Putin and then lack of employment (excluding pensioner status). 
Of least concern to a CPRF voter in 1999 were blaming the economic transition for Russia’s 
problems, fair treatment of all citizens from the government as a measure of equality and belief that 
television coverage of the 1999 Duma election was biased. As respondents in St Petersburg 
complained of increasing inequality in Russia, it was surprising that voters for the CPRF did not feel 
more strongly about this issue than members. It is possible that members are more concerned with 
highlighting the gap between rich and poor as a major issue for the population in order to sustain a 
belief in the inevitability of the triumph of communism.  
While concerns about equality and the fairness of television coverage of the 2003 Duma 
election also failed to noticeably differentiate CPRF voters from supporters of other parties and non-
voters, of least concern to a CPRF voter in 2003 (in comparison with other variables) was the 
absolute necessity of restoring the USSR, which had a very low statistical significance, followed, 
interestingly, by being on an extremely low income. Members in St Petersburg aspired to represent 
the poorest and most disadvantaged in Russian society but one admitted that those in the direst 
circumstances had little interest in politics. Those interviewed were not working class in the 
traditional sense, partly due to retirement after having lost their former jobs and partly due to having 
office-based jobs in the case of younger respondents rather than industrial jobs, but they were 
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actively campaigning for the rights of workers and the disadvantaged with the aim of achieving a 
communist state at some distant point in the future.  
Are younger voters turning to the CPRF as they approach retirement? The surveys analysed 
here do not confirm Kiewiet and Myagkov’s finding that voters in their forties and fifties are turning 
to the CPRF, they in fact indicate that they are not and therefore also do not confirm a national trend 
in the assertion of an interviewee in St Petersburg who reported that voters in this age range were 
joining the party in greater numbers than before. The CPRF’s supporters were generally older, and 
more so with the second survey, and were comprised of the comparatively economically 
disadvantaged rather than the most disadvantaged. CPRF voters also tended to be those with a 
positive attitude towards the former regime. However, the analysis also shows that whilst CPRF 
voters might have strong ideological convictions, they are not by any means convinced that they 
wish to see a return to the former regime. 
Although the party increased its share of the vote among voters under 30 and the better 
educated from 1993 to 1995,1045 it has since lost that momentum and with at least 60 per cent of its 
voters being pensioners, the CPRF is very much the party of the old. The largest age group in the 
party is also those who are retired but whilst this section of the membership is generally considered 
(by interviewees for the fieldwork) to be quite passive, these older members will campaign actively 
for the party at election time and were considered by respondents to be the party’s greatest asset in 
this respect. There is, however, another aspect to the ageing membership of the CPRF as projections 
of the future population of Russia indicate a declining and ageing population and the proportion of 
elderly is projected to increase by 12 percent to 24.8 percent of the Russian population by 2015.1046 
The results of an ageing population will be greater pressure on the country’s pension system and a 
greater tax burden on the shrinking working-age population1047 which, all combined, may increase 
support for the CPRF if the party focuses on pensions and care for the elderly and if generational 
experiences do lead retiring Russians to support the CPRF, there is a potentially increasing number 
of voters for the party over the next few years.  
Younger voters for and members of the CPRF share the characteristic that both groups are 
very few in number. The commitment of younger members to the cause, however, is not in doubt 
and they provide an important alternative image of the party, even if it is one that is infrequently 
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seen. The younger members in the Komsomol play an important role in election campaigns, 
recruitment, raising awareness and encouraging youth participation in politics, although their degree 
of success is difficult to judge and the organisation is comparatively small. In St Petersburg and 
elsewhere, where the Komsomol was organised ‘from below’ as an organisation of young people 
rather than ‘from above’ as an organisation for young people (which has been the case in some 
regions), the organisation is actively campaigning for what its members see as a more just society. 
Whilst traditional campaign methods are still being used, the Komsomol is now turning to the 
internet to get its message across as television and radio stations are state controlled. Despite the 
discouragement of manipulated media and election results and the ‘unfashionable’ image of the 
CPRF, the members of the Komsomol are enthusiastically engaging in modern methods of 
communication and agitation to keep political debate alive, from the communist perspective, on the 
internet and on the streets when other forms of communication are censored. 
As has been shown, there is no majority in favour of a return to the past economic and 
political system which raises a problem for the party in that its name and policies are associated with 
a system that the majority of the electorate do not wish to see restored. The party needs to attract 
younger members to replace the older membership as older members die. Even if the Russian 
population is ageing the party still needs new intakes of pensioners to keep the membership at a 
level where the party is still able to campaign during elections. With restricted access to the media 
for parties the presidential administration wants to limit, door-to-door campaigning is still important 
for the party.  
 
THE FUTURE OF THE CPRF 
To what extent has the party changed? The acceptance amongst both leadership and 
membership of multi-party competitive elections, despite media bias against the communists, means 
that the CPRF has moved a long way from its revolutionary origins and full participation in 
elections by the CPRF was seen by all respondents for Chapter 5 as the only realistic option for 
regaining power. There was also an acceptance that any future communist state would have to be 
different from the USSR with a far greater degree of freedom for its citizens. When asked about the 
advantages and disadvantages of the old system, responses revealed that it was the security of the 
former economic system that members wished to see recreated, not the entire system itself with 
restrictions on freedoms. There was also an acceptance that times had changed and that party policy 
had to reflect this and that the attainment of communism was a very distant prospect indeed but an 
inevitable one, nevertheless. 
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While the adoption of patriotism has been popular with the electorate, the CPRF’s patriotism 
has not been enough for the party to retain, never mind extend its support. The party has clearly 
failed since its early electoral successes to move with the times and adapt its policies and tactics to 
deal with the changing political situation, in particular the adoption of patriotic rhetoric by United 
Russia and other parties. The CPRF has been unable to distinguish its brand of patriotism from those 
who have sought to copy the party or to discredit the patriotic stance taken by others. With the 
political space to its left already occupied by several small parties that fail to register a significant 
share of votes and the well-documented antipathy towards social democracy in Russia, especially 
among communists, it is unlikely that any move towards either the left or the centre would be 
successful for the party.  
Although the CPRF has suffered some recent setbacks the 2007 election, with new electoral 
rules, was predicted to benefit the CPRF. The new electoral rules for 2007 included all seats in the 
2007 election being elected from party lists alone, rather than the mixed system used in previous 
elections and the increase in the threshold for eligibility for seat allocation from five percent of the 
vote to seven percent, which was designed to exclude many minor parties from the distribution of 
seats with parties that clear the threshold gaining a larger share of the seats than the percentage of 
the vote they received, after minor parties have been excluded.1048 This was predicted to lead to an 
increase in parliamentary representation for the CPRF, however, the actual election results were: 
United Russia - 64.3 percent and 315 seats; the CPRF - 11.57 percent and 57 seats; the LDPR - 8.14 
percent and 40 seats and A Just Russia - 7.74 percent and 38 seats. This represented only a very 
minor gain for the CPRF and the party is challenging the results, which it claims are falsified. The 
share of the vote the party claims it should have received is ten percent higher than that declared in 
the offical results.1049  
There have been an increasing number of challenges to Zyuganov’s leadership with the most 
serious so far in 2004, after the party failed to win the Presidency for the third time. The party had at 
least recognised that Zyuganov could not win against Putin in 2004 and so offered the electorate a 
different candidate for the Presidential election thereby avoiding an overwhelming defeat for the 
present leader. Zyuganov did, however, stand in the 2008 Presidential election and although not 
competing directly against Putin, his main competitor, Dmitry Medvedev, who was always expected 
to win since his candidacy was endorsed by Putin. The fourth attempt to win the Presidency ended 
in predictable failure with Medvedev wining 70.28 of the vote and Zyuganov achieving the expected 
                                                 
1048
 www.russiavotes.org. 
1049
 RFE/RL Newsline, www.rferl.org/newsline, 10/12/07 and 05/12/07. 
 247
second place with 17.72 percent, according to official results, which the CPRF disputes.1050 Foreign 
media carried numerous reports of intentions to falsify the vote in both the parliamentary elections 
of 2007 and the Presidential election of 2008 involving pressure on public sector workers to vote for 
United Russia and then Medvedev and through the falsification of official turnout.1051 Although the 
deviation from democratic norms was considered to be considerable in both cases, this is not 
considered to have altered the outcomes of either election in terms of who won. However, since 
Zyuganov did not achieve even a close second place, whether according to the official results or the 
party’s own estimate of support, perhaps the party will finally replace him but even so, it is difficult 
to see how any new leader would be able to reposition the party to enable it to build stronger 
coalitions and extend its support. 
The ideology that inspired the October Revolution survives, popular with a small minority, 
but the successor to Lenin’s revolutionary party is no longer revolutionary and no longer really 
communist as it aims to ‘improve’ capitalism. While communism has not been abandonned 
altogether, it is now seen as a very distant future aim. Members appear to have accepted democratic 
elections but see the current ideology as a necessary compromise. The re-adoption of democratic 
centralism succeeded in uniting the party in its early years but external pressures and a failure to 
keep up with political developments have led to the recent splits and loss of support. The successor 
to the party that once aimed to bring about a worldwide, proletarian revolution now largely 
represents those who lost their status in society with the end of the CPSU, rather than the working 
class. 
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